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Exploring new directions

The Eastern Tropical Pacific Tuna Purse Seine fishery. Exploring new directions. Kieran Kelleher Michael Arbuckle The World Bank. Key messages. RFMOs may not be the most effective instrument for allocation and control of rights among individual fishers (as opposed to states)

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Exploring new directions

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  1. The Eastern Tropical Pacific Tuna Purse Seine fishery Exploring new directions Kieran Kelleher Michael Arbuckle The World Bank

  2. Key messages • RFMOs may not be the most effective instrument for allocation and control of rights among individual fishers (as opposed to states) • Other complementary instruments and arrangements may be required

  3. Focus • Alternatives • Rights…. not buyback • ‘sustainable’ buybacks require secure rights • Combined EEZs as key unit …. not HS • Segments • Purse seine • Longline • Local coastal small scale (and P&L) • Establish boundaries for the rights discussion

  4. Assumptions • A high proportion of the PS catch is within the EEZs • It is unprofitable for PS vessels to fish only on the HS • Coastal states by themselves have the ‘power’ to structure an efficient and effective rights-based regime • distant water fishing not a primary consideration

  5. Role of IATTC • Strengths: • Scientific advice • Agreement on TACs, • limits: dolphin (and bigeye?) • Technical measures • Less strong • Vessel/ capacity limits • Efficient allocation of quotas/ limits • control and penalty determination/ application

  6. Nature of rights • Current – vessel capacity & dolphin • Move to • Quantity of fish (% of TAC) and • Limits – dolphin, YF and bigeye (?) • Allocation – 2 levels • State • Fisher

  7. IATTC (political/ ecological) Overall TACs and limits Allocation between states ? Independent verification/ control TunaCorp A Corporate Instrument? (economic) States as shareholders in TunaCorp States pool quotas, or part of quotas/ limits States pool EEZs/ licensing Fishers pay for quotas TunaCorp manages, finances control, research Acts as ‘firewall’ Architecture

  8. Architecture 2 • Unitary rights trading architecture • Not set of aligned national regimes (e.g. EC) • Vessels to operate freely in all EEZs (conditional ceding of licensing authority) • Independent catch control / verification – level playing field and transparency e.g. SGS • Internalize management costs • All coastal states, or fast-track of lead group?

  9. Initial allocation • State level • Formula based on current / historical record – negotiated • Fisher level • Each state allocates as it sees fit – year 1 • Denominated in terms of TunaCorp trading units (YF, dolphin, etc) • Year 2+ fishers can trade through TunaCorp • TunaCorp allocated % of TAC from Year 2- fishers bid for TunaCorp TAC • States could request TunaCorp to auction their quota (market could be open to all members, or restricted to that States’ fishers?)

  10. conclusions • A rights regime requires clear boundaries (fishery, area, participants) • It may be necessary to explore arrangements outside conventional RFMO roles • Extending the role of IATTC to manage a rights-based regime at fisher level may not be effective • A corporate type instrument such as TunaCorp may be required • Workshop participants are invited to explore all options

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