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Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis. Econ 737.01 April 14, 2011. Outline. I. Introduction II. Example III. Costs IV. Benefits. I. Introduction. How do you determine the appropriate approaches to testing, treatments, etc.? For HIV (Elgar Ch. 44):

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Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

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  1. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Econ 737.01 April 14, 2011

  2. Outline • I. Introduction • II. Example • III. Costs • IV. Benefits

  3. I. Introduction • How do you determine the appropriate approaches to testing, treatments, etc.? • For HIV (Elgar Ch. 44): • Which antiretroviral drug regimen should be offered? • What criterion should be used for starting antiretroviral therapy? • What tests should be used to monitor patients before and after antiretroviral treatment? • Should a second line of treatment be offered if necessary?

  4. I. Introduction • Cost-benefit analysis is typically used to guide decisions in economics, but applying it to health care would put us in the morally sticky situation of explicitly placing a dollar value on a year of life. • Cost-effectiveness is the somewhat more politically correct alternative. • 1) Compute dollars required to save each year (or quality-adjusted year (QALY)) of life • 2) Accept treatment if $/year is below a given threshold. • Determining the threshold still involves implicitly placing a $ value on a year of life, but it’s somewhat more palatable.

  5. I. Introduction • We can’t just “let the market decide” because of all the market failures involved with health care (imperfect information, moral hazard, etc.). • Shouldn’t we just use the approaches that work the best? Not necessarily – as economists, we care about utility, not just health. • Who would care about whether a treatment is “cost-effective”? • Patients (if they’re paying) • Doctors (are they health maximizers, patient utility maximizers, or social welfare maximizers?) • Insurance companies (they can structure coverage to incentivize cost-effective treatments) • Government (same; they have budgets to worry about)

  6. I. Introduction • Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio: ratio of changes in costs to changes in benefits if we switch from a “default” treatment to a new treatment • C1: net present value of total lifetime costs of new treatment • C0: net present value of total lifetime costs of default treatment • E1: effectiveness of new treatment, measured in (discounted) life years or QALYs gained • E0: effectiveness of default treatment • Average cost-effectiveness ratio: special case where C0 and E0 are assumed to be zero • Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is what’s typically used, since for most conditions there is already some available treatment.

  7. II. Example (from Elgar) • We are in charge of a country’s health system. We have $6 million to allocate, and 11 programs to choose from. (See Table 44.2.) • “Shopping spree” approach: Order them by average cost-effectiveness, then pick them until budget is exhausted (Table 44.3). • We end up funding programs E, A, B, I, F, C, D, and K.

  8. II. Example • Now four new (mutually exclusive) programs are developed for a particular condition (Table 44.4). • Should we divert resources from one of the currently funded programs to make room for one of the new ones? • Start with the cheapest option M1. It’s C/E ratio $1250 is lower than the C/E ratio for the worst program that made the cut ($5500 for K). So, M1 would indeed be funded.

  9. II. Example • Now, compute incremental C/E ratios for each of the remaining options and see if any are better than the cheapest option. • M2: Incremental C/E ratio for M2 relative to M1 is $5000, which is less than the threshold of $5500 so switch to M2. • M3: Incremental C/E ratio is $15000>$5500, so no. • M4: Drop M3 from the table and compute incremental C/E ratio for M4 relative to M2 (Table 44.5). C/E ratio is $6000>$5500 so no.

  10. II. Example • Weak dominance: M3 is “weakly dominated” because the incremental C/E ratio for M4 relative to M3 is smaller than the incremental C/E ratio for M3 relative to M2. This means there is no threshold for which we would ever pick M3. • Strict dominance: Suppose we had another option that cost $200,000 and produced 25 QALYs. This would be “strictly dominated” because M2 costs less and produces more QALYs. • We can express each incremental move among the Ms as part of the larger table (Table 44.6).

  11. II. Example • Key assumptions • Fixed budget determines threshold. How would you determine threshold otherwise? (Economists have started using utility maximization to do this.) • Budgets are often period-specific, not based on net present values over a long time horizon • Predictable utilization • Independence of programs • Divisibility (can spend whatever’s left over on the marginal option) • Costs and benefits can be accurately measured

  12. III. Costs • Costs are generally considered more straightforward to measure than benefits. • Do you use marginal costs, average costs, or prices? • These can be very different … for instance, with pharmaceuticals fixed costs are huge (R&D), marginal costs are small, and price is well above marginal cost. • Often price is used in this case, but this ignores producer surplus.

  13. IV. Benefits • Issues: • Defining the health states • Assigning probabilities to the health states • Assigning utilities to the health states • Fi=probability person is still alive at age i • δ=time discount factor • qi:=Expected value of preference weight at age i; 1 indicates perfect health, 0 death, between 0 and 1 alive but imperfect health

  14. IV. Benefits • Survival probabilities • Experimental data: usually limited to short (<5 years) follow-up periods, extrapolation necessary • Observational data: endogeneity concerns • Preference weights • Source of considerable uncertainty • How do you deal with heterogeneity in preferences? • Given difficulties estimating key parameters, sensitivity analysis is crucial

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