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The Logical Arguments for Constitutional Democracy

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8 diapositives · 121 Views · Jan 07, 2020

Explore the methodological points of methodological individualism, catallactic model of politics, and normative implications for a society of free men. Delve into the tension between Buchanan and Tullock, social choice theory, veil of uncertainty construction, and fiscal structure. Analyze Buchanan's broader contributions and the importance of applying economic concepts to political theory. Discover how shared values impact coordination in society, and the significance of constitutions as coordinative institutions. Unpack the logical arguments for limited government in The Calculus of Consent without reliance on rights-speak.

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  1. The Logical Arguments for Constitutional Democracy Peter J. Boettke Econ 828/Fall 2005 17 October

  2. Main Methodological Points to Emphasize • Methodological Individualism • Catallactic Model of Politics • Normative Implications for a society of free men

  3. Buchanan More philosophical and subtle Subjectivism Men are not just rats Normative individualism Tullock Relies on observation to drive questions Homo-economicus Natural economist Normative bent is there, but not overt Tension Between Buchanan and Tullock

  4. The contribution to political philosophy and political economy • Social Choice Theory • Impossibility Theorem and its Import and Irrelevance • Decisions within Rules and Decisions over the rules • Veil of uncertainty construction • Costs of Decision Making • Unanimity principle • Externality principle • Bargaining within Politics • Log rolling, Pareto Improvements and Perversities • Fiscal Structure • Federalism and political competition (industrial organization of government)

  5. Central Diagram of the Calculus of Consent Cost Costs Decision Making Costs Externality Costs % of Agreement Voting Rule

  6. Buchanan’s Broader Contribution • 1986 Nobel Prize for the economic theory of politics • Buchanan as an ‘Austrian’ and ‘classical liberal’ • Buchanan and the rebirth of political economy

  7. Contract or Coordination: The Contribution of Russell Hardin • Coercion, Exchange, Coordination • Shared values are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for coordination in a complex society • “Liberalism, constitutionalism and democracy work for us because we are coordinated enough on various matters.” p. 17 • Conflicting nature of economic (practice in search of a theory) and political liberalism (theory in search of a practice) • Constitutions not as contracts, but as coordinative institutions which enable us to pursue mutual advantage and realize our interests (from Hobbes to Hume) http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/hardin/hardin_home.html

  8. Conclusion • The Calculus of Consent established more than any other book the usefulness of applying economic concepts to address questions in political theory and political science • The Calculus of Consent demonstrated that pursuing the logic of individual choice and the benefits of exchange model provided a coherent argument for limited government that did not rely on rights-speak