Threat modeling

1. Threat modeling Aalto University, autumn 2012

2. Threats • Threat = something bad that can happen • Given an system or product • Assets: what is there to protect? • What are the threats against these assets? • How serious are the threats i.e. what is the risk?

3. [Internet, originalsourceunknown]

4. [Internet, originalsourceunknown]

5. Security “pixie dust” • Security mechanism are often applied without particular reason • Cryptography, especially encryption does not in itself make your system secure • If there is no explanation why some security mechanism is used, ask questions: • What threats does it protect against? • What if we just remove it? • Is there something simpler or more suitable for the purpose?  Must understand threats before applying security mechanisms

6. Threat modeling approaches • Different angles to threat modeling: • Assets: what is valuable in the system and how could it be lost? • Attackers and their motivations: who would want to do something bad and why? • Engineering: what parts are there in the system and how could they be caused to fail? • Defenses: what (more) could be done to prevent or mitigate attacks? • Checklists: what have we learned from the past?

7. Casestudy • Public transportation tickets

8. Assets • Transport capacity (seats) • Right to travel • Payment • Ticket • Balance on the card • Money from ticket purchases • IT system and its components • Card reader (ticket validator) in vehicle or station • Backend system (The list is by no means complete)

9. Potential attackers and attacks • Passengers: don’t want to pay, want to travel free • Travel without ticket • Bypass check-in: jumping the gate, use middle door, using HSL rail traffic without a ticket • Counterfeit tickets • Load money or time on the travel card (technical attacks against smart card) • Sale of fake tickets • Travel with wrong ticket or share tickets: • Travel in the wrong zone, use wrong discount ticket, intentionally broken ticket • Travel with another person’s period tickets, pass-back, reselling daily tickets • Ticket theft and sale of stolen tickets • DoS: all get in free, vandalism • Bus driver: wants more money • Steal fare money, sell tickets without paying in the money (without receipt?) • Let friends in free • Bus operator • Tax fraud • Subsidy fraud • Traffic authority?

10. Public transport ticketing Clearing Possibly multiple operators Operator backend system Internet shop Connections over Internet Station and depot systems Wireless data POS terminal Vehicle terminal NFC interface Travel card

11. Systematicthreatanalysis

12. Basic security goals • Consider first the well-known security goals: • Confidentiality • Integrity • Availability • Authentication • Authorization • Non-repudiation • Which goals apply to the system? How could they be violated?

13. Threat trees [source: Microsoft]

14. STRIDE • STRIDE model used at Microsoft: • Spoofing vs. authentication • Tampering vs. integrity • Repudiation vs. non-repudiation • Information disclosure vs. confidentiality • Denial of service vs. availability • Elevation of privilege vs. authorization • Idea: divide the system into components and analyze each component for these threats • Note: security of components is necessary but not sufficient for the security of the system

15. STRIDE • Model the system as a data flow diagram (DFD) • Data flows: network connections, RPC • Data stores: files, databases • Processes: programs, services • Interactors: users, clients, services etc. connected to the system • Also mark the trust boundaries in the DFD • Consider the following threats:

16. [source: Microsoft]

17. Risk assessment • Risk assessment is very subjective • Risk = probability of attack × damage in euros • 0 < Risk < 1 • Risk = low / medium / high • Numerical risk values tend to be meaningless: • What does risk level 0.4 mean in practice? • Usually difficult to assess absolute risk but easier to prioritize threats • Risk assessment models, e.g. DREAD • Damage: how much does the attack cost to defender? • Reproducibility: how reliable is the attack • Exploitability: how much work to implement the attack? • Affected users: how many people impacted? • Discoverability: how likely are the attackers to discover the vulnerability?

18. Pitfalls in risk assessment • The systematic threat analysis methods help but there is no guarantee of find all or even the most important threats • You need to understand the system: technology, architecture, stakeholders and business model • Attackers are clever and invent new threats while threat analysis often enumerates old ones • Always start by considering assets and attackers, not technology or security mechanisms

19. Saltzer and Schroeder • Design principles that help avoid problems • Violations often indicate vulnerabilities • Saltzer and Schroeder design principles [CACM 1974]: • Economy of mechanism: keep the design simple • Fail-safe defaults: fail towards denying access • Complete mediation: check authorization of every access request • Open design: assume attacker knows the system internals • Separation of privilege: require two separate keys or other ways to check authorization whenever possible • Least privilege: give only the necessary access rights • Least common mechanisms: ensure failures stay local • Psychological acceptability: design security mechanism that are easy to use correctly

20. What next? • After identifying threats, we must assess the risk, prioritize the threats and choose countermeasures • The process is iterative i.e. new analysis must be done after designing the system with countermeasures • More detailed threat models can be done for each system component • Threat analysis should be done during system design but can also be done on existing systems

21. Reading material • Dieter Gollmann: Computer Security, 2nd ed., chapter 1.4.3 • Ross Anderson: Security Engineering, 2nd ed., chapter 25 • Online resources: • OWASP, Threat Risk Modeling, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Threat_Risk_Modeling • MSDN, Uncover Security Design Flaws Using The STRIDE Approach, http://msdn.microsoft.com/fi-fi/magazine/cc163519(en-us).aspx • MSDN, Improving Web Application Security: Threats and Countermeasures, Chapter 3http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff648644.aspx

22. Exercises • Analyze the threats in the following systems: • Oodi student register, https://oodi.aalto.fi/ • Noppa • Remote read electric meter • University card keys • Traffic light priority control for public transportation • Lyyra student card, https://www.lyyra.fi/ (based on Sony FeliCa contactless ICC) • What are the assets and potential attackers? • Apply the STRIDE model or threat trees; this will require you to model the system first