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The Fortunes of Fishes & Fishers

The Fortunes of Fishes & Fishers. Institutional Innovation in Atlantic Resource Management DG Webster University of Southern California. Overview. Reasons for innovation Innovations in the Atlantic (1) Variegated implementation of Combo Packages

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The Fortunes of Fishes & Fishers

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  1. The Fortunes of Fishes & Fishers Institutional Innovation in Atlantic Resource Management DG Webster University of Southern California

  2. Overview • Reasons for innovation • Innovations in the Atlantic (1) • Variegated implementation of Combo Packages • Origins of this innovation: western bluefin tuna • Innovations in the Atlantic (2) • Time-area closures • International aspects: Gulf of Guinea • Implications of competition as driver

  3. Protect Fish Rebuild stock/ ecosystem Placate conservation interests Protect Fishers Increase economic rents Lock in fishers’ shares of resource Reasons for Innovation Best of Both • Rebuild biology & economy • Make everybody happy

  4. Innovation in the Atlantic (1) • Combo packages • Total allowable catch • National quota distributions • Statistical document programs • Multilateral trade restrictive measures • Temporary quota transfers Some stocks rebuilt to MSY levels

  5. Uneven Application (1) • Western bluefin tuna • Severely depleted then, severely depleted now • Bigeye tuna and northern swordfish • moderate depletion then, rebuilt now • Eastern bluefin • Moderately depleted then, same now • Southern swordfish • Signs overfished then, fully/underfished now

  6. Uneven Application (2) Weak/no measures for • Skipjack and yellowfin tunas • Fully exploited or slightly depleted Management w/o international enforcement • Blue marlin and white marlin (bycatch) • severely depleted

  7. Protecting the Fish? Not really protecting the fish • Only applied to stocks that were already depleted • Not optimal management at MSY (goal of ICCAT) • Only applied to stocks that were commercially valuable • No alternative bycatch enforcement innovations developed even though marlins are severely overexploited

  8. More complex than just price/value Protecting the Fishers? • Bluefin tuna is highest priced • Adopted for this species first • Not as effective as for less expensive fish • Bigeye tuna is highest commercial value • Swordfish is much less valuable, yet management/effectiveness similar • Yellowfin and skipjack rival overall value of bigeye, but management not applied

  9. Direct Competition ICCAT’s management package: • Reduces direct competition • Coastal vs. distant water countries • Historical vs. developing countries • Is only applicable if regulations are adopted • May not prevent loss of market share if substitutes are plentiful

  10. Indirect Competition • Creates pressures to disperse management measures to other stocks • Increases need for regeneration of scarcity rent through effective management

  11. Examples • Bigeye tuna & southern swordfish • Each subject to direct & indirect competition • Adoption of plans coincides with growing concern regarding increasing competition • Northern swordfish • Mainly subject to indirect competition adoption with plans coincides with growth of substitutes • Eastern & western bluefin tuna • Little direct competition due to geography and early exclusion • Little indirect competition due to lack of substitutes

  12. Western Bluefin Pre-innovation accord Period of accord Period of concern Innovation Period of conflict

  13. World Bluefin Pre-innovation accord Period of accord Period of concern Innovation Period of conflict

  14. Western Bluefin 1991 nomination under Article I of CITES Pre-innovation accord Period of accord Period of concern Innovation Period of conflict

  15. CITES Impact • Initial reductions in reported landings • Non-compliance after 1993 • Back to pre-1991 levels by 1996 • Enforcement & monitoring measures • Still utilized for western bluefin • Constant updates/improvements • Adopted for other ICCAT stocks • Proliferation to other organizations

  16. Innovation in the Atlantic (2) Time-area closures • Protection of juveniles/spawning populations of targeted species • Bluefin in the Mediterranean & Gulf of Mexico • Bigeye in the Gulf of Guinea • Protection of bycatch species • Marlins in US EEZ

  17. Source: ICCAT Landings Database Ghana vs. EC

  18. International Implications • Disproportionate impact • EC has distant water fleets & their harvests were already in decline • Ghana only fishes in the Gulf of Guinea • Ghana is EC’s biggest rival in the Atlantic • Ghana never really implemented the closure • EC pressed hard for compliance • Eventually started cutting back on closure

  19. Implications • With direct & indirect competition, management to protect fishers can help rebuild stocks • Without competition, effective management requires strong, continuous pressures from non-commercial groups • All innovations have distributional impacts that improve/reduce likelihood of adoption & effectiveness

  20. Acknowledgments • USC Wrigley Institute for Environmental Studies • Offield Family Foundation • Alice C. Tyler Charitable Trust and the John C. Tyler Trust • The Haynes Foundation

  21. Bigeye Tuna Period of conflict Period of accord

  22. Northern Swordfish Period of concern Period of accord Period of conflict

  23. World Swordfish Period of concern Period of accord Period of conflict

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