The Causal Theory of Reference

1. The Causal Theory of Reference

2. Explaining Reference • Kripke: a name refers to a thing if there is the right sort of causal link between the thing and the use of the name • This causal link is equivalent to Frege’s sense • It is explicable in purely physicalist terms

3. Baptism • The event that fixes the reference of a term is a baptism or dubbing • Point at dog and say ‘this is Fido’ • Establishes a causal link between term and thing • Causal link exists for all witnesses of this act

4. Borrowing • Those who don’t witness baptism have to ‘borrow’ reference • They are causally linked to other users who have the referencing ability • Ultimately all referencing depends on causal connections to witnesses of the baptism • We can talk about Napoleon because we are causally connected in the right way to someone who saw Napoleon, and to the one who named him.

5. Advantages • It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ • The sense of ‘Venus’ is different from the sense of ‘Phosphorus’ because the causal chain that links Venus to ‘Venus’ is different from that which links Venus to ‘Phosphorus’

6. Advantages • It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ • Sense determines reference, and the causal chain determines reference by being linked to the relevant thing

7. Advantages • It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ • To understand the meaning of a word is to grasp the sense • The causal chain from use of a term to the thing itself must pass through the brain • It depends on some causal features in the brain • Which is why not all brains can have the right causal links • Animals, for example • Those causal features are the grasping of the sense

8. Advantages • Solves the ‘puzzles’ of reference • How do Venus is the evening star Venus is Venushave different meanings though their referents are identical? • Because the meanings are constructed out of senses and the senses/causal links are different for ‘Venus’ and the ‘evening star’

9. Advantages • Solves the ‘puzzles’ of reference • How can we talk about things that don’t exist? • There can’t be causal links to non-existent things • Consider how the name ‘Pegasus’ is introduced • Described as a horse with wings • The terms ‘horse’ and ‘wing’ both refer • Those terms have causal chains • Therefore ‘Pegasus’ has a causal chain

10. Advantages • Solves the ‘puzzles’ of reference • How can we say that things don’t exist? • There can’t be causal links to non-existent things • The ‘Pegasus’ solution works here too

11. Problems • Change of reference Two babies are born, and their mothers bestow names upon them. A nurse inadvertently switches them and the error is never discovered. It will henceforth undeniably be the case that the man universally known as ‘Jack’ is so called because a woman dubbed some other baby with the name.

12. Problems • Change of reference • There are multiple chains between terms and referents • Every introduction forms another chain from Bob to ‘Bob’ • Some may link the referent and different terms,Others may link the same term to different referents • If too many link a referent and a different term then that term becomes the name of the object

13. Problems • Quâ-problem • I point at a dog and say ‘Fido’ • Why have I named the particular dog and not the species, or the dog’s nose, or an air molecule at the end of my finger, or the idea of the dog, or … • It’s the intention of the grounder to name the dog • The intention must be a describable one • So descriptions are again required

14. Problems • Natural kind terms • The solution to the quâ-problem requires descriptions of natural kind terms • They have all the same problems as in pure description theories • Modal Problem • “Tigers are wild striped felines” • There’s a possible world where they don’t have stripes • Because there are no Freemasons • They are still tigers

15. Problems • Natural kind terms • The solution to the quâ-problem requires descriptions of natural kind terms • They have all the same problems as in pure description theories • Necessity Problem • You don’t need to be able to describe an elm in order to be able to refer to it

16. Problems • Natural kind terms • The solution to the quâ-problem requires descriptions of natural kind terms • They have all the same problems as in pure description theories • Sufficiency Problem • Pegasus is the winged horse • But if we find a winged horse created by Freemasons in Tibet by gene-splicing, that wouldn’t be Pegasus

17. Problems • Twin-Earth is a planet just like Earth except water there is not H2O, but XYZ • ‘Water’ as said by a twin-Earthling does not mean the same as ‘water’ said by an Earthling • Yet everything is the same. • Descriptions can’t give the meanings of terms • Meanings just ‘ain’t in the head’