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George Mason School of Law

George Mason School of Law. Contracts I Paternalism III F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu. Next day. Fraud. Does Akrasia argue for paternalism?. The akratic might wish for laws that address their weakness of will. Can you think of examples?. Does Akrasia argue for paternalism?.

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George Mason School of Law

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  1. George Mason School of Law Contracts I Paternalism III F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

  2. Next day • Fraud

  3. Does Akrasia argue for paternalism? • The akratic might wish for laws that address their weakness of will. • Can you think of examples?

  4. Does Akrasia argue for paternalism? • The akratic might wish for laws that address their weakness of will. • Can you think of examples? • Restrictions on drugs and alcohol • Tax laws that favor savings • Tax laws that favor health plans

  5. The Counter-arguments1. Bad Faith

  6. The Counter-arguments2. The state’s informational problem • The State might easily get it wrong • How do we know the subject’s deep preferences?

  7. The Counter-arguments2. The state’s informational problem • The State might easily get it wrong • The paternalist’s biases

  8. The Counter-arguments2. The state’s informational problem • The State might easily get it wrong • A reversal of preferences does not imply akrasia.

  9. The Counter-arguments2. The state’s informational problem • The State might easily get it wrong: • Is addiction per se bad? Might it ever make sense ex ante to become an addict?

  10. Gary Becker: Rational and irrational addiction Utility Preferences for commodities over time Time 0 Addiction: the more you consume, The more you want Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (1996)

  11. Gary Becker: Rational and irrational addiction Over time the preference for classical music increases —but this is a benign addiction Utility classical music B A Time 0 Subject suffers from “withdrawal” if music taken away from him Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (1996)

  12. Gary Becker: Rational and irrational addiction Utility classical music B A Time 0 C coffee Unlike classical music, there comes a time when the subject would like to stop drinking coffee. Though he finds he cannot do so, his ex ante decision to start drinking coffee is still rational

  13. Gary Becker: Rational and irrational addiction Utility classical music B A Time 0 C coffee D hard drugs Ex ante, the decision to start taking hard drugs is irrational

  14. The Counter-arguments • Can the state distinguish between rational and irrational addiction? • Just how would you categorize the taste for the following: • Tobacco • Ice cream • Lotteries

  15. The Counter-arguments3. Self-help • If we might be weak-willed, can we address the problem without the help of legal barriers? • Social sanctions • Self-binding

  16. The Counter-argumentsSelf-binding as a response to akrasia Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (1984)

  17. Examples of self-binding • Marriage • Home purchases

  18. The Counter-arguments4. The value of autonomy • Even if autonomy is merely a means, things can matter as means. • The abstract value of freedom • Autonomy strengthens self-control

  19. Paternalism and Perfectionism • Paternalism: Interfere with personal choices to make subject better off

  20. Paternalism and Perfectionism • Paternalism: Interfere with personal choices to make subject better off • Perfectionism: Interfere with personal choices to promote a moral goal • Note how these might overlap

  21. Impugning Individual Choice Perfectionism Paternalism The Paternalist seeks to make the subject better off, while the Perfectionist would vindicate a moral goal.

  22. Impugning Individual Choice Perfectionism Paternalism These overlap when making a person better off vindicates a moral goal

  23. Impugning Individual Choice Perfectionism Paternalism And that will happen when the subject would not choose well for himself because his preferences are immoral.

  24. Impugning Individual ChoiceTwo kinds of paternalism • Soft Paternalism overrules personal choices in order to satisfy subject’s deepest preferences, without advancing a moral goal • E.g. Morally neutral judgment biases

  25. Impugning Individual ChoiceTwo kinds of paternalism • Soft Paternalism overrules personal choices in order to satisfy subject’s deepest preferences, without advancing a moral goal • E.g. Morally neutral judgment biases • Hard Paternalism overrules personal choices when the subject’s deepest preferences are immoral and “he doesn’t know what’s good for him”

  26. Impugning Individual Choice:Varieties of Paternalism Soft Paternalism (neutral preferences) Perfectionism Hard Paternalism (immoral preferences)

  27. Varieties of Perfectionism • The Social Perfectionist does not seek to make the subject better off, but only those he might influence • And thus is not a paternalist

  28. Varieties of Perfectionism Private Perfectionism (Hard Paternalism) Social Perfectionism Soft Paternalism The private perfectionist is a paternalist, but not the social perfectionist

  29. George Mason School of Law Contracts I Duress F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

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