Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense

1. Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense World Wide Chemical Conference October 15, 2004

2. Agenda Joint Combat Developer JCIDS Training, Doctrine, and Exercises FY 06-11 POM Study Installation Protection Upcoming Targets

3. Joint Combat Developer for CBRN Defense • Implementation plan tasks Army, as Executive Agent, to serve as JCD • - Directed by JRO • - Force Protection FCB oversight • Focus is concept experimentation • Medical and non-medical • Resources: • - D049 • - USACMLS • Objectives: • - Support JCIDS analysis • - Validate doctrine/TTP • - New applications for existing capabilities • - Support JPEO materiel development, fielding plans

4. JCIDS Acceleration of CBRN Capabilities Documents • CJCSI 3170.01C, 24 Jun 2003, established the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and implemented the Knowledge Management / Decision Support (KM/DS) Tool • Integrated Concept Teams • CbtWMD Issue Team • Force Protection Functional Capabilities Board • Results • – Since JCIDS was instituted, 16 CBRN capabilities documents have been staffed and approved • – The rate of production of approved CBRN capabilities documents increased 220% in the last two years under JCIDS

5. Approved Capabilities Documents As of 20 Sep 04

6. CBRN Joint Capabilities Improvement Initiative Team (CIIT) • Purpose: • To integrate new JCBRN processes and developments into the Joint National Training Center • Create capability to train and exercise CBRN and other war fighting skills • Objectives: • Develop the capability to train the force under CBRN conditions • Identify/address CBRN capability gaps • Implementation: • CIIT Charter approved – USJFCOM/JRO-CBRN collaborative effort • Staffed with 2 JRO-CBRN funded and 2 USJFCOM funded contractors • Support to COCOMs – USEUCOM AGILE RESPONSE, USPACOM UFL-04, NORTHCOM DETERMINED PROMISE 03 and 04, Senior Leadership Seminars at three COCOMs, CBRN Familiarization Courses at three COCOMs

7. Combating WMD Enhanced Planning Process Study • National Strategy to Combat WMD published in Sep 2002 • JROC approved the CBRN Defense Concept, Baseline Capabilities Assessment and its attributes, assumptions, and metrics; the prioritized insights; and the core capability gaps, July 2003 • 2004 SPG directed Department to reduce gaps/risk

8. Summary of Risk in PB05-09 FYDP • Procurement: Enough equipment for most Homeland Defense and Win Decisively needs, but not for Swiftly Defeat and Deter Forward needs • RDT&E: Leaves 39 gaps identified by JROC, particularly in • Defense against Non-Traditional Agents • Medical countermeasures • Standoff bio detection • Genetically-engineered bio threats • Infrastructure: Program can be executed, but testing incomplete and slower, leading to fielding equipment of potentially lesser reliability. Scientists harder to retain.

9. Current Infrastructure Capability • Testing with simulants, not live agents • Most problematic: detection, decontamination • Testing components, not entire system • Most problematic: standoff detection, bio point detection, and integrated early warning • Testing with aging instrumentation and outdated methodologies • Limited production capacity • Most problematic: medical countermeasures, especially product-testing bottlenecks • Delay in ability to meet future needs • Most problematic: decontaminants; detectors; medical countermeasures • Limited ability to attract and retain scientists • Relying on models, especially for Non-Traditional Agents

10. Enhanced Planning Process Guidance • Combating the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a SECDEF top-10 priority • SPG Guidance: Develop funding options to reduce risk for: • Chem-Bio Defense Program: Address the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Defense Program (CBRNDP) capability gaps identified in the Defense Baseline Capabilities Assessment (DBCA) • Combating WMD Operations: Identify executive agents for new missions – Addressed separately through Functional Area Assessment process • WMD Infrastructure: Address intellectual and physical infrastructure recapitalization for medical and non-medical laboratories and key WMD testing and evaluation (T&E) facilities

11. DETER FORWARD SWIFTLY DEFEAT WIN DECISIVELY DETER FORWARD SHAPE SUSTAIN SHIELD Resourcing Options Risk Assessment SENSE Operational Future Institutional Force Mgt CBRNDP Infrastructure New Missions • Green – full capability, minimal risk Yellow – partial capability, moderate risk • Red– minimum capability, high risk EPP Analytical Process Architectures Concepts CBRN Operational Elements CbtWMD Architecture Non Proliferation Counter Proliferation ConsequenceManagement National Strategy to Combat WMD • BCA: • Attributes • Assumptions • Metrics National Military Strategy Joint Vision Joint Operating Concepts Force Protection Architecture Personnel Assets Information Functional Concepts Enhanced Planning Process (1) Homeland Defense (HLD) Must win, while conducting one of the following scenarios (1) (2) (4) SWIFTLY DEFEAT DETER FORWARD JPG Language DETER FORWARD SWIFTLY DEFEAT DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD Infrastructure S&T - T&E - Training Infrastructure S&T - T&E - Training DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD Nonproliferation Counterproliferation Consequence Management

12. Methodology Derived from Strategy (1) Homeland Defense Most demanding planning scenarios used (1) (4) (2) WIN DECISIVELY DETER FORWARD SWIFTLY DEFEAT SWIFTLY DEFEAT SWIFTLY DEFEAT DETER FORWARD SWIFTLY DEFEAT Infrastructure S&T - T&E - Training Infrastructure S&T - T&E - Training DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD Nonproliferation Counterproliferation • Interdiction = Proliferation Security Initiative, etc. • Elimination = WMD + Delivery Systems IAW JP 3-40 Consequence Management

13. Options Development • EPP issue team developed five options to address shortfalls in CBRND Program and related infrastructure • Cost-benefit model optimizes content of each option • Objective: Balance procurement and RDT&E to support the most demanding 1-4-2-1 scenarios: • Simultaneous HD, WD, SD, and DF • CBRN threat in all scenarios • Each option incrementally reduces risk to the force

14. IPP Implementation Approach DOD Force Protection DOD Force Protection CBRNE Project Guardian Implementation Urgent Requirement Capability Document Installation Prioritization Review Installation Annually Standards Concept of Operations

15. Services confirm list annually • Installations can be slightly reordered • to coincide with adjacent DOD installations Learn lessons first, then do OCONUS • JSIPP / IPP Implementation Timeline • FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 50 IPP ?? IPP ?? IPP 9 JSIPP 15 IPP 20 IPP 30 IPP 40 IPP 45 IPP { 9 JSIPP 15 IPP 30 IPP 40 IPP 45 IPP 50 IPP ~75 IPP From these, 15 are OCONUS TBD 20 IPP Installation Priority List

16. Upcoming Targets • COCOM Conference • Consequence Management Baseline Capabilities Assessment • Emerging Missions Functional Area/Needs Analyses • R & N

17. Nonproliferation Counterproliferation COMBATING WMD Consequence Management Homeland Security JRO-CBRND Way Ahead • Strengthening the alliance with JSTO, JPEO, industry • Using/adapting existing methodologies to address emerging mission areas • JRO for Combating WMD