LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST NOTABLE DISASTERS ITALY PART 3B: EARTHQUAKES (Continued)

1. LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST NOTABLE DISASTERSITALYPART 3B: EARTHQUAKES (Continued) Walter Hays, Global Alliance for Disaster Reduction, Vienna, Virginia, USA 

2. NATURAL HAZARDS THAT HAVE CAUSED DISASTERS IN ITALY FLOODS GOAL: PROTECT PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIES WINDSTORMS EARTHQUAKES HIGH BENEFIT/COST PROGRAMS FOR BECOMING DISASTER RESILIENT VOLCANOES ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

3. Italy has a long history of destructive earthquakes.

4. LOCATIONS OF PAST NOTABLE EARTHAUAKES

5. A DISASTER is --- --- the set of failures that overwhelm the capability of a community torespond without external help  when three continuums: 1)  people, 2) community (i.e., a set of habitats, livelihoods, and social constructs), and 3) complex events (e.g., earthquakes, cyclones,..) intersect at a point in space and time.

6. Disasters are caused by single- or multiple-event natural hazards that, (for various reasons), cause extreme levels of mortality, morbidity, homelessness, joblessness, economic losses, or environmental impacts.

7. THE REASONS ARE . . . • The community is UN-PREPARED for what will likely happen

8. THE REASONS ARE . . . • When it does happen, the functions of the community’s buildings and infrastructure that are UNPROTECTED with the appropriate codes and standards will be LOST.

9. THE REASONS ARE . . . • The community has NODISASTER PLANNING SCENARIO or WARNING SYSTEM in place as a strategic framework for concerted local, national, regional, and international actions.

10. THE REASONS ARE . . . • The community LACKS THE CAPACITY TO RESPOND to the full spectrum of expected and unexpected emergency situations.

11. THE REASONS ARE . . . • The community is INEFFICIENT during recovery and reconstruction because it HAS NOT LEARNED from either the current experience or the cumulative prior experiences.

12. TOWARDS EARTHQUAKE DISASTER RESILIENCE

13. QUAKE HAZARDS • INVENTORY • VULNERABILITY • LOCATION • PREPAREDNESS • PROTECTION • FORECASTS/SCENARIOS • EMERGENCY RESPONSE • RECOVERY and • RECONSTRUCTION EARTHQUAKE RISK POLICY OPTIONS ACCEPTABLE RISK RISK UNACCEPTABLE RISK QUAKE DISASTER RESILIENCE DATA BASES AND INFORMATION ITALY’S COMMUNITIES HAZARDS: GROUND SHAKING GROUND FAILURE SURFACE FAULTING TECTONIC DEFORMATION TSUNAMI RUN UP AFTERSHOCKS

14. 35 30 25 UNREINFORCED MASONRY, BRICK OR STONE 20 REINFORCED CONCRETE WITH UNREINFORCED WALLS 15 10 REINFORCED CONCRETE WITH REINFORCEDWALLS STEEL FRAME ALL METAL & WOOD FRAME 5 0 V VI VII VIII IX CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS HAVE DIFFERENT VULNERABILITIES TO GROUND SHAKING MEAN DAMAGE RATIO, % OF REPLACEMENT VALUE INTENSITY

15. CAUSES OF DAMAGE INADEQUATE RESISTANCE TO HORIZONTAL GROUND SHAKING SOIL AMPLIFICATION PERMANENT DISPLACEMENT (SURFACE FAULTING & GROUND FAILURE) IRREGULARITIES IN ELEVATION AND PLAN EARTHQUAKES FIRE FOLLOWING RUPTURE OF UTILITIES “DISASTER LABORATORIES” LACK OF DETAILING AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS INATTENTION TO NON-STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS

16. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT DISASTER RESILIENCE ALL EARTH-QUAKES PREPAREDNESS FOR THE LIKELY GROUND SHAKING IS ESSENTIAL FOR DISASTER RESILIENCE

17. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT DISASTER RESILIENCE ALL EARTH-QUAKES BUILDING CODES AND LIFELINE STANDARDS ARE ESSENTIAL FOR DISASTER RESILIENCE

18. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT DISASTER RESILIENCE ALL EARTH-QUAKES TIMELY EMERGENCY RESPONSE IS ESSENTIAL FOR DISASTER RESILIENCE

19. SOME OF ITALY’S MANY NOTABLE EARTHQUAKES M6.9 IRPINIA: NOVEMBER 23, 1980 M6.3 L’AQUILA: APRIL 6, 2009

20. EPICENTER: IRPINIA QUAKE

21. L’AQUILA EARTHQUAKEA Town of 70,000 M6.3 3:30 AM APRIL 6, 2009

22. LOCATION MAP

23. LOCATION MAP

24. SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS VULNERABLE UNREINFORCED MASONRY BUILDINGS DAMAGED UNIVERSITY DORM COLLAPSES VULNERABLE INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGED AT LEAST 200 DEAD AND 2,000 NJURED TENS OF THOUSANDS HOMELESS

25. L'AQUILA AND 26 TOWNS AND VILLAGES DEVASTATED

26. L'AQUILA: SITE EFFECTS FROM LOCATION IN OLD LAKE BED

27. ONNA: 3 MILES FROM L'AQUILA

28. ONNA

29. AFTERSHOCKS EXACERBATE DAMAGE IN VILLAGE OF ONNA

30. DAMAGE TO ROAD

31. DAMAGED HOUSE

32. SANTA MARIA PAGANICA CHURCH

33. DAMAGE TO CHURCH

34. DAMAGE TO DOME OF CHURCH

35. COLLAPSED BUILDING

36. COLLAPSED BUILDINGS AND RESCUE WORKERS

37. RESCUE WORKERS

38. SEARCH AND RESCUE

39. SEARCH AND RESCUE

40. SEARCH AND RESCUE

41. RESCUED VICTIM

42. EVACUEE ASLEEP IN CAR

43. EVACUATION CENTER: UNIVERSITY SPORTS CENTER

44. EVACUEES: STADIUM

45. EVACUEES HOUSED IN STADIUM

46. LACK OF HOSPITAL RESOURCES Many earthquake survivors had to be transported to Rome for surgery and/or treatment due to shortage of resources in the L’Aquila area

47. CONTROVERSY OVER CLAIM OF PREDICTION An Italian scientist claims to have predicted the earthquake on the basis of radon gas emissions from the fault zone. The Italian Government did not take any action because the technique is controversial.

48. THIS DISASTER EXPOSED POLICY FLAWS • UN—PROTECTED • UN—PREPARED • UN--ABLE TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY

49. FACT:VILLAGE HOUSES WITH LITTLE OF NO EARTHQUAKE RESISTANCE COLLAPSED, INCREASINGING DEATHS AND INJURIES The 5 pm occurrence) instead of a 10 pm occurrence) likely reduced the number of deaths.

50. FACT: KNOWING WHERE THE SEISMICALLY ACTIVE FAULTS ARE AND BEING UNPREPARED FOR THE INEVITABLE EARTHQUAKES LEADS TO UNNECESSAY DISASTERS