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This presentation by Chris Anderson, from July 29, 2009, delves into the use of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to enhance the integrity and privacy of electronic voting systems. It identifies critical issues like trust and privacy, which conflict in e-voting. ZKPs allow a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a true fact without revealing the fact itself. Neff's scheme uses a verifiable choice representation to let voters challenge and verify their votes while maintaining ballot privacy. This framework addresses common challenges in electronic voting, ensuring both security and verifiability.
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Using Zero Knowledge Proofs to Validate Electronic Votes PRESENTED BY CHRIS ANDERSON JULY 29, 2009
Outline • What is the problem? • What does zero knowledge mean? • Neff’s scheme • Challenging the encrypted vote • Conclusion
The Problem • Trust • Two secure voting requirements contradict each other when dealing with e-voting • Privacy • Verifiability • Receipt-freeness & uncoercibility
What Does Zero-Knowledge Mean? Task: Prove to a verifier that some fact is true. Parties Involved Prover Verifier Follows a challenge/response protocol Rules: Verifier accepts proof if it is true and both parties follow protocol Verifier rejects proof it is false and verifier has followed protocol The prover reveals nothing about the fact that the verifier could not determine without the prover Verifier is unable to prove same fact to someone else
Neff’s Scheme • Zero-knowledge protocol developed by Andrew Neff • Cast vote is represented by a n x l matrix of ballot match pairs(BMP) called a verifiable choice(VC) • n=number of candidates • l=security parameter • Each BMP consists of a pair of plain text b1, b2 in {0,1} which are encrypted using a random value • If the BMP belongs to the row for the chosen candidate, the BMP will be 0,0 or 1,1 • If the BMP belongs to a row for a candidate who was not chosen, the BMP will be 0,1 or 1,0
Neff’s Scheme • Voter challenges the candidate by submitting a bit string with length l • Each BMP has a pledge bit used to compare BMP with voter’s challenge string • If kth bit in string = 0, compare BMP left element to pledge bit • If kth bit in string = 1, compare BMP right element to pledge bit
Conclusion • Neff’s scheme allows voter to verify correctness • Solves a major hurdle with e-voting systems • Questions?
References • Ben Adida. Advances in Cryptographic Voting Systems, 2008. • VenetaVelyanova. An Analysis Of The Neff’s Voter • Verifiable Election Scheme, 2008.