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On explaining cooperation: Linking Psychology and Biology

On modeling cooperation: Linking the laboratory to the real world Richard Schuster Department of Psychology University of Haifa (Israel) University of Haifa’s Forum on Research Methods – 4 April, 2006.

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On explaining cooperation: Linking Psychology and Biology

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  1. On modeling cooperation:Linking the laboratory to the real worldRichard SchusterDepartment of Psychology University of Haifa (Israel)University of Haifa’s Forum on Research Methods – 4 April, 2006

  2. On modeling cooperation:Linking the laboratory to the real worldRichard SchusterDepartment of Psychology University of Haifa (Israel)University of Haifa’s Forum on Research Methods – 4 April, 2006 On explaining cooperation: Linking Psychology and Biology

  3. The focus of this series is on interdisciplinary research My talk is on cooperation. And how I use an “Interdisciplinary approach” This can means many things…... Today I mean explanation: how do we answer the question “why cooperate? I will talk about the advantages from distinguishing between two kinds of explanation……. Psychological and Evolutionary ….and then combining them within an integrated psycho-biological framework…

  4. A Behavioral/Psychological explanation looks at the influences on the behavior of cooperating by individuals at the time that the behavior is performed.

  5. Behavioral / psychological explanation: this offers a proximate explanation in answer to the question “Why cooperate?” Aristotle called this an efficient cause whose action produces a change of state: the kinds of causes that explain who behaves, when, how often, in what form ………… Individual causes:stimuli; learning history (memories); current states of motivation emotion and physiology; outcomes: rewards, etc Social causes: presence of others: which others, ranks, past interactions… What kinds of things are explained?/who cooperates and who does not (individual differences)/how often a given individual will engage in cooperation/how is cooperation performed – the behavior, coordinated, cues…/whether a given individual would choose cooperation when non-cooperation is also available as an option

  6. One Behavioral /Psychological factor I will emphasize today is engaging in the behavior of cooperating: By “behaving cooperatively,” I will refer to dimensions of behavior associated with cooperating that are not associated with not-cooperating. For example, cooperation includes non-random choosing of partners that use each other to work together for shared outcomes based on coordination, complementary roles, social cues, etc etc…………. I will ask whether “behaving cooperatively”is associated with intrinsic states (emotions and the like) that are also part of the answer to the proximate question “Why cooperate?” Is cooperating intrinsically pleasurable? rewarding? motivating?

  7. An Economic/Evolutionaryexplanation: this looks mainly at outcomes that are linked to behaving cooperatively with the potential to benefit individuals (economic outcomes). Such benefits may not follow as direct outcomes from cooperating, they can occur at any time during an individual’s lifetime and they have the potential to influence natural selection.

  8. Evolutionary / economic explanation: this provides what is often called an ultimate explanation The link to evolution offers an ultimate explanation because it offers an answer to the “whyquestion” that is framed as “why the behavior might have come to exist as an adaptation molded by evolution.” It asks not what influences individuals when they cooperate – but how much cooperation “pays” or is beneficial/profitable to the individual at any time during its lifetime how outcomes can contribute to evolutionary fitness by increasing individual success and ultimately reproductive success. In animals, “outcome” in this context usually refers to cooperation that pays off economically in things like more food from hunting cooperatively, or a victory from fighting cooperatively that leads to larger territory and/or more mating partners.

  9. This economic evolutionary approach also uses economic outcomes to distinguish between cooperation and other social behaviors…. • e.g., Robert Trivers, The Evolution of Social Behavior (1985): • “…social acts” are classified by individual outcomes: • both parties gain (cooperative)….. • the actor confers a benefit but suffers a cost (altruistic), • the actor gains while inflicting a cost (selfish)

  10. Unlike a proximate or efficient cause, evolution does not explain what triggers cooperation in any individual during its lifetime.Instead, before an individual is born, natural selection has already weeded out genes that reduced the fitness of ancestors, and the selected genes explain a potential to cooperatethat is only expressed when the favorable conditions arise. A proximate explanation is still needed to explain what makes a given individual behave, how, how often, with whom……..

  11. Another way to look at the difference between proximate and ultimate explanations is to look only at outcomes and to distinguish betweenshort- and long-term outcomesfollowing an act of cooperation. Assume a cooperative (or any) behavior is performed: The short-term outcomes are the outcomes linked to the psychology of cooperation by operating in the “here-and now” to determine the likelihood of that an individual will engage in the behavior via processes underlying perceptions, motivations, incentives, emotional states, reinforcements …….at the time of engaging in the behavior. The long term-outcomes are the profitable, economic and fitness-determining consequences at any time during the life of an individual or its kin that are linked to cooperation and determine its evolution via natural selection. These can emerge months or years later. The link between them: short-term outcomes can activate proximate mechanisms that function to evoke behaviors that are ultimately beneficial by leading eventually to long-term profitable outcomes.

  12. There are four points to know about the differences between short- and long-term outcomes …. 1) Short- and long-term outcomes can be different – in different currencies. Two examples: play and illness.

  13. Consider the widespread behavior of playin animals and humans. We can speak of a behavioral “bias to play”because individuals – usually young ones but not only - expend time and energy when engaging in play that is not immediately compensated by any economic outcomes such as food. Why do this? Many will say that play leads to improving skills that will eventually increase success over the life span: ex. play hunting and play fighting. This is the ultimate evolutionary explanation. But how do they know? The likely answer is that they don’t. So why do they do it? They are having a good time. This then is the proximate / behavioral explanation: processes of motivation, emotion and reward that evolved to make the behavior happen in the first place and thereby lead to the ultimate payoffs.

  14. Another example of the difference between proximate and ultimate: illness Proximate dimensions: Disease symptoms such as fever, pain, sweating, loss of appetite, psychological states, misery are evoked by reactions in the body to pathogens and their effects on systems….. Ultimate dimensions: Symptoms are signs of evolved mechanisms that indicate the operation of defenses against invading pathogens…….the symptoms are in fact linked to advantages that increase survival. As with play, the operation of proximate and ultimate processes are both explanatory – and complementary – for explaining disease ………..

  15. 2) Time –lag: There can be a substantial time lag between the outcomes that influence behavior and the outcomes that influence evolution. Long-term outcomes can guide evolution, but they often cannot be used as an explanation of behavior when it occurs. The reason: discounting.. Discounting function: rapid decrease in the value of delayed outcomes Value of outcome 0………………....x Time

  16. 3. Some kinds of outcomes can only influence cooperation via proximate processes……. Events like intrinsic emotional states (pleasure, empathy….) can be linked to engaging in cooperation with others for shared outcomes: “helping another costs me but it feels good” Such outcomes provide proximate explanations when they function as incentives or goals that motivate and reinforce cooperation when it is performed. But such outcomes do not in and of themselves provide a contribution to fitness unless they also lead later to beneficial economic outcomes – but this is not always guaranteed.

  17. 4) The same beneficial economic outcomes can sometimes operate as both proximate and ultimate outcomes……. Some kinds of outcomes - like food, money, mating partners etc – are both economically valuable and can be immediately gained following cooperation. Such outcomes provide a proximate explanation when they function as hedonic incentives or goals that motivate and reinforce cooperate when it is emitted: the Law of Effect of learning theories. Economists speak of “utility” or “expected utility” as a psychological quantity that represents the value of an outcome for an individual – an incentive to behave…and value as we know can be a relative thing………. But the same outcomes also provide an ultimate explanation if they are the kinds of beneficial outcomes that influence natural selection.

  18. Which kind of explanation is preferable?It would not matter if proximate outcomes mapped onto long-term beneficial consequences that elevate fitness. Immediate and long-term benefits would then offer different measures of the same cause. Either could be measured. But the type of explanation does matter when cooperation occurs at levels that exceed predictions from the economic outcomes available at the time of cooperating: there is too much cooperation which we call a “bias to cooperate”

  19. But first…..I want to suggest that our understanding of cooperation is incomplete and even distorted when explanation and methodology are dominated by an economic perspective. I take advantage of a historical tilt or bias towards the economic/evolutionary type of explanation as capable of offering the more powerful or fundamental way to answer the question “why cooperate?” I will refer to three variants of this perspective: the Evolutionary the Behaviorist and the Game-theoretical

  20. The historical bias towards economic/evolutionary explanations:1. Explanation.

  21. Here is an example of the Behaviorist perspective, anchored in the Law of Effect that explains how the likelihood of cooperation is determined by its reinforcing consequences following the behavior of individuals… B.F. Skinner (Science and Human Behavior, 1953, pp. 297-298): “.... a 'social law' must be generated by the behavior of individuals. It is always an individual who behaves, ….andhe behaves with the same body and according to the same processes as in a non-social situation." Note that “social behavior” as a distinct category of action has been defined into non-existence

  22. Here is an example of the Evolutionaryperspective from behavioral ecologists who use game theory models to focus on cooperation whose evolution is determined by beneficial outcomes that elevate fitness • Since 1981, game theoretical models have been a large part of the literature of animal cooperation. ….The game matrix focuses not on the nature of the behaviours involved but on their economic consequences. Game theory's significance as a tool for modeling cooperation hinges on the idea that one can determine which combinations of actions are cooperative by examining the game matrix. Hence, students of game theory prefer a view of cooperation that de-emphasizes the behavioural properties of an interaction, and focuses on the economic consequences of an interaction. • We argue that the economic definition of cooperation is the best option because it can be objectively applied, and it offers us the powerful tools of game theory. • Students of social behaviour should recognize as an economically defined interaction that may or may not involve coordination. …we argue that cooperation is an outcome, not a mechanism. • (and then go on to show cooperation without coordination or awareness…… in ants) • D.W. Stephens & J.P Anderson, Animal Behaviour, 1997

  23. …and here is the samegame-theory bias from economic theorists… Karl Sigmund, Ernst Fehr & Martin A. Nowak,Scientific American, January 2002:“It may seem callous to reduce altruism to considerations of costs and benefits, especially if these originate in biological needs. Many of us prefer to explain our generous actions simply by invoking our good character. We feel better if we help others and share with them. But where does this inner glow come from?It has a biological function. We eat and make love because we enjoy it, but behind the pleasure stands the evolutionary program commanding us to survive and procreate.In a similar way, social emotions such as friendship, shame, generosity and guilt prod us toward achieving biological success in complex social networks.”

  24. Game theorytreats outcomes as both a proximate cause influencing individual motivation and behavior and as surrogates for fitness that determine evolution Analogous economic processesare assumed to operate, maximizing economically-important outcomes that determine the emergence of cooperation as a consequence of both proximate psychological processes (learning, etc) and ultimate processes of natural selection.

  25. The historical bias towards economic/evolutionary explanations:2. Methodology

  26. The issue of methodology arises because the different kinds of explanations – proximate vs. ultimate - have been associated with different ways of modeling and analyzing cooperation in the laboratory. The domination of evolutionary / economic explanations is associated with 50+ years of experimental models that de-emphasize the influence of behavior by exaggerating the role of payoffs. The influence of behavior is dismissed in both method and theory. This was achieved by minimizing or totally removing the social properties of behaving cooperatively that are intrinsic to many kinds of cooperation performed by humans and animals in the natural world.

  27. The Psychologist/ Behaviorist B.F. Skinner: cooperation is defined as an inter-dependent contingencybetween the behavior of two or more individuals and the outcomes achieved by each whether or not there is social interaction. B.F. Skinner (1953, p. 311): Cooperation: when the reinforcement of two or more individuals depends on the behavior of both or all of them

  28. 1) The explanation of cooperation resides in the contingency between the behaviors of 2 or more individuals and outcomes. This is a pure economic explanation. • 2) The behaviors used when cooperating only address the secondary question of what individuals actually dowhen they cooperate but not why they do it.The why is selfish profit. • 3) In the natural world, cooperating individuals might coordinate actions in complex ways or interact and communicate. • 4) But from an economic perspective, cooperation can still be claimed in the complete absence of social interactionas long as an individual's outcomes also depend on the behaviors of others and benefits are obtained by all. • 5) The neglect of cooperation as a social behavior is reflected in a long history of experimental models that eliminate the differences between the performance of cooperation and non-cooperation: both are simple behaviors performed by anonymous and physically isolated subjects.

  29. Skinnerian laboratory models: as simple as individual reinforcements for two animals that synchronize two simple, brief acts such as pressing a bar…..

  30. Non-socialcooperation: Models with no social interaction whatsoever are still called cooperative

  31. Note the close similarity with the ecological / evolutionary perspective quoted before……… • “Hence, students of game theory prefer a view of cooperation that de-emphasizes the behavioural properties of an interaction, and focuses on the economic consequences of an interaction.” • “Students of social behaviour should recognize cooperation as an economically defined interaction that may or may not involve coordination. …we argue that cooperation is an outcome, not a mechanism.” (D.W. Stephens & J.P Anderson, Animal Behaviour, 1997)

  32. Player 2 Player 2 Coop Coop Non-Coop Non-Coop Coop Coop RE 3 RE 5 SE 3 SE 0 Player 1 Player 1 Non-Coop Non-Coop TE 5 TE 3 PE 1 PE 1 Game-theory models: more complex inter-dependent contingencies specified in game theory payoff matrices that offer choice Prisoners’ dilemma Mutualism

  33. 3. Cooperation and non-cooperation are defined entirely by outcomes 2. The behaviors of “cooperation” and “non-cooperation” are arbitrary, identical and individual acts 1. Subjects are anonymous and isolated But Game-theory models retain all the impoverished social dimensions of the earlier Skinnerian models…

  34. I suggest that this bias toward the economic/evolutionary in method and theory represents a historical error that has delayed efforts to answer the question “Why cooperate?” by confounding psychology and biology: everything has been linked to outcome and benefit To me, this emphasis on economic decision-making – whether in Economics, Evolutionary Biology or Psychology - represents an unnecessary denigration of the psychological / proximate kind of explanation as being somehow soft, imprecise or impossible to confirm – a “soft science” - how it is done (psychology) but not why (economics/evolution) ….whereas the economic approach offers the security of counting and measuring explicit events in a hard and mathematical science.This is an updating of the old “Behaviorist” issue of avoiding the kinds of events that allegedly cannot be specified or confirmed. …..the “hijacking” of psychology by economics

  35. But economics alone cannot be used to explain cooperation that is based on irreducible social dimensions…………..

  36. The study of cooperation in the natural world:cooperation as a social behavior.

  37. Question:Do models of isolation and anonymity have relevance to cooperation in the natural world? The validity of anonymous/isolation games seems relevant to those situations in which behaviors are performed individually– and potentially have impact on other anonymous individuals or on society as a whole: where to throw trash; whether to make noise in a movie theater; whether to drive a car with consideration for other drivers or pedestrians; whether to wait in line or jump the queue; whether to give money anonymously; whether to conserve natural resources or rare wildlife; whether to work for peace… There is a social context but it is anonymous, lacks personal social interaction and reduces cooperation to an individual event. If there is a social relevance, it is limited in humans to things like: reputation, impression on others…

  38. Another kind of cooperation that is also widespread in humans and animals in the natural world consists of actions by individuals that work together by using each other to act cohesively for jointly-obtained outcomes, as in team sports, warfare or group hunting. ……. The irreducible social dimensions associated with this kind of natural cooperation include: • - cooperating individuals are familiar • - they work together by using each other’s behaviors and locations to coordinate actions, sometimes with complementary roles • -outcomes are jointly-obtained successes or failures • - outcomes may lead to competition and dominance over allocation • -adjunct social interactions • (Schuster, Human Nature, 2002; Schuster & Perelberg, Behavioral Processes, 2004; Schuster & Berger, in press)

  39. To understand this kind of cooperation, I will try to show that… Levels of cooperation – and preference for cooperation – can exceed predictions from economic outcomes at the time of performance. This bias is caused by proximate processeslinked to the behavior of cooperating, especially its social dimensions. This can make cooperation excessive and uneconomic in the short term. The social dimensions of cooperation can be incorporated into laboratory models that will then evoke the same kinds of behaviors - and the bias to cooperate - as in the natural world Cooperation – even when “excessive” or uneconomic in the short-term – can still be economic but only in evolutionary terms when long-range consequences can be traced to such behaviors that influence the natural selection of cooperation via ultimate processes.

  40. These issues will be addressed in four parts: 1 - Behavior:How do animals and humans cooperate in their natural world? 2 – Influence of Behavior:Is there a bias to cooperate that is influenced by the social dimensions of cooperating? 3 - Models:How can cooperation be represented by laboratory models that incorporate the behavioral dimensions of cooperation in the natural world- and the bias? 4 - Explanation:How can a proximate and ultimate processes be incorporated within an integrated explanatory framework?

  41. 1. Behavior:How do animals and humans cooperate in their natural world?

  42. In the natural world, when cooperation is expressed as joint actions for shared outcomes, this kind of behavior is associated with irreducible social dimensions that are absent when not cooperating. This is widespread in many species and in different contexts…. hunting, aggression, defense, reproduction... Three animal examples: dolphins, lions and chimpanzees

  43. dolphins Cooperative hunting of bottlenose dolphins mms://vod4.haifa.ac.il/L/CRI/RM200604/dolphins2.wmv

  44. Lioness A Lioness C Prey: antelope Lioness B Cooperative hunting of lionsZibalianja, Botswana Intentional, planned and coordinated hunt water mms://vod4.haifa.ac.il/L/CRI/RM200604/lions linyanti short film.wmv

  45. Cooperative hunting by the common chimpanzee,Tai Forest, Ivory CoastIntentional, planned and coordinated hunt mms://vod4.haifa.ac.il/L/CRI/RM200604/chimp hunt Tai Oct 05.wmv

  46. Analogous examples of human behaviors....... Teamwork with complementary roles “Distributed cognition:”group performance divided among team members.While cooperating, each individual performs a role so specialized that it would be ineffectual if the individual was forced to perform the entire task alone. This kind of organization “..permits individuals to combine their efforts in ways that produce results that could not be produced by any individual... working alone.” (E. Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild, 1995)

  47. In all these cases, cooperating becomes an extended action based on individuals acting cohesively 2. The only cues available during coordination are social: from locations and behaviors of partners 3. While cooperating, there is unrestrictedsocial interaction 4. Outcomes are also a social event: they are jointly achieved and potentially shared, with the possibility of competition 5. Strategies develop within groups for working togetherPairs and groups therefore varyin: cues * coordination * roles * dominance * allocation of outcomes * social behaviors ….

  48. 2. Is there a bias to cooperate that is influenced by the social dimensions of cooperating?

  49. The bias is known from observing human behavior in the “natural world” of group decision-making and joint action by groups Robert Frank, Passion Within Reason, 1988Sober & Wilson, Doing Unto Others, 1998In Anthropology: hunter/gatherers (pygmies, Bushmen, Ache): work of Colin Turnbull….

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