Anna Ohanyan , Ph.D., Associate Professor Stonehill College

1. Networked Regionalism as Conflict Management in Politically Divided Areas: the Balkans and the South Caucasus Anna Ohanyan, Ph.D., Associate Professor StonehillCollege Department of Political Science and International Studies Easton, MA 02357 USA Fulbright Scholar, Armenia, 2012-2013 aohanyan@stonehill.edu Presentation prepared for the European Geopolitics Forum, Brussels and Turkish Industry and Business Association, Brussels Anna Ohanyan

2. The (rather unscientific) starting point of this research In mid-1990s, in Armenia, holding a Turkish soap in my hands…. Anna Ohanyan

3. Broader conceptual puzzles • Economy – politics relationship • Economic pacifism: trade relationships are associated with peace and security; • Equitable trade promotes prosperity and reduces poverty; supports internationalism and helps to end wars; • Economy driving politics • Testing the merits of these assumptions in politically divided areas (PDAs). • Are the PDAs the rule or the exception when it comes to politics driving economic engagements? • Ethno-centric bias in IR theories; • Regional trade blocks in PDAs that (1) started out around non-economic and security related issues areas; (2) gradual and carefully cultivated regional arrangements that ultimately led to greater trade liberalization, as opposed to market forces pushing through boundaries, and shaping political outcomes. • Interviews reported in “On Money and Memory”, Conflict, Security and Development Anna Ohanyan

4. Regional arrangements in PDAs • Political solutions are not a precondition for cross-conflict engagements; • Politics drives the economy: • Changing organizational structures and identities in all regional organizations; • MERCOSUR – created to reduce tensions between Argentina and Brazil; • South African Development Community – initially built around regional security issues relative to apartheid in South Africa; • South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation - incremental approach to regional engagement around non-economic issues, and free trade arrangements developed later; • Association of South East Asian Nations – founded to promote regional political harmony, economic integration evolved subsequently as political tensions subsided. • Central American System of Cooperation – stimulated by regional solutions to conflicts; includes a Central American Parliament • African Union/Intergovernmental Authority on Development • Why are some regional arrangements more effective in realizing their conflict management potential than others? Anna Ohanyan

5. Policy Rationale • Protracted conflicts with high transaction costs and missed opportunities for development in the region; persistent poverty and high unemployment levels in the region; high levels of unemployment and poverty in all countries and non-recognized entities. • Unrealized regional potential • Regional competitiveness of PDAs is quite low • Weakened economies as individually they are too small to compete in the global economy, particularly Armenia and Georgia • Ineffective problem solving at a regional level; regional governance structures fragile and fragmented; • Environmental issues • Transnational criminality • Transportation routes • Public health • Lost opportunities on local community level development • Loss of FDI • Small and underutilized tourism industry Anna Ohanyan

6. Policy Rationale • Lack of security mechanisms; the existing stability is a result of a precarious and unregulated, dependent on the maintenance of the status quo; “home grown security arrangements” (anonymous respondent 2013) • Despite its strategic importance as a region, as an economic unit it falls behind increasingly organized regional economic units in South Asia, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, among others. • Regional trade blocs are on the rise worldwide; South Caucasus remains fragmented. • Persistent state weakness in the member countries of the regions; regions with closed border nourish authoritarianism (Richard Beilock), and visa a versa. • Instrumentalization of the conflict by the political elites in PDAs, both in the Balkans and South Caucasus. Anna Ohanyan

7. Research Objectives • To examine the way various kinds of regional cooperative structures influence conflict management processes on the ground; • How to maximize the conflict management potential of regional arrangements in PDAs? • The network approach: whether the types of ties matter for patterns of peace; not all regional models are born equal when it comes to their impact on conflict management and resolution processes. • “Clash of regionalisms”, more so in South Caucasus (Sakwa) Anna Ohanyan

8. Asking the right questions • Thinking about regions as existing structures to be discovered ; in this respect, PDAs do not fare well: “Balkans is not a region”; “South Caucasus is not a region”; “you cannot build a region on a khinkali” • Thinking about regions as deliberate processes to be activated. • Instead of asking a “product” question (“Is a given PDA a region?”), one needs to ask a “process” question (“To region or not to region”) • Subsequently, if “to region”, then what types of regionalism matters the most for catalyzing effective conflict management processes? Anna Ohanyan

9. Definitions • Regionalisation as a “largely uncoordinated consequence of private sector-led economic integration” (Beeson 2003, 253). • uncontrolled and unmediated efforts led by the private sector and civil society to achieve greater regional integration. • In PDAs, where intergovernmental links are weak or nonexistent, such regionalization efforts are likely to produce regional spaces that are fragmented and piecemeal. • Is built around real and realized material interests of organized stakeholders. • Is more organic and spontaneous than regionalism. • "Regionalism is a policy and project whereby states and nonstate actors cooperate and coordinate strategy ... to create an interlocking web of regional governance structures such as those already found in Europe." (Fawcett 2005). • Tool of institutional cooperation (Swanström 2002), whether in the form of preferential trade agreements or in the form of other types of institutional integration (Soesastro 1994). A • Structure for cooperation that is cultivated by internal or external actors (Hettne and Inotai 1994). • Institutionalized cooperation among states within a given region (Acharya and Johnston 2008; Swanström 2002). • In all of these perspectives, regionalism is a process strategically cultivated by political actors. Anna Ohanyan

10. Working definition of PDAs as regions in this study • A region in a PDA is a system of; • geographically proximate states with deep security and economic interdependencies; • relatively weak internal and strong external recognition of it as a distinctive area; • layer of international institutions engaged in state-building and region-building projects of various sorts. Such regions are characterized by: • weak cross-border interface, and yet are open to international actors for state-building purposes or are vulnerable to external power penetration; • weak internal governance/administrative structures and poorly consolidated democratic institutions; • states in a politically divided region have functional ties that are embryonic and uneven. • cooperation in “practical” and non-security areas is more pronounced than ties related to the security environment (Andreev 2009). • In short, the economic and political interdependencies realized at least by one state in the region, or an external power, is an important steppingstone toward greater regional integration. Anna Ohanyan

11. Regional Integration as Conflict Management • “It may be argued that institutionalization, including agency creation, is the true mechanism of post-conflict otherwise missing the classical model of conflict resolution. Institutionalist approaches to outcome creation constitute the principal difference between conventional and alternative models of conflict resolution. Regional integration by definition is just that – the progressive institutionalization of interdependence among participating states. it provides an extension to conflict resolution in a long-term perspective, suggesting that successful reconciliation is a process of mutual interest maximization, rather than a single-stream event of distributive settlement. By building on the integrative dynamic of conflict integration functions as a long-term post-settlement reconciliation strategy” (BoykaStefanova, 2006). • Towards building regional peace systems; • “Peace is a marathon, not a sprint” Anna Ohanyan

12. Definitions: PDAs as regions* • Regions are as dynamic constructs, effectively cultivated by internal or external action with the specific objective of enhanced security and peace in the region. • Regionalism in this framework becomes a policy initiative rather than just an analytical concept. • Regionalism as a CM strategy is a deliberate process of network cultivation across interest-based communities, with the intention of creating favorable conditions for compromises and peace agreements. Anna Ohanyan

13. Reasons behind poor regional integration in PDAs • Conflicts as the primary and most visible hurdle for regional integration • Geo-political overlay: Russia as the frequently cited obstacle against greater regional citizenship by the member states • “Clash of Regionalism” in the South Caucasus (Sakwa) • No institutional champion for regionalism in South Caucasus • Highly centralized states, which disempowers the local levels of government from seeking regional contacts with other countries • Weak administrative structures inside the states that can seek out and cultivate regional contacts for greater problem solving capacities • Poor regional transport infrastructure • Politicized economies and lack of consolidated democratic structures and cultures in PDAs • Weak civil societies and unorganized professional communities and stakeholders for regional cooperation • “Uni-colored political and economic systems” (GevorgTer-Gabrielyan, 2012) Anna Ohanyan

14. Limits of traditional CM infrastructure in PDAs* • CM and Peace Studies were rather revolutionary when introduced in 1960s and slowly spilling transforming themselves into concrete practical tools of inter-state and inter-community engagement • CM tools were alternative to traditional diplomacy: • Track Two Models were revolutionary because • Allowed to access new stakeholders • Provided new outlets for information processing between the conflict sides • Created structures for dialogue • Opened up the closed diplomatic circles relatively, by bringing in new voices into conflict management process • However, the current infrastructure of CM is poorly responsive to the contemporary characteristics of conflict both between as well as within states; • Strong sovereignty-bias; lack of acknowledgement of the deep structural domestic roots in foreign policies of countries and entities in conflict. Anna Ohanyan

15. Transcending traditional CM models through networked regionalism Traditional CM characteristics Regional networked CM characteristics Post-Westphalian Relatively open, but less choreographed and more unpredicatable Varied patterns of mobilization Heteropolar More responsive to domestic political developments in conflict countries Offers a broader and varied choice of possible solutions Greater opportunities for issue-linkages in the negotiation processes Long term process Interest maximization Governance-focused: statebuilding as well as region-building as a CM strategy • State-centric or Westphalian • Relatively closed, but more manageable by national authorities and external powers • Top down • Exclusive and uni-sectoral • Unresponsive to hybrid regimes in semi-democratic settings that fuel the conflict as a result • Offers a rather narrow choice of possible solutions • Single-stream event • Distributive settlement Anna Ohanyan

16. The Argument • Enhanced regional cooperation and building regional ties can serve as a conflict management strategy • Certain kind of regional engagement models are more conducive to and supportive of CM processes in a given PDA Anna Ohanyan

17. Growing enthusiasm for regional approaches to CM Anna Ohanyan

18. Regional Networked Peace Paradigm • Post-Westphalian; relaxed sovereignty bias in foreign aid structures, trade policies and third-party intervention regimes • Long-term approach, institutionalizing regionally cross-cutting networks between professional communities; • Opening new “frontlines” and frontiers in conflict management regimes : • De-politicizing the existing limited nature of cross-conflict engagements • Developing trans-governmental professional networks • Developing societal professional networks • Institutionalized both tracks of cross-conflict engagement: technical/technocratic/professional AND political; • To signal that expanded regional professional networks are not equivalent to diluting unresolved political issues; • Governance-focused: building governance capacities of conflict-states through trans-national, trans-governmental networks; creating concrete dividends for regional engagements. • Network features: top-down and bottom-up, highly institutionalized, highly heteropolar; stretched/centered, depending on the policy area. Anna Ohanyan

19. Limits and opportunities of regional networked peace paradigm • Can be erroneously perceived as a way to consolidate the status quo or a political outcome not favorable to a conflict side; • Ex: resistance of Azeri government to engage with Armenians until the NK conflict is solved; Abkhaz fear of being pulled back into Georgia; Armenian fear to engage with Turkey until Genocide recognition. • Political resistance by member states of the region - fear of external/regional powers; example, Georgia • Political resistance by member states of the region – fear of regional projects to further the interests of the initiating state: • Ex: Armenian fears of Turkish initiatives in regional cooperation in South Caucasus; Eurasian Union proposal for Armenia; Azeri suspicions of Russian and French membership in OSCE Minsk Group • The pull of “global” capitals and global trade flows; • Economic and political incentives • Creates space for tri-lateral engagements in cases when two conflict sides do not communicate; • Expands the menu of issues that can be discussed, creating opportunities of linkages during negotiation processes • By building trans-governmental networks, strengthens the problem-solving capacities of the nation-states • Softens the border discourse and border politics • Offers unique developmental opportunities across at a community level; micro-level regionalism Anna Ohanyan

20. Network attributes that matter for CM:patterns of network mobilization • Patterns of network mobilization • top-down versus bottom-up; • whether a given regional network is developed by the elites or has more organic and grassroots component • CM implications: elite-driven peace processes are vulnerable to the nature of political systems in conflict countries (democracies/authoritarian states) • Top-down processes lack the public legitimacy and complicate implementation: OSCE Minsk Group and NK conflict • Such network environments favor principled versus interest-based negotiation processes • Closed foreign policy processes vulnerable to great power interests • Such networks are purely political as opposed to developmental Anna Ohanyan

21. Network attributes that matter for CM:extent of institutional density • High/low • Refers to the quantity of the links and relationships between network members (Bohmelt 2009). • Higher density networks offsets the problem of isolated interventions that are characteristic to low density networks: • Isolated track two initiatives; projects with little added value for peace processes • Higher density network environment adds to their legitimacy and generates a momentum for engagement: ex., Turkish-Armenian unofficial engagement processes. • Higher density networks secure multiple access points to the conflict societies • higher-density networks create better institutional conditions for integration, coordination (Schnabel 2002; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011), and transfer effect among various conflict management initiatives. • Dense networks of cross-cutting ties are said to reduce the fallout from disagreements and can even serve preventative functions by creating an atmosphere more supportive of peace agreements, thereby enhancing the political will needed to achieve a resolution (Gawerc 2006). • High density creates multiple “peace pressure points” which serve as “force multipliers” by these networks (Der Derian2011) • High density network conditions diversify frontlines of conflict management. Anna Ohanyan

22. Network attributes that matter for CM: heteropolarity • Heteropolarity • Refers to the extent to which regional networks are pulled together by actors from variety of sectors, state and nonstate, connecting local, national, regional and global levels of governance • High heteropolarity creates opportunities for complementarities in efforts • Exposes the “time difference between economic and political globalization” (Goetschel 2000, 262). • Can address the existing disjuncture between territorially confined democratic political authority and the globalized practice of economic power (Goetschel 2000). Bringing together actors from various sectors in politics and economy, heteropolar regional networks create new institutional forums and forms of engagement at the regional level. These spaces offer unique opportunities for regionalized conflict management initiatives. • Helps to build democratic peacebuilding processes; ex of Northern Ireland Anna Ohanyan

23. Network attributes that matter for CM: degree of power concentration • Centered (high centrality) versus stretched (low centrality) networks; • centered networks are usually built around a single international or regional organization. • Members of a stretched network are poorly connected with one another, but also lack a single institutional hegemon that may monopolize the resource provisions in the network ; at the same time, the presence of an institutional hegemon can help to build coordination in efforts within the network • Centered networks tend to be developed by design and strategic planning; stretched networks tend to be developed by default and through spontaneous processes; • Centered networks are better positioned to address coordination problems • Centered networks are able to balance the opportunities for conflict management created by regional networked governance. Therefore, such networks are best equipped to address the problem of isolated initiatives. Anna Ohanyan

24. Regional Network Profile in the Balkans* • Patterns of network mobilization • Both top-down and bottom-up, albeit both types of networks are insufficiently connected with one another • Bottom-up business networks prevalent, driven by forces of Yugosphere • CEFTA as a framework to facilitate such bottom-up business contacts; • Agrokor’s regional approach to business development and its growth • Political top-down processes are networks are developed by the European Commission; Regional Cooperation Council plays a key role in bridging both types of networks Anna Ohanyan

25. Regional Network Profile in the Balkans* • Institutional density • Business networks are understandable highly institutionalized • In other spheres, comprehensive regional governance structures are still beyond reach, but significant steps to that end are undertaken • Justice and Home Affairs, and Security Areas, are perhaps among the most institutionalized network areas at a regional level • EU, NATO, REC and OSCE are among the central nodes in networks of cooperation in defense and intelligence cooperation • In 2011, the number of regional cooperation events were as follows: Economic and Social development area (63); Energy and Infrastructure (45), Justice and Home Affairs (48), Security Cooperation (37), Building Human Capital (26) and Parliamentary Cooperation (9), among others. Anna Ohanyan

26. Justice and Home Affairs Graph from IztokPrezelj Anna Ohanyan

27. Regional Network Profile in the Balkans: Heteropolarity* • Examples of heteropolar networks • Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe (NALAS) • South East Europe Regional Network for Qualifications Frameworks Anna Ohanyan

28. Regional Network Profile in the Balkans: power centers* • Stretched versus centered networks • Stretched - Central and South Eastern European Higher Education Institutions relating to the Life Science disciplines (agriculture, food, biotechnology, natural resources, rural development and the environment) (CASEE). Anna Ohanyan

29. General patterns of networked regionalism in the Balkans Anna Ohanyan

30. Regional Cooperation Council: networked organization • RCC as a networked organizationas well as a network development instrument in the Balkans • As a networked organization, RCC • Has top-down patterns of development • Is highly institutionalized, with relatively dense links to international organizations and EU structures as well as to national administrations • Is relatively heteropolar: it enjoys access to public as well as private sectors, with international financial institutions • Is a stretched network: sources of policy initiatives as well as funding are rather diverse • As a networked organization, RCC is an institutional hegemon; it enjoys a certain degree of autonomy from donors and beneficiaries; it is a “status neutral” organization Anna Ohanyan

31. Regional Cooperation Council: regional network development instrument /region-building mechanism • RCC as a mechanism of region-building • Both top-down and bottom-up; intermediating role between the grassroots and the government • Challenges that assumption that an inter-governmental agreement easily translates into outcomes – the devil is in the detail; “guerilla fighter” in region-building; • The current state of regional initiatives as created and facilitated by RCC in terms of their institutional density can be described as moderate. • Overall, RCC has created a substantial “corpus” of regional initiatives, but in the words of Minic (2012), Biservic (2012) and Cucu (2012) there is a need to consolidate the existing institutional infrastructure of regional cooperation. Minic maintains that the instruments, mechanisms, projects and programs of regional cooperation have been set up, but that they are fragile (2012). “They have to be nurtured. Lot of care and commitment is needed to consolidate all of those, the established structures” (Minic 2012). “Vibrations of regional cooperation” need to be consolidated to structures of regional governance (Bisevic 2012) • High levels of heteropolarity in RCC developed networks: example, developing the Social Agenda for the West Balkans; building a heteropolar network to win EC support • DPC varies from one policy issue area to the next. Anna Ohanyan

32. Basic comparison of network regionalism in the Balkans and South Caucasus Anna Ohanyan

33. South Caucasus regional profile • South Caucasus: the “failed region” or “collection of weak states”? • South Caucasus as a pronounced regional security complex rather than a regional security order • Security interdependence largely due to geographic proximity; the eruption of conflict between Georgia and Russia can potentially create serious economic hardships in Armenia; Armenia’s dependence on Georgia for transit routes for energy and transportation; • Proliferation of dual use technology, narcotics, criminal networks; • Public health threats and high possibility of regional proliferation • Environmental degradation as a regional issue • Internal security threats, in terms of weak democratic institutions and poor governance; politicization of the conflicts for domestic political purposes by politicians. Anna Ohanyan

34. Regional Network Profile in South Caucasus • Patterns of mobilization • Case of state-led and “hard” regionalism; driven by state actors; • Top-down patterns of mobilization within politics, elite-driven regional networks; • Dominance and monopoly OSCE Minsk Group in the NK peace processes and Geneva Talks • Peace processes as driven by national elites: negative regional autonomy; the failure of the OSCE Minsk Group for NK conflict to steer the process; • Limited functions for OSCE: keep the Azeris at the table and prevent the reactivation of existing conflict fault lines; a forum to engage with Russians; • Limited number of non-state actors in maintaining a relatively basic infrastructure of Second Track diplomacy • Eurasia Partnership Foundation • Conciliation Resources • Safer World • Alliance for Conflict Transformation • International Alert “In terms of diplomacy, we are back to basics. The peace process is no longer focused on the status of NK or conflict resolution. It is much more basic, it is conflict management. But it is still a progress because prior to it there was nothing” (Richard Giragosian 2012, personal interview) Anna Ohanyan

35. Regional Network Profile in South Caucasus • Institutional density • Even the top-down networks that have been in operation for quite some time, have very low levels of institutional density; • Ex., meetings between Armenian and Azeri governmental officials are very infrequent, which contributes to lack of accountability of their relationships between one another. • Infrequent meetings feed into unstable relationships and bellicose rhetoric between the heads of states and other high-ranking politicians (Bisevic 2012, personal interview) • Lack of semi-flexible and semi-formal structure short of full institutionalization • Non-state actor contacts are also few in number, and poorly institutionalized; • Lack of institutional sustainable and funding shortages is problematic • Caucasus Forum, one of the few truly regional, multilateral initiatives, originally funded by International Alert, reduced its operation primarily due to the luck of funding • Caucasus Business Network/International Alert also a truly regional initiative– subject of future research Anna Ohanyan

36. Regional Network Profile in South Caucasus • Heteropolarity • Levels are very low; track two events run parallel from the track one; • Sectoralrepresentation has not been diverse; • No institutionalized contacts between basic and primitive track two events and formal negotiation channels or governmental structures • Track two events that have occurred to date have been singular; the problem of isolated interventions is high. • Absence of vibrant trans-governmental networks observed in the Balkan is particularly glaring in South Caucasus • Declining number of track two events since 2008 (GevorgTerGabrielyan; GulshanPashayeva) Anna Ohanyan

37. Regional Network Profile in South Caucasus • Power centers • Non-state actor initiatives lack the institutionalized roots, and do not have the public visibility in their respective societies; in short, they have almost no political power of their own; • Organizational resources – diffused and spread out; no institutional hegemon to coordinate efforts • Financial power centers are mostly outside, in terms of their funding sources of Track Two events. Various bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors are funding civil society initiatives of Track Two engagement; British government and the EU are the dominant supporters of Track Two events. • Financial resources – more concentrated, UK and EU; • Political resources: OSCE Minsk Group, while facing criticism for lack of outcomes, is one of the main political centers of the mediation regime around NK. Anna Ohanyan

38. Regional networked peace paradigm* • Consolidation of “regional vibrations of co-operations” in PDAs • Macro-level: • Legitimate liberal state (democratic peace theory) • Relaxing the sovereignty-bias of donor institutions; developing regional aid strategies • Meso-level: • Inter-mediating institutions and mechanisms of region-building; RCC for South Caucasus • Trans-governmental networks with high institutional density and heteropolarity • Diversified and sectorallyheteropolar donor structures • Micro-level: • Strong local levels of governance; de-centralization of states • Developing professional communities Anna Ohanyan

39. Policy Implications for South Caucasus • Promoting 3+3 regional models (states and non-recognized territories, status-neutral method) • Opening up a new, technocratic/professional, frontline of conflict management, distinct from OSCE Minsk Group’s political avenue • Cultivating trans-governmental networks (statebuilding with region-building) • Inter-mediating regional agency to activate mostly latent regional stakeholders • Acknowledging the state weaknesses as a serious drawback to regional conflict management efforts • Poor local governance within highly centralized states • Weak civil societies and a lack of professional associations that could serve as seeds for regionally cross-cutting and pragmatic networks • Statebuilding in tandem with region-building efforts • Change of the donor structures and aid packages to reflect genuinely regional approaches to CM Anna Ohanyan

40. Policy Implications for Regional Networked Peace Paradigm in South Caucasus • Institutional possibilities: champions for the region? • Home-grown regional integration/cooperation is not likely at the moment, contrary to other PDAs, reviewed earlier. • Russia’s models (Eurasian Union) as well as Turkey’s (Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform) are politically driven and un-organic; they are top-down, and to date, lack technical/pragmatic dimension that is characteristic to EU models of regional orders; • Georgia, the potential local champion for regionalism: does not want the role, is fearful of Russia, and may generate resistance from Abkhazia and Ossetia; it is emerging as a de facto regional center for many transnational firms and donor agencies • EU models build on interests and are promising in terms of nurturing organic ties, but they are poorly developed in respect to CM dynamics • Eastern Partnership 2G: Status-neutral regional intermediating organization can be established, within the framework of Eastern Partnerships. • OSCE offices in each country can be connected with OSCE Minsk Group; • BSEC capacities can be enhanced so it is better positioned to cultivate trans-governmental networks Anna Ohanyan

41. Policy Implications for Regional Networked Peace Paradigm in South Caucasus • Eastern Partnership 2G • “the growth in the influence of the EU in the area could be highly positive, but only if it is decoupled from global geopolitical agendas and instead focuses on what the EU was originally established to achieve - to rid Europe of the scourge of war” (Sakwa, 472). • EU has a long and deep tradition of cultivating networks and working through network governance. • Already has moved the Eastern Partnership Politically, frustrated Russia, but did little to invite any serious backlash from the latter. So let’s keep going! • Lack of EU membership on offer as a carrot is not as big of a hurdle to foster regional engagement in South Caucasus as many think. • The existing political elites look toward Europe for legitimacy; this may be enough of an incentive to advance regional engagement by Europe. • Two main assets of EU engagement in the South Caucasus: it is value-driven and technical; it can also foster “status-neutral” model of engagement in the region, to invite greater support by all parties in the region. • Has a strong state-building component; addresses domestic sources of conflicts in the region. Anna Ohanyan

42. Policy Implications for Regional Networked Peace Paradigm in South Caucasus • Eastern Partnership 2G • Institutional hegemon in the region: • Field-presence • Multi-national and a large team of technical and professional expert, largely driven from the field • Building bridges to variety of sectors as well as levels of governance (local, national and regional) • Streamlining the donor funding through this agency for better coordination and more surgically precise impact on the ground • Distinct from EU Delegations present in the region • Clearly defined and negotiated regional development goals, with all state and minorities in the region • Similar models: European Agency for Reconstruction (closed and transferred its portfolio to EU Delegations) and Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (closed and transferred its portfolio to RCC, with greater regional ownership). Anna Ohanyan

43. Policy Implications for Regional Networked Peace Paradigm in South Caucasus • Importing RCC to South Caucasus • Regional ownership • Institution inter-mediating between the civil society and the governments at a regional level • Network development from ground-up; Security and Justice and Home Affairs, cooperation around the environment, as possible starting points: ideally, pulling in Russia into such an initiative, for example, around working regionally to assist Russia in organizing safe Winter Olympics in Sochi. • OSCE Mink Group 2G • OSCE Minsk Group is a top-down, institutionally sparse and uni-sectoral network. Changing its network characteristics • Building bridges with OSCE country offices; creating an interface with Track Two efforts in the region • Offering developmental programs that can “transfer down” Track Two initiatives to the grassroots; • Creating a semi-institutionalized mechanisms for more frequent meetings and cooperation between the heads of states from Armenia and Azerbaijan • BSEC: strengthening its CM capacities; more emphasis on fostering regional trade within South Caucasus; greater trans-governmental contacts at a regional level. Anna Ohanyan