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U.S. North Korean Nuclear Armament Dispute

U.S. North Korean Nuclear Armament Dispute. March 12, 1993. North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) in three months. Don’t threaten to withdraw from NPT. Threaten to withdraw from NPT. October 21, 1994.

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U.S. North Korean Nuclear Armament Dispute

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  1. U.S. North Korean Nuclear Armament Dispute

  2. March 12, 1993 • North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) in three months.

  3. Don’t threaten to withdraw from NPT Threaten to withdraw from NPT

  4. October 21, 1994 • The U.S. and North Korea conclude negotiations by adopting the “Agreed Framework.” • North Korea agrees to freeze and eventually eliminate its Nuclear facilities in exchange for two Light Water Reactors and annual shipments of fuel from the U.S.

  5. Do Nothing Use Limited Force Go to War Negotiate

  6. Agree, Comply Agree, Don’t Comply Disagree, Comply Disagree, Don’t Comply

  7. October 16, 2002 • Pyongyang admitted to having a uranium enriching program after a visit by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher to North Korea. • Soon after discovering this tensions between the U.S. and North Korea began to rise.

  8. Inspect Don’t Inspect Find Inspect N Don’t Find Don’t Inspect

  9. December 12, 2002 • North Korea exits the “Agreed Framework” and reopens its frozen nuclear facilities. All inspectors are banned from the country. • The U.S. began talks with North Korea soon after in an effort to resolve the conflict.

  10. Do Nothing Use Limited Force Go to War Negotiate New Terms

  11. Partake in Negotiations, give their terms Refuse to Negotiate

  12. Accept Terms Reject Terms

  13. October 9, 2006 • After failed negotiations the North Korean Government detonated a test nuclear bomb. • The Blast was measured at 1 kiloton with some radioactive output. Overall many considered the test to be a failure as the blast was considered minimal.

  14. Threaten by Nuclear Tests Don’t Threaten

  15. Subgame - Sanctions NK/US IN,NO IN,LI IN,LV IN,SA NI,NO NI,LI NI,IV NI,SA AG,NC AG,CO NG,NC NG,CO

  16. NE for Subgame - Sanction SGNE: Pure > (AGNC, INNO) => $(39.5, 24.3); (AGNC, INLI) => $(39.5, 24.3); (AGNC, INIV) => $(39.5, 24.3); & (AGNC, INSA) => $(39.5, 24.3) Mixed >None AG,NC is strongly dominant for North Korea.

  17. Subgame - No Response

  18. NE for Subgame – No Response SGNE: Pure >(AGNC, INLI) => $(36.9, 26.3); (AGNC, INIV) => $(36.9, 26.3); (AGNC, INSA) => $(36.9, 26.3) Mixed > (AGNC, 269/280INNO + 11/280INLI) => $(36.9, 26.3); (AGNC, 279/290INNO + 11/290INIV) => $(36.9, 26.3); & (AGNC, 139/150INNO + 11/150INSA) => $(36.9, 26.3) • These mixed strategies are trivial as they all lead to the same payoff; and in the context of the rest of the game tree, sanctions (the SA portion of INSA) is the only (sub)strategy that is a Nash equilibrium in all other sub-games, i.e. it is subgame perfect, whereas INLI, INIV, and INNO are not.

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