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RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON

IN LIGHT OF THE UN TRIBUNAL INDICTMENT. RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON. TABLE OF CONTENTS. Recent Events. SUMMARY. Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 1/12: Ministers Resign and Collapse of Hariri’s Government Government Formation Process. After Hariri’s Murder The Judicial Process

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RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON

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  1. IN LIGHT OF THE UN TRIBUNAL INDICTMENT RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON

  2. TABLE OF CONTENTS Recent Events SUMMARY Special Tribunal for Lebanon 1/12: Ministers Resign and Collapse of Hariri’s Government Government Formation Process After Hariri’s Murder The Judicial Process Reactions to STL BACKGROUND INFORMATION Lebanon Politics Lebanon Background Hizballah’s Threats Governmental Regime Political Trends Political Camps External Actors Overview of Hizbullah Hizbullah’s Military Aspects A Threat to Lebanon A Threat to Israel A Threat to the Region Map and Statistics History of Main Events 1920-2010 Internal Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the Present Social and Demographic Characteristics

  3. SUMMARY Focal Points • The fall of PM Saad Hariri’s government, and the growing tensions over the preliminary indictments of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, have provoked fears of regional destabilizationand renewed sectarian violence in Lebanon. • Hizbullah, strongly backed by a Syria and Iran striving to deepen their influence in Lebanon, acts aggressively against state institutions and political opponents to advance its interests, thus challenging Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence. • The present crisis highlights the increasing “Hizbullazation” of Lebanon. Hizbullah continues to advance its goals, gain legitimacy and strengthen its political basis. For the first time since “The Cedar Revolution” (2005), Syria and Hizbullah have managed to attain political dominance. • Hizbullah’smilitaristic abilities and forces now largely surpass its 2006, pre-Second Lebanon War levels. The international acceptance of this trend has rendered Hizbullah confident of its power and its right to use it, despite its status as an illegal non-state terrorist entity. • A radical government led by Hizbullah will have a major effect on national issues (government policy, “Defense Strategy”, internal security, UNIFIL’s mission, STL), constituting strategic challenges, not only for Lebanon and Israel, but for the entire region.

  4. RECENT EVENTS Ministers Resign and Collapse of Hariri’s Government On 12 January 2011, 11 Lebanese ministers withdrew from the National Unity Government headed by SaadHariri. The government immediately dissolved due to the lack of support from the Lebanese Parliament. Of those 11 ministers (including the Foreign Affairs, Energy, Communications, Industry and Tourism ministers), 10 are members of the “March 8” political camp lead by Hizbullah. The other minister is a presidential appointee who publicly identifies with Hizbullah. This new crisis in the Lebanese political arena follows the failure between Saad Hariri’s and Hizbullah’s coalitions to come to a comprise regarding the outcome of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL, charged with investigating the assassination of Rafik Hariri),despite mediation attempts by Syria and Saudi Arabia to reach a deal concerning the reaction to the tribunal indictments.

  5. RECENT EVENTS Government Formation Process After the Hariri government has collapsed, the current administration is considered temporary. The President (Michelle Suleiman) is required to build a new government within 30 days by electing a (Sunni) Prime Minister with the approval of Parliament. In the past weeks, both the “March 8” and “March 14” alliances have tried to convince external parties to support them in their attempts to achieve a majority in the Parliament (they need at least 65 of the 128 members). Druze leader WalidJumblatt’s support for the “March 8” alliance could be decisive in promoting the formation of a new government more closely related to Hizbullah.

  6. RECENT EVENTS Government Formation Process The events of the past few days, and the announcement that Hizbollah has obtained a majority in the Parliament to elect the Sunni millionaire NajibMiqati as the next prime minister (as a consequence of Syrian moves), demonstrate the plausibility of a government established by Hizbollah. The “March 14” Alliance has expressed its refusal to participate in a Syrian-Iranian “puppet” government. Employing martial rhetoric, proponents of the Alliance called for a “Day of Anger” in protest. Christian leader SamirG’ag’a declared that a pro-Hizbullah government could lead to a civil war and “transform Lebanon into Gaza”. Due to these developments, Lebanon is currently trapped in a delicate situation, giving rise to mutual accusations between the parties and fears of renewed sectarian violence.

  7. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON After Rafik Hariri’s Murder The present crisis climaxes over tensions regarding the STL, which is expected to indict members of Hizbullah and to determine potential Syrian and Iranian culpability in the Hariri’s political assassination. RafikHariri, along with 22 other people, was killed on February 2005 by a truck bomb. The murder initially led to the appointment of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), headed by DetlevMehlis. The Mehlis Report, presented on October 2005, implicated Lebanese, Syrian and Iran intelligence officers. Following the 1757 UN Security Council Resolution on May 2007, the STL was finally created on March 2009 to procure a formal and binding international sentence in the case. The mission headquarters are located near the Hague and 49% of the project is financed by the Lebanese government.

  8. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON The Judicial Process The draft indictments of the STL investigation were presented on Monday, 17 January 2011 but the details of the suspects and their charges remain confidential. However, various sources report that the STL will charge high-ranking Hizbullah, Syrian and Iranian authorities with the crime of political assassination. This judicial process represents a huge danger to Hizbullah’s– and its supporters’ – status and legitimacy in Lebanon. Following the decision of the prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, to publish the indictments, Judge Daniel Fransen has 6-10 weeks to decide whether to confirm or dismiss them. The names of the suspects will be publicized if he decides that there is enough evidence to proceed with a trial.

  9. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON Reactions to STL The potential impact of the STL depends much more on how the different relevant actors react to the report than the conclusion of the report itself. Many Hizbullahofficials have expressed their potential willingness to tolerate a damning STL judgment should Hariri’s camp agree to make no concerted effort to fulfill its sentence. However, if the “March 14” camp is determined to fulfill the indictments or possibly even declare support for the findings, Hizbullah might decide to re-ignite hostilities and provoke bloodshed. Hassan Nasrallah tried to quell the tensions, but also stated that Hizbollah would not tolerate an arrest of any of its members. He also declared that Hizbollah would deny support to the STL should it gain control of the government.

  10. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

  11. LEBANON BACKGROUND Map and Statistics Area: 10.452 km2 Width: 88 km (maximum) 32 km (minimum) Population: 4.224.000 Population Density: 404/km2 Terrain: Plateau along the coast; mountainous in the center, east and north; valley in the far east. GDP (estimate to 2010): $58.576 billion GDP per capita: $14.988

  12. LEBANON BACKGROUND History of Main Events : 1920- 2010 “Justice and Accountability”: First Israeli operation against Hizbullah Second Lebanon War – UNIFIL Mandate by UNSCR 1701 Resolution “Litani Operation”, Creation of UNIFIL by 425 Resolution Israeli withdrawal to the “Security Border” Founding of the “Great Lebanon” entity Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon Start of the Lebanese Civil War 1985 2000 2006 1978 1993 1920 1975 2009 1996 2005 1943 1976 1982 1989 Lebanon achieves Independence – “National Pact” Syria enters Lebanon Hariri’s Murder, “Cedar Revolution”, Syrian withdrawal after UN Resolution 1559 “Peace in the Galilee” War, creation of Hizbullah End of the Lebanese Civil War, “Taif Agreement” “Grapes of Wrath” Israeli Operation against Hizbullah National Unity Government

  13. LEBANON BACKGROUND Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present • September 2004: Lebanon Constitutional Amendment – Backed by Syria, its approval extended the office term of President Emile Lahoud. 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 • 14 February 2005 – Rafik Hariri’s Murder – Former Prime Minister Hariri killed by a car bomb in Beirut. Leaders of the March 14 Alliance accused Syria and Hizbullah. In response, the March 8 Alliance, which attributed responsibility for the murder to the USA and Israel, was formed.

  14. LEBANON BACKGROUND Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present • 14 March 2005 – “Cedar Revolution” – The murder of Hariri led to a series of demonstrations, popularly named the “Cedar Revolution”. Participants demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon as well as the establishment of an international commission to investigate the murder. 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 • 26 April 2005 - Syrian Retirement after UN 1559 Resolution – After the United Nations called for an investigation, Syria withdrew it troops from Lebanon. The Lebanese political arena consolidated into two political camps: the March 14 Alliance and March 8 Alliance.

  15. LEBANON BACKGROUND Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present • July 2006 – Second Lebanon War - In response to Hizbullah rocket fire and the wounding, killing and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, the IDF entered Hizbullah-controlled southern Lebanon. The war resulted in UN Resolution 1701, which prompted a ceasefire and established a renewed version of UNIFIL to act as a deterrent to Hizbullah aggression. 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 • May 2007 – Nahr al Bared conflict – Battles between the Lebanon Internal Security Forces (ISF) and militants of Fatah Al Islam (an Al-Qaeda inspired group).

  16. LEBANON BACKGROUND Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present • May 2008 – Internal Strife – After Siniora’s government attempted to prohibit a Hizbullah communications network, the group responded with violence. The struggle concluded with the “Doha Agreement”, which ushered in Michel Suleiman as president and sealed a commitment between the coalitions to avoid a new civil war. 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 • June 2009 – Close victory of the “March 14 Alliance” in elections – A national unity government was formed, directed by Saad Hariri and including a Hizbullah veto (“National Silence Government”).

  17. LEBANON BACKGROUND Social and Demographic Characteristics Lebanon’s population is a mixture of 18 ethnic-religious minorities, including Muslim Shi’ites, Muslim Sunnis, Christian Maronites, Christian Greek Orthodox, Druze and Greek Catholics. This country’s diversity is a consequence of its history as a refuge for the region’s persecuted minorities. Druze Shiites Christians Sunnis The last official census was held in 1932, when there was an established Christian majority. A recent non-official study by the “Statistics Lebanon” firm shows that Shiites constitute 28% of the total population, Sunnis 28%, Maronites 21.5%, Greek Orthodox 8%, Druze 5% and Greek Catholics 4%.

  18. LEBANON POLITICS Governmental Regime Lebanon is technically governed as a parliamentary democracy. Due to its complex demographic composition, Lebanon has a special governing system known as “Confessionalism”, intended to ensure fair representation among its diverse population. This system functions in both the government and the parliament and was implemented by the “1943 National Pact” and the “1989 Taif Agreement”. Role Distribution in Government (before its fall): • President – Christian Maronite (Michel Suleiman) • Prime Minister – Muslim Sunni (Saad Hariri) • Parliament Chairman – Muslim Shiite (NabihBerri)

  19. LEBANON POLITICS GovernmentalRegime Distribution in Parliament: The 128 seats of the unicameral Parliament are equally divided between Christians and Muslims, and proportionally between the minorities as well as between the regions.

  20. LEBANON POLITICS Political Trends Ethnic-Religious rivalry - The main component of Lebanese politics affecting civil life, institutions roles distribution, laws and policies. Parties tend to be armed or connected to armed factions, so political issues tend to result in violent confrontations. External involvement – Since the Civil War, Lebanon has been a battleground for regional actors to settle their disputes. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Arab Emirates, the USA and France are all historical stakeholders that have actively influenced Lebanese politics by supporting parties and indirectly dominating internal Lebanese affairs.

  21. LEBANON POLITICS Political Trends Hizbullah’s character as “a state within a state” – Hizbullah’s civilian-military system, provided by Iran and Syria, enables it to implement independent policies. Moreover, it gained the political “veto power” by integrating into the former government. The Palestinian issue – A sensitive issue since the Civil War, the Palestinians maintain a substantial presence in Lebanon as refugees. Most of them have a limited legal status: they do not receive Lebanese citizenship or internal aid, and are often manipulated to achieve terrorist goals, both local and global.

  22. LEBANON POLITICS Political Camps The characteristics of the Lebanese political regime, “Confessionalism”, requires the conforming of inter-ethnic political camps. This means combining different ethnic groups and forming political alliances. The elements that divide the camps include: • Religion and ethnic identification: Sunnis vs. Shiites vs. Christians • Character of Lebanon: Secular vs. Islamist • Path of Politics: Moderation vs. “Resistance” • Regional affinity: Pro-Occidental / Pro-Saudi vs. Pro-Syrian/Iran • Economic Methods

  23. LEBANON POLITICS Political Camps Since 2005, the Lebanon political arena has been divided into two main political camps: “March 14” Camp Headed by Saad Hariri’s principle Sunni party (Movement of the Future) with Maronite and Druze allies, it was consolidated after the mass demonstrations of the “Cedar Revolution”. Obtained parliamentary majority (71 of the 128 seats) in the June 2009 elections and formed a government after four months of negotiations. Hariri is seconded by the Christian leaders AminJ’amil (Falanges chairman) and SamirG’ag’a (Kajal chairman).

  24. LEBANON POLITICS Political Camps “March 8” Camp The main opposition coalition, it obtained 57 seats in the June 2009 elections and negotiated a national unity government with “veto power”. It is conformed by the main Shiite parties Hizbullah (headed by Hassan Nasrallah) and Amal(headed by NabihBerry), in cooperation with the Christian leader Michael Aoun and a number of Sunni, Christian and Druze leaders. Non-aligned actors The President: Michel Suleiman The Druze leader: WalidJumblatt

  25. LEBANON POLITICS Political Camps PARLIAMENT ELECTION RESULTS 2009

  26. LEBANON POLITICS Political Camps PARLIAMENT COALITIONS AFTER ELECTION RESULTS 2009 (*Note: The Progressive Socialist Party (Druzes) was firstly part of the 14 March Coalition, one month after the elections withdraw, but remain part of the Parliament majority)

  27. LEBANON POLITICS External Actors The division between the Lebanese camps follows a familiar pattern in the Middle East; they are divided into the “moderate camp” and the “radical camp”. The chief external actors in Lebanese politics reflect this schism: • Syria – sees Lebanon as part of its area of influence, primarily supports Shiites though also Sunni groups. Recently returned to influential prominence in Lebanon after international pressure forced its oust in 2005; is thus interested in maintaining stability. • Saudi Arabia – acts in support of the Sunnis to reinforce it position, especially following Syria’s recent withdrawal. While it strongly supports Hariri, it also wants stability.

  28. LEBANON POLITICS External Actors • Iran – has a growing influence in the military arena by providing financial support, intelligence, and arms to Hizbullah, thus advancing Shiite interests and fortifying the threat to Israel’s northern front. • Egypt, Arab Emirates– interested in protecting Sunni factions. • The Occident (mainly USA and France) – consider Lebanon a geo-strategic asset in the region, and is interested in protecting the Christians minority (Lebanon used to be a French colony). In addition, it works to support pro-Occident Sunni parties.

  29. HIZBULLAH THREATS Overview of Hizbullah Hizbullah is a radical Shiite organization which represents a major political and military force in the region. The organization functions as a front-line Iranian proxy, relying on both Iranian and Syrian support. Following the rise of the Shiites in Lebanon in the 1960s-70s and the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Hizbullah was established as a result of the 1982 Lebanon War, during which it wasenforced by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.Hizbullah’smain goal is to instigate an Islamic revolution in Lebanon by imposing a government based on Shiite laws and to export this revolution to different regions in the Middle East. With the death of AbbasMussawi, in 1992, Hassan Nasrallah was nominated as the new Secretary-General. This marked a new era in Hizbullah operations, combined with expanding political activity as a party in the Lebanese Parliament.

  30. HIZBULLAH THREATS After the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hizbullahsucceeded in strengthening its status in the Lebanese “street”, progressively legitimizing itself as a national resistance movement. This process was enforced by its entrance to the government in July 2005. Once in a position of power, the organization slowly consolidated its hold on the political situation, procuring a “veto” in 2008. Hezbollah’s power stems from a number of sources: Military Political Socio-Economic Professional and well-trained army Modus Vivendi with the government Operates primarily in Shiite regions Guerilla warfare techniques and civilian shields Increased influence following governmental recognition Ideological indoctrination Largely backed by Iran Strategic force (UAV’s, missiles, etc) “Blocking third” veto right Terror component

  31. THE ZILZAL C802 COASTAL MISSILE 220M ROCKET LAUNCHER SAGGER ATGM MISSILES THE IRANIAN-MADE ABABIL UAV HIZBULLAH THREATS Hizbullah’s Military Aspects 122mm Grad (25km / 15 mil) Hezbullah’smodus operandiincludes the use of advanced conventional weapons with guerilla terrorist techniques. To this effect, it has amassed a massive arsenal combined with advanced weapons, over 40,000 rockets, anti-tank and coastal missiles, IEDs, UAVs and more. This is backed by Scudand M600 rockets, which allow Hezbollah to target the Israeli population from deep within Lebanon strategic depth. 240mm Fajr 3 (50km / 30 mil) Fajr 5 (75km / 45 mil) M-600 (300km / 185 mil) Scud-D (600km / 375 mil)

  32. HIZBULLAH THREATS Following the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and despite UNSCR 1701, Hizbullah began the process of repairing and increasing its capabilities. This occurred through a number of venues: Training Drills Smuggling Infrastructure Personnel Arsenal Functioning as a front-line proxy of Iran in the region, Hizbullah continues to rely on massive weapon transfers as a lifeline for its operations. The smuggling takes place by air, land and sea, benefiting from pivotal Syrian support as well. IRANIAN WEAPONS FOUND IN LEBANON

  33. HIZBULLAH THREATS Despite the explicit prohibition of non-governmental weapons in southern Lebanon (UNSCR 1701), many weapons are sent on to the region. "Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer…any arms or related material…all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft“ (UNSCR 1747, Paragraph 5) Iranian meddling in the region well exceeds weapon transfers. Iran continue to play an active role in training members of Hezbullah, as well as providing assistance for its political activity, which has already seen dividends. Iranian efforts are complemented by massive economic support to Hezbullah. The Iranian Quds organization alone contributes between 100-200 million dollars annually to Hezbullah.

  34. HIZBULLAH THREATS Hizbullah’s military assets are deployed within populated areas throughout Lebanon, as part of its strategy, doctrine and preparation for war. Hizbullah’s Deployment in Southern Lebanon 5,000 Activists ≈40,000 Rockets Command Each village military compound contains dozens of activists and hundreds of rockets Unit Sector Village Massive long-range strike Targeting mostly Israeli population centers Territorial defense of the launching units Concept of Operation

  35. Khirbat Salim Tayr Falsi Marwaheen 14/17/09 Depot in town center containing 122mm rockets, 155mm rockets, mortars and more detonates 23/8/09 Local civilians forcibly eject Hizbullah operatives attempting to establish operations in town 12/10/09 Arms depot detonates. Weapons are removed and transferred to nearby village HIZBULLAH THREATS Since Lebanon War, Hezbollah routinely deploys in the rural environment of southern Lebanon. This serves as its backbone for war-time operations. 2006 2010 Inhabited Environment CMZ (Closed Military Zones)

  36. HIZBULLAH THREATS A Threat to Lebanon Hizbullah possesses the most powerful military force in Lebanon, thanks to Syrian and Iranian assistance. Its arsenal far outnumbers that of the Lebanon National Army, and in some parts of the country constitutes the de-facto martial authority. Hizbullah continues to advance it goals, gain legitimacy and strengthen its basis in Lebanon (and may even attain political domination). It uses a dual strategy of accumulating power without seizing control of the government while progressively weakening political rivals and destabilizing the political system. Hizbullah’sdual process of legitimization and destabilization in the Lebanese political arena is expected to continue for the foreseeable future (due to its demographic advantages), and could perpetuate ethnic tensions.

  37. HIZBULLAH THREATS A Threat to Israel Since its creation, Hizbullah has posed a military threat to Israel’s northern border, challenging Israel’s security interests in Lebanon and the region. During the past 30 years, Hizbullahhas employed various means in its attempt to terrorize the Israeli population, including attacks on Israeli military bases, missiles fired at Israeli civilians, kidnapping soldiers, etc. Hizbullah military potential is reserved as a future platform for Iran and Syria to attack Israel.Iran established it and aided it with resources, logistics and arms. For Syria, Hizbullah is useful in the fight against Israel and as a means to advance its interests in the Lebanese internal political order.

  38. HIZBULLAH THREATS A Threat to the Middle East Hizbullahenvisions itself as an active regional player with the purpose of creating an Islamic Shiite revolution in the Middle East. Moreover, as an instrument of Iran Hizbullahbelieves that moderate/pro-occident countries stand in opposition to their plans in Lebanon. Hizbullah sees Lebanon as a potential military platform from which to threaten said countries and thus accumulate power for the radical camp. A strong Hizbullah, in control of Lebanese politics and territory, constitutes a destabilizing force in the region that threatens the development of moderate trends in the Middle East.

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