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Proxy Offer Curve – RUC Effect REVISED Settlement and Billing - Market Analysis

Proxy Offer Curve – RUC Effect REVISED Settlement and Billing - Market Analysis. Pamela Shaw. Proxy Energy Offer Curve. Situation: The proxy Energy Offer Curve used to calculate the RTAIEC (Real Time Average Incremental Energy Cost) will result in a negative average cost for energy.

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Proxy Offer Curve – RUC Effect REVISED Settlement and Billing - Market Analysis

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  1. Proxy Offer Curve – RUC EffectREVISEDSettlement and Billing - Market Analysis Pamela Shaw NATF

  2. Proxy Energy Offer Curve Situation: The proxy Energy Offer Curve used to calculate the RTAIEC (Real Time Average Incremental Energy Cost) will result in a negative average cost for energy. AIEC in the RUC formula is designed to allow the Resource to retain the cost incurred to generate above LSL. Result: A negative cost will increase the Revenue deducted from the RUC Guarantee. Increasing the Revenue would result in lowering the Make Whole payment and possibly subjecting the QSE to a Clawback Charge.

  3. Protocol Language • Protocol Section 5.7.1.3 Revenue Less Cost Above LSL RUC hours The total revenue for the Resource operating above its LSL less the cost based on the Resource’s Energy Offer Curve capped by the energy offer curve cap or proxy Energy Offer Curve described in Section 6.5.7.3, Security Constrained Economic Dispatch, as applicable, during all RUC-Committed Hours of the Operating Day • Protocol Section 5.7.1.4 Revenue Less Cost During QSE Clawback Intervals The total revenue for the Resource less the cost based on the Resource’s Energy Offer Curve capped by the energy offer curve cap or proxy Energy Offer Curve described in Section 6.5.7.3, Security Constrained Economic Dispatch, as applicable, during all QSE Clawback Intervals of the Operating Day

  4. Negative AIEC’s impact to RUC revenues RUCMWAMT= (-1) * Max (0, RUCG – RUCMEREV– RUCEXRR– RUCEXRQC) / RUCHR RUCEXRR = Maximum of 0 or sum of all RUC intervals RTSPP * Maximum of 0 or {Real-Time Metered Gen – (1/4 of LSL)} - Real-Time AIEC * Maximum of 0 or {Real-Time Metered Gen – (1/4 of LSL)} RUCEXRQC = Maximum of 0 or sum of all QCLAW intevals (RTSPP * Real-Time Metered Gen ) - Real-Time AIEC * Maximum of 0 or {Real-Time Metered Gen – (1/4 of LSL)}

  5. Negative AIEC’s impact to VSS lost opportunity Negative Energy Offers will also effect VSSEAMT by increasing the amount paid to the QSE. VSSEAMT q, r = (-1) * Max (0, RTSPP p * Max (0, (HSL q, r * ¼ - RTMG q, r)) – (RTICHSL q, r – RTVSSAIEC q, r * (RTMG q, r - LSL q, r * ¼))) Where: RTICHSL q, r = RTHSLAIEC q, r * (¼ * HSL q, r – ¼ * LSL q, r)

  6. TWOS Proxy Offer Curve Example Inputs • For Interval 14 • TWOS=80 MWs • HSL= 160 MW • LSL=15 MW • For that Operation day • SWCAP=2250 Outcome

  7. Proxy Offer Curve and Negative AIECAREA - REVISED Results RTAIEC = -$183

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