Cath Wallace , Environment and Conservation Organisations of NZ Inc, eco.nz

1. IUCN WCC 2012 – Workshop 0747 – Jeju-do South Korea Sunday, 09 Sep 2012 11:00 - 13:00 ROOM: 203Adopting Green Practices in Response to Oil Spills in 3 Regions The MV Rena on the Rocks in New Zealand - systems resilience and lessons for NZ’s oil and gas policies? Cath Wallace, Environment and Conservation Organisations of NZ Inc, www.eco.org.nz & Senior Lecturer, SGEES, Victoria University of Wellington; Cath.Wallace@paradise.net.nz

2. New Zealand - a marine continent ECO

3. Acknowledgements Thanks to Rena aground on Astrolabe Reef, 12 October 2012, Photo: Mark Alen. • Charlotte Moser & fellow panelists; • The Resilience Alliance • Keith Manch & Maritime New Zealand - source of figures & images unless otherwise noted. • All the people who have worked to protect the marine environment, including from the Rena oil & debris. • The officials who worked to draw lessons.

4. The Event: Rena was an isolated oil spill but it highlighted the NZ government’s oil and gas economic programme risks. NZ’s response system struggled. Rena, a cargo ship, Liberian registered, Greek owned, ran aground on Astrolabe Reef, 22 kilometres (15 miles) off the North Island New Zealand coast on 5 October 2011 The crew took a “shortcut” to get to port on the right tide. Navigational error and sloppiness.

5. The Rena Oil & Debris Spill – 5 Oct 2011 The Oil The Debris Timber, plastic goods. Milk powder, hides, packages of meat, nasi goreng noodles and spices – small silver packets, look like fish. Various other stuff. Plastic beads for plastic manufacture – look like salps, fish eggs. These widespread, some vacuumed up. 1,712 tonnes heavy fuel oil & 200 marine on board Rena when it grounded. Heavy, toxic. Over 1,300 tonnes of oil recovered through fuel recovery operations on board Rena by cleanup company. Around 350 tonnes of oil released from Rena fuel tanks between 5–11 October 2011, more since.

6. The Rena on Atrolabe Reef, the exclusion zone & navigational hazards near the port of Tauranga, North Island, NZ. The oil and debris was carried by currents long distances north and south.

7. Resilience of what? • Environment • NZ Government’s economic growth strategy, especially oil and gas exploration and disregard of GHG • Oil spill response governance systems • Civil Society • Maori & coastal Communities • Interactions between them • NZ’s alternative energy efforts. • Oil spill affected commerce. • NZ’s policy and legal gaps at sea. • NZ’s reputation and branding

8. Resilience to what? Disturbances in the form of potentially harmful oil spills. Industry & cabinet pressure for access to oil and gas. Public & some Maori concerns and pressure re environment. Pressure from economic interests threatened by oil spills. • Government budget cuts. • Turf protection between government agencies.

9. Rena a trigger event that shocked the systems • Immediate “accident” and maritime safety response. • Spill system response. • Wildlife rescue • Clean up • Public concerns at slow response, slow mobilisation, • Implications for future oil spills. • Concerns at growth strategy. • Concerns that seabed mining and oil permits being granted beyond 12 nm with no environmental controls and no public input. • Environment groups already pushing for law but it was stalled.

10. Formal Governance system: Spatially nested, nationally fragmented. Environmental Governance gap beyond 12 nm. • Resource Management Act 1991 provides cascading National, Regional and Local government integrated sustainable management. Covers land to sea ->12 nautical miles. National and regional responsibilities in Territorial Sea. • BUT - No environmental management law then except for transport and fishing from 12 nautical miles out to 200 EEZ & Continental Shelf. Policy & new law then stalled. Now passed but problematic and weak environmentally. • Maritime NZ responsible for coordinated response but not the control over policies or other agencies. Few staff. • Ministry of Transport - transport policy not implementation. • Department of Conservation responsibility for native wildlife.

11. “Response” operating system model – Maritime NZ

12. Ministry of Transport, Environment Ministry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Dept of Conservation Maritime New Zealand Governance system nationally split. Maritime NZ does regulation not policy- coordination without power over resources. Developed from slide by – Maritime NZ.

13. Impactson Wildlife Birds Marine Mammals, fish, invertebrates Ecological studies under way. Uncertainty about impacts on these. Impacts on fish and invertebrates may linger and not just oil. Small plastic beads spread throughout the area and other debris. • 2,410 dead birds collected, of which 1448 were oiled • At peak 409 birds were being cared for: 345 little blue penguins, 60 New Zealand dotterel and 4 pied shags. Total greater. • 120 rare New Zealand dotterels in Bay of Plenty area – 60 pre-emptively caught and cared for at the wildlife facility; 1,700 rare New Zealand dotterels in existence

14. Wildlife rescue

15. Marine ecosystem using the Ecopath model. Source – Daniel Pauly. The Rena released nutrients such as meat and milk powder, but also toxics such as oil. Plastic beads are still appearing around the area, are tiny and easily ingested by fish.Ecosystem impacts are being studied but are not yet reported.

16. Civil Society Response • Maori communities in coastal and island areas – traditionally marine species and environment considered kin, responsibility to ensure health. Emotionally devastated by pollution and loss of seafood. Maori communities demanded information and action. Government provided supermarket supplies, information, cleanup. • Local residents, environmental & animal welfare NGOs and others mobilised to rescue wildlife, collect and remove debris, oil. • Authorities initially slow to use volunteer effort, to limit exposure to toxics, to coordinate volunteers. People just got “stuck in” and refused to wait.

18. The Response: intersecting systems & scales – govt & non-govt. Short tem 1,041 tonnes of waste collected 8,061 volunteers registered in the volunteer database but many more responded. 12 active groups in Adopt-A-Beach programme – but many more coastal land owners and community folk just doing it. • Oil, containers, debris and vessel parts removed to the extent allowed by limited equipment and bad weather – private sector & govt, community. • Beach clean up – civil society, army, and contracted private sector, regional government.

19. Systems operating above and below the scale of management concern • Government’s economic strategy and disregard for environment. • Fiscal stringency – government spending cuts. • Maori cultural & social system – traditional responsibility for the environment • Community and civil society – intrinsic values, bequest and existence values, social connections with place. • Economic & other values from the environment – tourism, fishing, recreation • System of international law and obligation

20. Political, Economic & Social systems & Context of Rena Spill • NZ government at Cabinet level then and now aggressively promoting extractivist economic growth, especially oil and gas extraction, but also minerals. Much opposition. • Immediately after the Deep Horizon well blow, Minister called for bids for huge tracts of deep seabed around NZ coast for oil and gas exploration, dismissed concerns. • Public awareness of oil industry destruction and oppression in Nigeria and of Deep Horizon etc. • Greenhouse gases and oil spill risks high political salience. • NZ capacity to respond to oil spills already in doubt. • Many Maori and other coastal communities others strongly oppose deep sea oil & gas activity. • Maori have kinship and stewardship ethos to environment. • NZers holiday at the beach – live close to it, value it hugely.

21. Rena“accident” a one off event – but showed up inadequacies, strengths of political , governmental, civil society, technology and political systems: • Problems of NZ’s oil spill preparedness in context of environmentally disregarding oil and gas led economic growth strategy; • Lack of capacity to be compensated because of failure to ratify MARPOL conventions. • Agency coordination problems and lack of capacity. – Lessons learned. • Communities willing and able to act, independently of govt or with it. • Agency coordination problems and lack of capacity. – Lessons learned. • Ecological system effects under study. • Socio-cultural, economic and environmental opposition to Government extractivist growth strategy strengthened.

22. Resilience and the Canterbury Earthquakes • Canterbury in the South Island of NZ had a series of major and minor earthquakes – shortly before the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami. • NZ anti-nuclear policy meant no radioactivity problem, but devastation acute, and repeated. • First earthquake not so bad – we thought building controls helped. 2nd major quake much more lethal, devastating – building controls not adequate • Initial spirit of resilience has been sorely tested – prolonged series of shakes and liquefaction of ground • Laggardly insurance response. • “Quake brain” – shattered nerves, loss of concentration & emotional equanimity.

23. Resilience, the Canterbury Earthquakes & lessons re oil • NZers have learned that human and system ability to cope with one event is eroded by multiple events – resilience is weakened and eroded until reorganisation or evacuation occurs. • Insurance companies very very slow. • NZ Earthquake Commission overwhelmed. • CHCH now in demolition & rebuild mode. • Civil society response in Christchurch substantial – “student army” self organised; Farmer “army” formed too, as well as multiple individual and community responses. Social cohesion stronger. • Repeated events weaken physical structures – • With oil, it would weaken ecosystem resilience, oil-incompatible economic activities. Social cohesion increases, then erodes.

24. Rena event responses Government Civil Society Community response vital but not sufficient. Social cohesion stronger, but repeated events will strain communities and individuals Modern technology and radio etc allow self-organisation, but official systems can block or enhance civil society responses. • Prime Minister and Cabinet still deny Rena link to oil and gas extraction programme. • Public sees connection. • Officials respond within the strictures of v limited resources, agency responsibilities and Cabinet willingness to reorganise systems and laws.

26. Outcome Scenarios:

27. Resilience is lost in repeated rough seas – A metaphor for the oil and gas economic policy?

28. Thanks to colleagues in ECO and Keith Manch, Maritime NZ Cath Wallace, Cath.Wallace@paradise.net.nz Senior Lecturer, SGEES, Victoria University of Wellington and ECO – Environment and Conservation Organisations of NZ www.eco.org.nz P O Box 11-057, Wellington, NZ ECO