A Social Environment Model of Socio-technical Performance

1. A Social Environment Model of Socio-technical Performance Brian Whitworth Institute of Information and Mathematical Sciences, Massey University, Albany, New Zealand

2. Socio-technical levels

3. Homo-Economicus • Individual does what benefits themselves, by reduced effort, increased gain, or both • Mill’s economic man, who seeks wealth, leisure, luxury and procreation • Competition for limited resources creates a need for competence

4. Individuals Competing Model

5. Rule 1: The Selfish Rule • Freely acting individuals {I1, I2 …} face action choices {a1, a2 …} with expected individual unit values outcomes {IU(a1), IU(a2), …} follow the rule:If IU(ai) > IU(aj) an individual should prefer ai over ajSelfish individual choose acts expected to give more valueto yourself. • A defeasible rule • Value includes psychological gains like appreciation, or social gains like reputation

6. Homo sociologicus • Our bodies are cooperative cell colonies, with cancer what happens when cells “defect” • Ants and bees form massively cooperative societies by genetics - the competing evolutionary unit is the colony not the individual, i.e. Biologists now argue for multi-level selection • Marx’s communist man • Social cooperation creates synergy benefits

7. Communities Cooperating Model

8. Rule 2: The Social Rule • If a social unit S of { I1, I2 …} individuals faces social action choices {a1, a2 …} with expected social unit values of {SU(a1), SU(a2), …}, then:If SU(ai) > SU(aj) then prefer ai over aj • Socialized individuals choose social acts expected to give more value to the communityNote: Social acts reference social units not individuals, e.g. “defend society” is independent of individual state. Allows social “castes” like worker or soldier

9. Synergy • Difference between what individuals produce as a social unit vs what they produce alone • Trade illustrates positive synergy • Conflict illustrates negative synergy • Generally pays individuals to join positive synergy social units, and leave negative ones (they are better off alone) • A property of the number of interactions, not the number of group members

10. The Social Dilemma • While genetics drives ant society, people can choose to follow Rule 1 or 2 • What if Rule 1 conflicts with Rule 2?i.e. what is good for society is not what is good for the individual? • Only Rule 2 allows synergy gains, but Rule 1 is the primal rule in nature

11. The Prisoner’s Dilemma • Prisoners Bill and Bob face two year jail for a crime they did commit • Each can plea bargain to testify against the other • If Bill testifies and Bob doesn’t, he walks free and Bob gets 7 years jail • If both testify, both get six years (one off for testifying). By Rule 1 it always pays individuals to defect

12. Other Social Dilemmas • Tragedy of the commons: • Farmers by a commons with cows and a land plot • If a farmer grazes the commons, his herd grows fat • If all farmers do so, it is overgrazed and dies off • Parallels modern conservation problems • Volunteer dilemma • Social loafing • False representation, etc, … • Individuals alone can’t solve social dilemmas, one “do gooder” is just a “sucker”

13. Social Instability • Anti-social acts like stealing “short-circuit” synergy gains • Each defection reduces synergy in a cascade effect • Rule 1: Synergy is unstable Peak of Synergy Valleys of Defection

14. Zero-Sum Barrier Non-Zero-sum:Expand the pie – to expand your slice! Zero-sum:Expand your slice – world domination! Human civilization somehow achieved massive non-zero-sum gains by non-genetic means

15. Social Order • In perfect social order all individuals are “one mind”, cf in a crystal all atoms move as one • Social anarchy- gas atoms move individually • A community with social order, by religion, culture or laws, avoids stealing and cheating (social disorder) • Can solve the social dilemma by following Rule2, but at the expense of freedom/Rule1 • “Barbarians” (Rule 1) vs “Civilization” (Rule 2)

16. Social inventions • Unfairness. Not inequity—unequal distribution of outcomes—but not distributing outcomes according to contribution, e.g. that fit adults live idly while others work to support them is unfair • Justice—punish unfairness so Rule 1 no longer profits—social order plus individual freedom • Social unit transmits world requirements (accountability) • People have a natural justice perception • Revenge is a primitive form of justice • State justice (police, laws, courts, prisons) aims to deny unfairness (Rawls, 2001)

17. Social Hijack • Individuals take social control for their own ends, just as a virus hijack a cell • Benevolent dictators (Plato) enforce social order (synergy), then justly return the gains to society • Dictators keep control by repressing and indoctrinating • Dictatorships are: • Unstable. Slaves have “nothing to lose but their chains” Marx • Impermanent. Kings, emperors, pharaohs, etc die, leaving a power vacuum. Bloodline dynasties over time produce incompetent offspring • Unproductive. In Zimbabwe Mugabe addressed social inequity by driving white farmers off productive farms, then gave them to cronies who looted - turned Zimbabwe from the bread-basket of Africa into the basket-case of Africa.

18. The golden rules • Do unto others as you would they do unto you • Rabbi Hillel’s sum of all rules: “If you don’t like it done to you, don’t do it to others”. • Kant’s proposal: “Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”, i.e. if everyone does it, is it still successful? • Pareto’s optimality principle: “Good actions benefit at least one other and do no harm.” • Rawl’s “veil of ignorance” requires state justice to be “blind” to individual needs. • Harsanyi rules out immoral or anti-social acts (Harsanyi, 1988). All encourage free individuals to choose Rule 2

19. Social environment Model

20. Good Citizen Rule 3 Rule 3 a. If {SU(ai) ≥ SU(aj) and IU(ai) > IU(aj)} then prefer ai to aj Choose acts that don’t harm society significantly, but benefit oneself OR b. If {IU(ai) ≥ IU(aj) and SU(ai) > SU(aj) }then prefer ai to aj Choose acts that don’t harm oneself significantly, but benefit society Rule 3 is a hybrid of Rule 1 and 2

21. Self vs Community Choices Rule 3 favors service, synergy and opportunity

22. Socio-technology • Online people help others they have not met and may not meet again, Neither Rule 1 nor Rule 3a explain this • Socio-technical systems succeed by good citizens – “small heroes” doing small selfless acts for others • That virtue” is productive and supportable by technology is an important social discovery (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006) • Socio-technical systems are a new social form, that change the social focus from denying defection to enabling good citizenship, e.g. open source

23. Examples

24. Other applications • Enron – A higher form of cheating • Credit crunch – A higher form of incompetence (in risk management) • Social inflation – When social environments ignore the demands of their environment, and social tokens lose external value, e.g. money (social token) loses value relative to external standard of a loaf of bread • Rectification –the demands of outer environments ultimately “cascade” over inner ones

25. Modelling Social Behavior?? • Social Foxes/Rabbits • As before PLUS • Combine: If both agree, form combined unit with double rewards plus synergy • Defect: If in combined state, • Defector gets plus synergy • Sucker gets minus synergy • Foxes/Rabbits • Move • Predate • Breed In Rule 2 state each creates others synergy