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Joint Operating Environment Towards 2035

Joint Operating Environment Towards 2035. Mr. Joe Purser Director, JFCOM Futures Group. Distribution “A” Requests for this document shall be referred to: Center for Joint Futures HQ; U.S. Joint Forces Command 112 Lakeview Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

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Joint Operating Environment Towards 2035

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  1. Joint Operating Environment Towards 2035 Mr. Joe Purser Director, JFCOM Futures Group Distribution “A” Requests for this document shall be referred to: Center for Joint Futures HQ; U.S. Joint Forces Command 112 Lakeview Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697 Attn: Mr. Paul Martin, Phone: 757-203-3129 1

  2. The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) • Provides context for the future joint force – the “demand signals” for JCDE • Reviews the trends and disruptions that will create change • Trends combine in different ways to form operational contexts that will frame future challenges • Contexts lead to implications, or challenges for the joint force We won’t get it all right – but we can’t afford to get it all wrong

  3. The international environment will change – sometimes dramatically… • Demographics– migration, growth, urbanization, aging, youth bulges. • Globalization– transparency, fast-moving information and money, with global audience. • Technology – rapid rate of change, proliferation, asymmetric developments. • Scarcity of Natural Resources – food, water, energy • Rising state powers – economies, militaries, influence. • Rising power of non-state actors – growth of ideological, religious, and identity-based groups, less bound by conventions. • Weapons of Mass Destruction – Cheaper and more effective ways to kill, injure, disrupt and terrorize available to a wider array of international actors.

  4. United States 2030 Trends – U.S. Demographics Retired Cohort Wage Earning Cohort Schooling Cohort The Past The Present The Future AGE 85+ United States 2007 AGE 0-4 12 6 0 0 6 12 Male Female Millions

  5. Russia Germany Japan United States China Mexico Yemen Nigeria Brazil India Trends – World Demographics • Demographics: Population by Age • Eight billion people in the world by 2025 (2 billion more than today). • Nearly all growth in the developing world. • Absolute decline in Europe, Japan, Russia, and Korea. • The U.S. will add 50 million people by 2025 (unique among the developed countries of the world). Population Reference Bureau World Population 2008: 6.7 Billion 8 6 4 2 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

  6. Trends - Migration & Population Change Some of the world’s most important current migration routes • The Global Movement of Peoples • Unprecedented migrant flows around the world. • Muslims/Africans to Europe. • Chinese to Siberia, Central Asians to Russia • Indigenous Europeans to U.S./Australia/Canada • Latin Americans to the United States • Movement toward areas of effective governance and to cities (whether well governed or not). • Away from areas of famine, drought, floods, or other climatic disasters. • Brain drain of skilled classes from the undeveloped world.

  7. World’sLargest Cities 2005 2020 • Tokyo • Mumbai • Delhi • Dacca • Mexico City • Calcutta • Lagos • Tokyo • Mexico City • Mumbai • New York • Sao Paulo • Delhi • Calcutta Major Urban Environments • As of last year >50% of the world’s population lived in cities. Rural growth is flat. • By 2030, 65 % of humanity will live in cities – 5½ billion human beings. • Large urban areas are usually near the oceans and subject to severe environmental, social, and political pressures.

  8. Trends - Resource Scarcity: Water & Food Percent of humanity subject to water scarcity: • 2025: 10% • 2050: up to 33% • The Meaning of Food and Water Scarcity • Increasing stress on water supplies, desertification and shifting growth bands impact food production and affect regional politics. • Potential for Agflation as water, oil for fertilizer, increasingly scarce land, and overall demand drive up the cost of food. • Prices increasing as China, India, and others industrialize, leading to greater competition over natural resources.

  9. Trends - Resource Scarcity: Energy The Meaning of Energy Competition • Energy demand follows population and economic growth. • Developing countries with increasing demand seek to transition to developed status. • Liquid fossil fuels may peak before alternatives arrive. • For China alone to develop a Western middle-class would require all the world’s current energy resources. • Should encourage innovation and energy diversity

  10. Non-conventional Products and techniques Era of Peak Oil Future World Oil Production Trends - Resource Scarcity: Energy The Meaning of Energy Competition • Energy demand follows population and economic growth. • Developing countries with increasing demand seek to transition to developed status. • Liquid fossil fuels may peak before alternatives arrive. • For China alone to develop a Western middle-class would require all the world’s current energy resources. • Should encourage innovation and energy diversity 118 mb/d ? Enhanced recoveries Development of known reserves Existing Capacity

  11. Regional Share ofthe Global Economy (%) 2008 33 19 31 17 - - 2025 30 30 16 11 13 NorthAmerica EastAsia EU Other SouthAsia Trends - Economics and Globalization Global Trade and Finance 2030 • World economy doubles, from $35 trillion to $72 trillion. • Global trade triples to $27 trillion. • Persons in extreme poverty down from 1.1 billion to 550 million. • 11 countries in the developing world with populations over 100 million and GDP over $100 billion. • China, Russia, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. • Will the financial crisis change these assumptions? • The Importance of Economics and Globalization • The Rise of new Asian Economic Powers will re-orient the global economy. • China as 2nd largest economy in 2030, passing E.U. by 2015, U.S. by 2040 – perhaps sooner given western financial crisis. • India as 3rd largest economy in 2030 – passing E.U. by 2025. • Reversal of globalization would constitute a major shock with dramatic consequences • The current configuration of government entitlements, plus interest on the debt will pinch discretionary spending as government takes an increasing share of national revenue.

  12. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Trends – State Threats Russia: • Modernization based on Oil Exports • Re-investing in Military Modernization – especially Strategic Nuclear Capabilities • Assertive “Near Abroad” creating new “Frontier of Instability” • Paranoia, Nationalism, and Revanchism • Demographic Catastrophe

  13. Trends – State Threats China: • Trade & Economic Growth >8% • Regional Hegemony – String of Pearls • Market Development “the Chinese Consensus” • Economic Growth Balancing Act with Regime • Systemic Contradictions and Stresses • May be “Old” before “Rich.”

  14. Trends – State Threats The Center of Instability: • Instability across Islamic World • Modernity vs. Medievalism • Radical Islamists may take over ‘apostate’ Governments • Islands of modernity are targets • Iran’s use of regional “hybrid” proxies

  15. Critical In Danger Borderline Stable Very Stable Trends - States Increasingly Challenged to Govern • 10 Most Unstable • States 2008 • Somalia • Sudan • Zimbabwe • Chad • Iraq • Congo (Dem. Republic) • Afghanistan • Cote d’Ivoire • Pakistan • Central African Republic Source: Foreign Policy Magazine • Challenges to State Governance • Unstable multinational states. • Mismatch between borders and languages, cultures, and nationalities coupled with factionalized leadership. • Dangerous transition from authoritarianism to democracy – often fails. • Persistence of Anocracy - societies where central authority is weak or nonexistent. Kinship bonds extended by personal allegiances to tribal leaders are the principal relations.

  16. Major Space Launch Sites Mapped to Antipodes Trends – Access to New “Key Terrain” The Future of “Key Terrain” Geographic Features, trade routes, ports and airfields will remain important terrain features for the joint force commander to consider; while orbital slots, launch site antipodes, …

  17. Undersea cable Internet capacity Links – The Cyber Commons Internet users affected by outage … littoral undersea environments, fiber-optic and server hubs may be equally important in the future. DNS Root Server Locations

  18. Trends - Cyber & Information Technologies Snapshot: Global Network 2030 • Real world simulated in virtual environments • Real-time “Google Earth?” • Immersive environments • Real word infused with embedded computation • Meta-tagged world • Augmented reality • Real and Virtual Worlds merge. • Infosphere with 6 billion “human brain” equivalent – nearing the total processing power of humanity itself.

  19. Trends - Cyber & Information Technologies

  20. Trends - Emerging Technological Challenges • Mass being offset by increased precision at greater ranges at decreasing cost. All adversaries will have access to precision weaponry, e.g., laser-guided mortars and rockets. • Accelerated information technologies and massive latent computing capacity creates massive parallel network computing. • ISR will get even more intrusive and ubiquitous, requiring tremendous new information storage, processing and dissemination capabilities. • Advanced space navigation and remote sensing more widely available. • Historical Examples of Military-Technical Change • • Combined Arms/Blitzkrieg • Carrier Warfare • Amphibious Warfare • Strategic Bombing • Radar • Ballistic Missile Submarines • Stealth • Battle over Networks/Global Internet

  21. …leading to Contexts of Conflict and War • Competition and Cooperation among conventional (state)powerswill provide a number of challenges and threats to the joint force • Weak and failing states will require engagement and cooperation • Threats from Unconventional states and non-state powers that will confront us with new and innovative ways to wage war • Battle of the Narrative will bring populations directly in touch with joint force operations and shape perceptions • Large, sprawling urban areas with dynamic pressures in which the joint force must operate • Defense of the US Homeland will require operations abroad and at home Contexts are the confluence of two or more trends and illuminate why wars occur and how they might be waged.

  22. Context: Competition and Cooperation Among Conventional Powers • Potential Future Examples • Rise of China and India • Shanghai Cooperation Organization. • Relations with Europe, Japan, Korea • Russia’s “Frontier of Instability” • Historical Examples • Congress of Vienna • 1800s Monroe Doctrine • World War II • Cold War • 1990-2005 China • Implications for the Joint Force • Longer-range, more-precise weapons are more widely available and cheaper. • Adversaries able to deny access. • U.S. and others may no longer be able to operate freely in the global commons (air, sea, space). • Technology, WMD proliferation, and globalization will bring homeland into reach. • The joint force will have a role preventing conflicts between other great states. • Potential For Conflict • Relative balance of military and economic power shifts. • New combinations of regional powers/alliances. • Struggle for control of international organizations. • Risks • Growing powers not accommodated or properly represented in international forums. • Emergence of unfavorable balances of power. • Breakup of traditional alliances. • Loss of access to Global Commons • Forced U.S. isolation.

  23. Context: Weak and Failing States • Historical Examples • Ottoman Empire • China 1850-1930 • Soviet Union • Yugoslavia • Congo • Somalia • Haiti • Potential Future Examples • North Korea • Mexico • Nigeria • Pakistan • Zimbabwe • Potential For Conflict • At-risk states are: • Politically unstable • Challenged by rebels and terrorists • May resort to mass killings of civilians • Enmeshed in international crises • Risks • 77% of all conflicts involve an unstable or failing state. • Failed/Failing State = threat to international peace. • Havens for disruptive non-state actors • Implications for the Joint Force • Early identification and diagnosis. • Responding to early signs of trouble. • Capabilities to enhance or restore stability. • Mitigate effects of state failure.

  24. Context: Security In Urban Environments • Potential Future Examples • Sao Paulo • Karachi • Dacca • Cairo • Lagos • Jakarta • Historical Examples • Hue • Beirut • Sarajevo • Grozny • Fallujah • Implications for the Joint Force • Shelter from U.S. advantages in ISR and fires. • U.S. must separate adversaries from noncombatant civilian populations • Governance & stability packages • High casualty rates • Context for Homeland Security as well • Risks • Humanitarian disaster. • Haven for international terrorists. • Fortress for conventional forces. • Potential For Conflict • Wars occur where humans live. • Most human wealth is located in cities. • Cities provide paces to hide. • Connects to: • Financial resources • Travel systems • Communication networks

  25. Contexts: Threats of Unconventional Power and Battle of Narratives over Global Networks • Potential Future Examples • Anarcho-Environmentalists • “Black Hat” Hacktivists • Al Qaida 2.0/3.0 • Western Transnationalists • Transnational corporations • Hezbollah • Historical Examples • COMINTERN • Vietnam War (Battle of the Narrative) • Hezbollah • Tamil Tigers • Al Qaida • Implications for the Joint Force • Battle of Narratives. • Identities forged via the internet and other communications technologies. • Able to take advantage of the forces of globalization. • Will fight without adherence to formal conventions. • NGO’s can help with local cultural awareness. • Potential For Conflict • Identity rooted in social and cultural blood and soil connections. • States must increasingly compete for allegiance. • Human migration and ubiquitous communications complicate identities. • Changing politics in developed countries • Risks • Erosion of U.S. led, state-based international system. • “Democratization of Violence.” • Swarming Terrorism • Erosion of U.S. “Identity.”

  26. Context: Protection of the Homeland • Potential Future Examples • Pandemic/Natural Disaster • Border Defense • National Missile Defense • Adversary use of Media • Cybersecurity against massive cyberattack • Terrorism/SOF Infiltration • Secession/Rebellion • Historical Examples • War of 1812 • Villa Incursion • Pearl Harbor • Anthrax Attacks • Hurricane Katrina • Infiltration of Illegal Immigrants • Implications for the Joint Force • Increased role for the Joint Force in domestic disasters • Attacks against the Joint Force at home bases possible. • Protection of “homeland” may include elements of cyberspace • Direct “attacks” against U.S. perceptions and National Will • Potential For Conflict • Homeland no longer “off limits” for adversaries • Greater technological reach by adversaries • More access to the U.S. through ports/airlines/computer networks/space/ISR • Federalization of natural disasters • Risks • Domestic security concerns overwhelm local/state authorities • Access to our population • US unable to secure its borders from multiple, overlapping challenges

  27. Implications - Adaptability of Future Adversaries • Adversaries do not wage discrete land, sea, air, space or cyberspace wars - Instead, they use all elements of power to wage war • Adversaries are examining the U.S. way of war, and developing different technical capabilities to negate U.S technological advantages or to exploit technologies as military capabilities • Adversaries will adapt military practice to: • construct a mix of conventional, irregular warfare, and nuclear threats • blur the line between political conflict and open war • place U.S. forces in strategic dilemmas by developing strategies to avoid our advantages and confront us with their own asymmetries. • They will use: • Globally ranging networks and open-source capabilities (internet, commercial navigation and imagery) • Increasing technical equality to make anti-access strategies challenging in all domains. • Mobility, mass, information, and precision fires on U.S. forces while denying our ability to respond

  28. Professional Military Education PME must develop broad understanding of the world More detailed cultural training and awareness Personnel Systems Transform mobilization-based development paradigm Incentivize adaptability and innovation Defense Economics and Acquisition Adversaries outpacing our system Tempo of acquisition is having strategic effects Some Leading Questions

  29. 2008 Stabilization Act +5% GDP US Spending vs. Tax Revenues as a Percentage of GDP The current configuration of government entitlements, plus interest on the debt will pinch discretionary spending as government takes an increasing share of national revenue

  30. Much about conflict will remain the same… • War is a human endeavor • War is an extension of policy • Local political considerations will (continue) to dominate. • Democratization of politics, by extension, will be the democratization of war. • Our enemies will continue to target our vulnerabilities • Enemy is a willful, learning, and adaptive force • The enemy will likely be able to learn and adapt faster than we can unless we change • Friction is unavoidable – technology can not erase it • Surprise will continue to be a major factor – maybe the dominant factor Must build a force that is adaptable, agile, and resilient

  31. Questions? Center for Joint Futures Joseph.purser@jfcom.mil https//www.jfcom.mil/ The JOE 2008 is available for download at: http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf The JOE Overview Fact Sheet is available at: http://www.jfcom.mil/about/facts_prt/JOE2008.pdf Distribution “A” Requests for this document shall be referred to: Center for Joint Futures HQ; U.S. Joint Forces Command 112 Lakeview Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697 Attn: Mr. Paul Martin, Phone: 757-203-3129 32

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