Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument

1. Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument PHIL 2610 1st Term 2016

2. Final Paper

3. Private Languages

4. On Private Languages “But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences – his feeling, moods, and the rest – for his private use? – Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language?”

5. On Private Languages “But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language”

6. The Question As we saw, Wittgenstein believes that there are public criteria for uses of mental state expressions, like “he has a toothache”: for example, clutching one’s cheek and moaning. The question here is: can there be a language (game) which has only private criteria? A language where only one person in principle has access to the criteria?

7. Why It Matters

8. Why It Matters Lots of philosophy seems to assume that such a private language is possible, or even actual or necessary. If Wittgenstein is right, then many other philosophers are wrong.

9. Example 1: Locke’s Theory of Communication As we saw, Locke’s theory of communication works like this: • I have an idea in my head. • I wish to communicate this to you. • I have a word that I use as a “public sign” of my idea. • Hopefully, when you hear this word, you think the same idea.

10. Example 1: Locke’s Theory of Communication As we saw, Locke’s theory of communication works like this: • I have an idea in my head. • I wish to communicate this to you. • I have a word that I use as a “public sign” of my idea. • Hopefully, when you hear this word, you think the same idea.

11. Example 1: Locke’s Theory of Communication As we saw, Locke’s theory of communication works like this: • I have an idea in my head. • I wish to communicate this to you. • I have a word that I use as a “public sign” of my idea. • Hopefully, when you hear this word, you think the same idea. dog

12. Example 1: Locke’s Theory of Communication dog

13. Example 1: Locke’s Theory of Communication dog

14. Locke and Private Language Communication wasn’t very effective, for Locke. The thing to note is that on Locke’s view, I know perfectly what I mean by ‘dog’– but this is something that I cannot communicate to you, except only roughly and approximately. It’s a private-ish language.

15. Example #2: Russell’s Ideal Language • Wittgenstein’s mentor at Cambridge. • Wrote the introduction to Wittgenstein’s TractatusLogico-Philosophicus. • Had Locke-style “empiricist” views– like that all our ideas are derived from experience.

16. Example #2: Russell’s Ideal Language Russell made a fundamental distinction between what we know by acquaintance and what we know by description. For Russell, the only things we are acquainted with are 1. universals 2. sense-data and 3. (maybe) the self. Everything else is a logical construct.

17. Example #2: Russell’s Ideal Language “In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component. A language of that sort will be completely analytic, and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied.”

18. Example #2: Russell’s Ideal Language “A logically perfect language, if it could be constructed, would not only be intolerably prolix, but, as regards its vocabulary, would be very largely private to one speaker. That is to say, all the names that it would use would be private to that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker.”

19. Example #2: Russell’s Ideal Language A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with.

20. Example #2: Russell’s Ideal Language “One can use ‘this’ as a name to stand for a particular with which one is acquainted at the moment. We say ‘This is white’. … But if you try to apprehend the proposition that I am expressing when I say ‘This is white’, you cannot do it. If you mean this piece of chalk as a physical object, then you are not using a proper name. It is only when you use ‘this’ quite strictly, to stand for an actual object of sense [i.e., a sense-datum], that it is really a proper name. And in that it has a very odd property for a proper name, namely that it seldom means the same thing two moments running and does not mean the same thing to the speaker and to the hearer.”

21. The Private Language Argument

22. The Diary Case Wittgenstein approaches the question of whether a private language is possible by imagining a speaker who wants to privately name some sensation S, and then keep a diary about when he feels S. Can we make sense of what this person is doing?

23. The Diary Case Suppose that I have what I think is the same sensation on multiple occasions. Now I want a name for it (?). Wittgenstein points out that if I use a definition, then the name won’t be “private” in the relevant sense: others can learn it by learning the definition.

24. The Diary Case So he claims what I have to do is to inwardly point to the sensation (concentrate on it) and say “Let this sensation be called ‘S’!” This is called an “ostensive” definition. Wittgenstein now wants to know whether this can establish a criterion for the use of the word “S.”

25. Issues with Ostensive Definitions (From Sec. 33) “Suppose, however, someone were to object: ‘It is not true that you must already be a master of a language in order to understand an ostensive definition: all you need– of course!– is to know or guess what the person giving the explanation is pointing to. That is, whether for example to the shape of the object, or to its color, or to its number, and so on.’ “–And what does ‘pointing to the shape’, ‘pointing to the color’ consist in? Point to a piece of paper. –And now point to its shape– now its color– now its number (that sounds queer). –How did you do it?”

26. Issues with Ostensive Definitions Here, Wittgenstein is suggesting that a lot of appropriate context has to be in place for ostensive definitions to succeed. It’s one thing to ask: Which of these two different objects is being pointed at? It’s another entirely to ask: Which aspect of this one object is being pointed at?

27. Issues with Ostensive Definitions “When one says ‘He gave a name to his sensation’ one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense…”

28. Issues with Ostensive Definitions “And when we speak of someone’s having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word pain; it shows the post where the new word is stationed.”

29. Issues with Ostensive Definitions “‘I can (inwardly) undertake to call THIS “pain” in the future’ –‘But is it certain that you have undertaken it? Are you sure that it was enough for this purpose to concentrate your attention on your feeling?’ –A queer question.”

30. On the Need for a Criterion If you’re Saul Kripke or Hilary Putnam, objects and natural kinds have ‘essences’ that themselves provide external ‘criteria.’ An application of a name or a natural kind term might be wrong or right, regardless of how the community used the words in question.

31. On the Need for a Criterion For example, on the question whether whales are ‘fish’, it might not matter that everyone in the community thought they were and applied ‘fish’ to whales. The kind named ‘whale’ happens to not be of the same kind as that named ‘fish’, regardless of whether anyone knows it.

32. On the Need for a Criterion Wittgenstein, however, thought that there weren’t these objective essences. You can’t latch on to these objective ‘essences’, you had to be taught to “follow along” with a rule for calling things ‘fish’ and your ability to do so was largely dependent on the type of creature you were.

33. The Issue OK, but what’s exactly the problem with an ostensivelydefined term for a private state?

34. Criteria vs. Symptoms There are different ways of telling that a field goal has been scored in basketball: • Watching the scoreboard • Listening to the crowd • Hearing the announcer say “a field goal has been scored” • Seeing the ball go through the hoop.

35. “If a philosopher asks, ‘Why does the fact that the ball went through the basket show that a field goal has been scored?” a natural reply would be, “That is what the rules of the game say; that is the way the game is played

36. Criteria “Once we understand the rules for playing chess, the question whether a player has won when he has achieved checkmate cannot arise.”

37. Criteria The ball going through the hoop is criterial of a goal being scored. There is a logical or conceptual connection between the two.

38. The Diary Case What could NOW be the criterion by which you were able to judge that a certain sensation was the same one you named “S” to begin with? Thus far we’ve been worried that you can’t succeed in naming anything and maybe that’s supposed to be the objection.

39. The Diary Case But put that to the side: it seems the answer is: I remember the sensation I named before, and this is the same one.

40. Private Rule Following (Sec 202) “And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.”

41. The Diary Case How is remembering what you did before (seeming to remember!) any different from just believing it? You remember the sensation being like this and you use that criterion to apply “S”– but there is no further standard of correctness!

42. “As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.”

43. Kripkenstein

44. Kripkenstein One of the most influential “interpretations” of Wittgenstein’s private language argument is Saul Kripke in his book, “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.”

48. “Pattern Problems” http://barronstestprep.com/prep/sat/math/Logic-Problems/Pattern-Based-Problems.html%7Cpage1

49. Rule-Following What makes it true that you are following one rule, rather than a different one that is also compatible with what you’ve done so far?

50. Rule-Following Furthermore, how can we tell if you’ve made a mistake and are not following the rule you intended to?