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Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse

Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse. Presentation by William J. Frey. Agenda. Case Narrative Case Chronology Relevant Facts Reenactment of walkway collapse Code of Ethics Issues. Case Narrative.

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Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse

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  1. Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse Presentation by William J. Frey

  2. Agenda • Case Narrative • Case Chronology • Relevant Facts • Reenactment of walkway collapse • Code of Ethics Issues

  3. Case Narrative • On July 17, 1981, the second and fourth story walkways of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel collapsed killing 114 people and seriously injuring an additional 200. • Cause: • “A deviation in the design in the way the rods connected the lower skywalk to the upper and the upper to the ceiling of the atrium was clearly described and zeroed in on as the ultimate cause of the accident.” Petroski: 86

  4. Relevant Facts (from Pfatteicher, 64) • Project put on fast track • Construction begun before design was completely finished • Walkway design details were left “unspecified” • Gillum could not directly supervise plans as his firm grew • In this case, the responsibility fell on Duncan • But Gillum still sealed the plans after the designing was finished

  5. Relevant Facts • Warning Signs (from Petroski) • The Atrium ceiling collapsed during construction; but a study carried out by an independent engineering firm found nothing wrong with the skywalk • Workers carrying loaded wheel barrows across the skywalk complained about excess vibration and swaying • Faulty connection recognized six times • “Duncan assured each inquirer that replacing the single, long hanger rods with double, offset rods would not compromise the safety of the walkways.” (Pfatteicher, 64)

  6. Aftermath • Petroski • “After twenty months of investigation, the U.S. attorney and the Jackson County, Missouri, prosecutor announced jointly that they had found no evidence that either a federal or state crime was committed…” (TAMU Instructor Manual) • However in an investigation carried out by the attorney general of Missouri… • Duncan, Gillum, and GCE International Inc. were found guilty of “gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering.” (TAMU Instructor Manual)

  7. Responsibility in Engineering • Herbert Fingarette, in Criminal Insanity, identifies legal responsibility as “response to essential relevance” • Moral responsibility can be formulated as moral response to essential moral relevance. • Cognitive skills: The ability to view a situation and identify those aspects that have moral relevance • Volitional skills: The ability to formulate or design actions that are morally responsive to the moral relevance in a situation

  8. Relevance involves the skill of seeing these models fleshed out in reality… A A 5 6 B W W B 1 3 1 3 C C W W 2 4 2 4 Case 1 Case 2

  9. as this… Proposed Modification Initial Design 4th Floor 2nd Floor Long rods threaded over entire length Shorter rods threaded only near connections • And allows that one can imagine the enactment of the proposed modification as…

  10. …ultimately as the risk of this…

  11. Moral Responsibility has different levels • Minimum level • What is morally obligatory • Identify the minimum necessary to avoid blame and locate action above this minimum • As the senior engineer, Gillum sealed the plans • Was he responsible for approving the change that led to the fall of the walkway? • Could part of this responsibility be delegated to the engineer on the scene, namely, Duncan? • How should state licensing boards and engineering professional societies assign blame and punish in cases like these?

  12. Other levels of responsibility • Above and beyond minimum responsibilities are… • Those morally permissible but not morally obligatory • Going beyond one’s role responsibilities • Proactively taking measures to identify and prevent harm or failure • Using one’s engineering skills to promote values such as environmentally sustainable engineering, social justice, and community solidarity • Questions for Hyatt • What would a good engineer have done in Gillum’s or Duncan’s place after the collapse of the atrium roof? • How would an exemplary engineer have responded to the six warnings given to Duncan? • How would an exemplary engineer have acted to prevent “gaps” arising from the responsibilities of the designers and the responsibilities of the constructors?

  13. Chronology (Adopted from TAMU Instructor Manual Chronology)

  14. Chronology

  15. Chronology

  16. Resources • Hyatt Regency Kansas City Walkway Collapse" Online Ethics Center for Engineering 11/24/2010 National Academy of Engineering Accessed: Thursday, December 16, 2010 <www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/24338.aspx> • Henry Petroski (1985). To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design. St. Martin’s Press: 85-97. • http://ethics.tamu.edu/ethics/hyatt/hyatt1.htm • The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse • Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical EngineeringTexas A&M UniversityNSF Grant Number DIR-9012252 • http://ethics.tamu.edu/ethics/hyatt/hyatt2.htm • Photos by Dr. Lee Lowry, Jr. at TAMU • Pfatteicher, S (2000). “The Hyatt Horror”: Failure and Responsibility in American Engineering”

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