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LIEBE Project Review: Radioprotection, Isotopes Inventory, and Risk Analysis

This review covers radioprotection measures, isotopes inventory, ALARA principles, risk analysis, and specific safety considerations of the LIEBE Project. It examines the production of polonium, isotopes inventory validation, ALARA dose rates, risk analysis, and prevention strategies for potential hazards.

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LIEBE Project Review: Radioprotection, Isotopes Inventory, and Risk Analysis

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  1. LIEBE Project review Safety work-package25.06.2014 V.Barozier2, AP.Bernardes2, J.Blaha2, M.Delonca2, A.Marchix1, T.Melo Mendonca2, T.Stora2, J.Vollaire2 Cea Saclay1, Cern2

  2. Outline • Radioprotection • Isotopes inventory • ALARA • Risk analysis • Similar to a static target • Specific LIEBE • Conclusion LIEBE Project Meeting

  3. Outline • Radioprotection • Isotopes inventory • ALARA • Risk analysis • Similar to a static target • Specific LIEBE • Conclusion LIEBE Project Meeting

  4. Radioprotection (p,xn) (β-) (n,γ) 209Bi 210-xPo (209Po: T1/2=102 y, 208Po: T1/2= 2.898 y) 209Bi 210Bi 210Po (T1/2=138 d) • Production of Polonium • Direct production via (p,xn) reactions on 209Bi • β-decay from 210Bi produced by neutron activation • Secondary helium-induced reactions in Bi and Pb neutron activation Secondary reactions Release of polonium is a driving element for safety  Already true for the static Pb-Bi target. Contamination is already managed at ISOLDE LIEBE Project Meeting

  5. Isotopes Inventory Main contributor in terms of radiotoxicity (>1% of total) is defined by the LA (N.B. Authorization Limits take into account the radiotoxicology of the given nuclide, Ref:ORaP*) 1 LA  5mSv dose due to inhalation exposure Acknowledgment J.Blaha/CERN, A.Marchix/CEA

  6. Isotopes Inventory After 1 year Acknowledgment J.Blaha/CERN, A.Marchix/CEA LIEBE Project Meeting

  7. Isotopes Inventory Validation of simulation with irradiated Pb-Bi samples on ISOLDE proton beam Pb-Bi samples irradiation and comparison with simulation for validation of activities inventory FLUKA (CERN) and MCNPX INCL4.6 – ABLA07 Isotopes inventory Total intensity : 3.22.E13 protons Acknowledgment J.Blaha/CERN, A.Marchix/CEA, M Melo Delonca/CERN, S.Lahiri/SINP LIEBE Project Meeting

  8. Isotopes Inventory Ratio between calculated and measured activities (calculation with INCL4.6-ABLA07/CINDER) Within factor 3 between measured and calculated activity Large discrepancies for nuclides closed to 1 Bq activity Acknowledgment A.Marchix/CEA, M Melo Delonca/CERN, S.Lahiri/SINP LIEBE Project Meeting

  9. Outline • Radioprotection • Isotopes inventory • ALARA • Risk analysis • Similar to a static target • SpecificLIEBE • Conclusion LIEBE Project Meeting

  10. ALARA Dose rate for the Pb388 target at 2m30 from the target – 1E18 protons Decay time start-up ≈10mSv/h. Storage of the target Factor 2 After 1 day decay Acknowledgment A.Dorsival LIEBE Project Meeting

  11. ALARA •  New fast connectors are needed • Modification is needed on irradiated Front-end to avoid to send people to disconnect the target after irradiation • Cooling system and pump as well Acknowledgment T.Melo Mendonca and V.Barozier/CERN LIEBE Project Meeting

  12. Outline • Radioprotection • Isotopes inventory • ALARA • Risk analysis • Similar to a static target • Specific LIEBE • Conclusion LIEBE Project Meeting

  13. Risk analysis – Similar to a static target Shock wave due to beam on Pb-Bi may induce dramatic failures of the loop Instantaneous power: ≈ 1 GW Installation was not jeopardised because of the external vessel acting as double envelope Beam window container rupture of a Pb static target due to beam impact LIEBE Project Meeting

  14. Risk analysis – Similar to a static target Preventing shock wave due to beam on Pb-Bi • Prevention: • ANSYS calculation to be finished to demonstrate no failure on beam window or grids • Safety barriers • Vessel is enclosing the full Pb-Bi loop including the filling tank and acts as double envelope • Leak detection LIEBE Project Meeting

  15. Risk analysis – Similar to a static target Transfer of Pb-Bi liquid to the FE Prevention NaF salt going through the ion source from the target container to the off-line after a chemical reaction • No direct link between the container and chimney • Inlet pipe to chimney tilted • Maximum volume of Pb-Bi inside diffusion chamber lower than inlet pipe height

  16. Risk analysis – Similar to a static target Water leak inside target Prevention/Protection • Leak detection on off-line prior putting a target on line • Welding pressure test before acceptance. Electron beam welding preferred from brazing. Cold line enclosed. • LIEBE leak detection • Vessel Enclosure 20°C 20°C Target base cool down with water LIEBE Project Meeting

  17. Outline • Radioprotection • Isotopes inventory • ALARA • Risk analysis • Similar to a static target • Specific LIEBE • Conclusion LIEBE Project Meeting

  18. Risk analysis – Specific to LIEBE target Water leak heat exchanger Prevention External vessel in between water and LBE LIEBE Project Meeting

  19. Risk analysis – Specific to LIEBE target Solidification of Pb-Bi (cold point or oxides) Prevention/Protection • - The loop will be sized and pressure tested at 1.43 of nominal pressure • 18 thermocouples around the loop will be installed instead of 3 for a static target • Filling container and procedure • Vessel enclosure • Leak detection LIEBE Project Meeting

  20. Risk analysis – Specific to LIEBE target Target Handling Prevention • Target compatible with robot before and after operation (gravity center modified) • Robot tests with LIEBE target foreseen • Pump may as well be installed with robot  to be tested LIEBE Project Meeting

  21. Outline • Radioprotection • Isotopes inventory • ALARA • Risk analysis • Similar to a static target • Specific LIEBE • Conclusion LIEBE Project Meeting

  22. Conclusion • Isotopes inventory done • ALARA principle to be developed and tested • Preliminary Failures analysis and input on design done. • Failure analysis to be updated with tests on loop LIEBE Project Meeting

  23. Acknowledgements CEA: A.Marchix CERN: V.Barozier, J.Blaha, M.Delonca, T.Melo Mendonca, T.Stora, J.Vollaire IPUL: K.Kravalis, R.Nikoluskins PSI: D.Schumann SCK.CEN: D.Houngbo, L.Popescu, P.Schuurmans SINP: S.Lahiri LIEBE Project Meeting

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