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Trellis: Privilege Separation for Multi-User Applications Made Easy

NEU SECLAB. Trellis: Privilege Separation for Multi-User Applications Made Easy. Andrea Mambretti. Kaan Onarlioglu , Collin Mulliner , William Robertson, Engin Kirda Northeastern University. Federico Maggi, Stefano Zanero Politecnico di Milano. Unsolved Problem?.

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Trellis: Privilege Separation for Multi-User Applications Made Easy

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  1. NEU SECLAB Trellis: Privilege Separation for Multi-User ApplicationsMade Easy Andrea Mambretti KaanOnarlioglu, Collin Mulliner, William Robertson, EnginKirda Northeastern University Federico Maggi, Stefano Zanero Politecnico di Milano

  2. Unsolved Problem? Secunia review 2015 – Vulnerabilities in the 5 Most Popular Browser

  3. NEU SECLAB Privilege Escalation “more” Priv “less” Priv Exploit Vuln Attacker Code (e.g. ssh server)

  4. Current Mitigations

  5. NEU SECLAB GEM [Mulliner(2014)] Multi-User Applications? Behind the scenes voidnew_article() { /* Not for test1 user */ article=gettext(); record(article); } Button used for Access Control Button used for Access Control

  6. NEU SECLAB Threat Model Logic vulnerability • Enforcing the access to new_article() using the GUI • (e.g., disabling the button) Button used for Access Control Memory corruption vulnerability • Exploit “test1” available functions and hijack the control flow to new_article()

  7. NEU SECLAB Previous Work - Privtrans Application Monitor UNPRIV Privtrans RPC Library PRIV Privtrans UNPRIV PrivUnPriv Slave D. Brumley, and D. Song. USENIX Security ’04

  8. Previous Work - Limitations Does not support multiple roles IPC overhead Physical application partitioning

  9. Trellis Approach Trellis-aware Application Application R. 1 R. 4 R. 2 R. 3 R. 3 R. 2 Trellis R. 2 R. 4 R.1 R. 1 Annotations Application Preparation

  10. Trellis Approach Trellis-aware Application Trellis-aware Application R. 4 R. 4 R. 3 R. 3 Trellis Role Change R. 2 R. 2 R. 1 R. 1 Runtime

  11. Trellis Contributions OS-based application development framework for multi-user application to enforce Hierarchical-Base Access Control policies (HBAC) Prototype implementation based on LLVM/Clang, GNU C Library, and the Linux Kernel Real-world application evaluation

  12. Implementation Partially Annotated Code Instrumented Annotated Code Annotation Propagation Syscall Insertion and Error Handler Code & Data Partitioning Fully Annotated Code Privilege Separated Code Binary Preparation

  13. Implementation Fun_1 Role:3 Fun_2 Role:5 Fun_1 Role:3 Fun_2 Role:5 Callers Fun_3 Role:None Fun_3 Role:3 Callee Input Output

  14. Implementation Partially Annotated Code Instrumented Annotated Code Annotation Propagation Syscall Insertion and Error Handler Code & Data Partitioning Fully Annotated Code Privilege Separated Code Binary Preparation

  15. Implementation Authentication Mechanism Trellis-aware Application OS start_auth(3) prompt_user_request(3) R. 6 R. 5 cred = read_input() R. 4 Fun_A R. 3 R. 2 verify(cred) if (auth(3)) { Fun_A() } else error_handler() lock(1) R. 1 unlock(3) Fun_A() lock(1)

  16. Implementation Partially Annotated Code Instrumented Annotated Code Annotation Propagation Syscall Insertion and Error Handler Code & Data Partitioning Fully Annotated Code Privilege Separated Code Binary Preparation

  17. Implementation Trellis-aware App on disk Trellis-aware App in memory fun_1 : role 1 fun_2 : role 1 gv_1 : role 1 fun_1 : role 1 fun_2 : role 1 gv_1 : role 1 fun_3 : role 2 gv_3 : role 3 fun_4 : role 4 fun_1 : role 1 fun_2 : role 1 gv_1 : role 1 fun_3 : role 2 gv_2 : role 3 fun_4 : role 4 Memory page alignment fun_3 : role 2 gv_2 : role 3 fun_4 : role 4 Without Partitioning With Partitioning

  18. Implementation - Runtime Remove accessprivileges for memory segments containing non-accessible roles PAM-based Authentication during application role switching Custom program loader to initialize the metadata in kernel-space Multi-heap page-basedAllocator for protecting dynamic allocated data

  19. Implementation trellis_alloc(size,role) ……… heap_2 heap_4 heap_n heap_3 heap_1 List of heaps, each for one role 1 Page 2 Pages List of chunks of page size

  20. Evaluation

  21. Evaluation Micro-Benchmarks End-to-end Performance Developer Effort Security Experiments

  22. Evaluation

  23. Discussion and Future works Binary privilege separation Just-in-time compiler support Indirect function call analysis integration Data declassification

  24. Conclusions OS-based application development framework for multi-user application to enforce Hierarchical-Base Access Control policies (HBAC) Prototype implementation based on LLVM/Clang, GNU C Library, and the Linux Kernel Real-world application evaluation Trellis is now open-source and available at https://github.com/m4mbr3/trellis.git

  25. Questions?

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