ES&H Inspection at LBNL

1. HSS Office of Health, Safety and Security ES&H Inspection at LBNL Scoping Visit December 3-4, 2008

2. Office of Independent Oversight Environment, Safety and Health Inspection at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Scoping Visit December 3, 2008

3. HS-1 Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer Glenn S. Podonsky Deputy Chief for Operations HS-1 Michael A. Kilpatrick Deputy Chief for Enforcement and Technical Matters C. Russell H. Shearer HS-10 HS-20 HS-30 HS-40 HS-50 HS-60 HS-70 HS-80 Office of Security Technology and Assistance Office of Security Policy Office of Nuclear Safety, Quality Assurance and Environment Office of Classification Office of Independent Oversight Office of Corporate Safety Analysis Office of Health and Safety National Training Center Office of Enforcement Arnold E. Guevara Director Martha S. Thompson Deputy Director Barbara R. Stone Director William A. Eckroade Director Jeffrey P. Harrell Director Larry D. Wilcher Director Andrew P. Weston-Dawkes Director Patricia R. Worthington Director Andrew C. Lawrence Director William H. Roege Director Richard L. Donovan Deputy Director HS-61 Office of Security Evaluations John Hyndman Acting Director HS-62 Office of Cyber Security Evaluations John Boulden III Director HS-63 Office of Emergency Management Oversight Steven Simonson Director HS-64 Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations Thomas Staker Director Page 2 of 11

4. HS-60 Office of Independent Oversight William A. Eckroade Director HS-61 Office of Security Evaluations John Hyndman Acting Director Office of Cyber Security Evaluations John Boulden Director HS-62 Office of Emergency Management Oversight Steven Simonson Director HS-63 HS-64 Office of ES&H Evaluations Thomas Staker Director Independent Oversight Offices • Office of Security Evaluations • Evaluates the Effectiveness of Safeguards and Security Policies and Programs • Office of Cyber Security Evaluations • Evaluates the Effectiveness of Classified and Unclassified Computer Security Policies and Programs • Office of Emergency Management Oversight • Evaluates the Effectiveness of Departmental Emergency Management Policies, Requirements, and Programs, Including Integration with Security Programs • Office of ES&H Evaluations • Evaluates the Effectiveness and Implementation of Departmental ES&H Policies, Requirements, and Programs • Evaluates the Effectiveness of the Implementation of Integrated Safety Management Systems through Onsite Evaluations Page 3 of 11

5. Overall Inspection Goal Evaluate ES&H performance including the adequacy of Integrated Safety Management Systems and implementation of these systems. Page 4 of 11

6. ES&H Inspection Topics • Integration of Safety Into Work Planning and Execution at the Activity Level • Feedback and Improvement Processes • Select Focus Areas • Chemical Management • Hazardous Waste Management • Worker Rights and Responsibilities • Injury and Illness (CARES) Page 5 of 11

7. Onsite Planning • Meet Counterparts • Tour Facilities • Meet With Site Process Owners • Discuss Ongoing and Planned Activities/Initiatives • Confirm Inspection Scope • Obtain and Review Documents Page 6 of 11

8. Data Collection Visit • Observe Activities/Facility Walkthroughs • Interviews and Discussions • Document Reviews • Keep Counterparts Informed of Observations • Daily Meetings to Discuss Observations and Status Page 7 of 11

9. Report • Summary Report and Validation Appendixes • Opportunities for Improvement • Findings • Ratings Page 8 of 11

10. Validation and Closeout • Informal Validation with Counterparts and Responsible Individuals • Formal Validation Meeting • Formal Closeout • Final Factual Accuracy Review Page 9 of 11

11. Sequencing January 6-8 Onsite Planning Jan. 26 – Feb. 5 Onsite Data Collection February 24-26 Summary Validation/Closeout March 2-16 Site Comment Period April Report Finalized Page 10 of 11

12. Next Steps • Establish Scope • Assign Counterparts • Issue Inspection Plan • Schedule Activities for Planning Visit Page 11 of 11

13. DOE Berkeley Site Office

14. HSS Pre-VisitBSO Overview Aundra Richards Site Manager December 3-4, 2008

15. Outline • BSO Background and History • Past • Present • BSO Mission and Responsibilities • BSO Organization • BSO Management System • BSO Continuous Improvements

16. BSO Background and History - Past • Prior to December 2004, the Berkeley Site Office (BSO) reported to the Oakland Field Office (OFO) • BSO had no authority for the University of California Contract • There was limited Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) On-Site Presence • The focus of the Site Office Staff was to Monitor Office of Science (SC-HQ) Programs and Operations • Primarily focused on Contractor Submittals • Limited Field Presence (i.e. Contractor Oversight primarily performed by OFO)

17. BSO History and Background -Present • BSO is a stand-alone Site Office Reporting to SC HQ and is responsible for • Contract Management • Program and Project Management • Federal Stewardship • Staffed with 23 Professionals (3 Vacancies) • 3 Divisions • 6 ES&H Professionals—plus 2 Shared Staff with Stanford Site Office (SSO) • Only 8 Staff Remain from the Original 2004 Organization • All ES&H Division Staff Members are experienced but new to BSO • ES&H Subject Matter Expert Support is obtained from the Integrated Support Center (ISC)

18. BSO Mission and Responsibilities • BSO Represents the Department of Energy as the Principal Funding Agency for LBNL • Direct Responsibility for the Contract with the University of California (UC) • Buildings are owned by the federal government, on UC owned land • BSO Exercises Federal Oversight for Safety and Operations through: • Focused Reviews • Assessments • Walkthroughs

19. BSO Organization Aundra Richards Site Manager Vacant Deputy Site Manager Vacant Senior Technical Advisor ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY and HEALTH DIVISION Mary Gross Sr. General Engineer / Division Director Vacant Management Analyst CONTRACTS & BUSINESS DIVISION Charles Marshall Sr. Contracting Officer/ Division Director Dana Coleman Business Management Specialist PROJECTS & FACILITIES DIVISION Vacant Division Director Kim Abbott Mike Carr Environmental Engineer Safety Engineer Kevin Hartnett Julie Henderson Physical Scientist Physical Scientist Salma El-Safwany General Engineer ============================ John Saidi** Scott Wenholz** Fire Safety & Health Physics Emergency Mgmt (SSO employee) (SSO employee) Hemant Patel Katherine Johnescu Environmental Eng General Engineer Federal Project Dir Federal Project Dir Barry Savnik Suzanne Suskind General Engineer General Engineer Federal Project Dir Federal Project Dir Warren Yip General Engineer Federal Project Dir ========================== Request FTE Vacant Facility Manager • Jacolyn Byrd Joe Krupa • Reimbursable Tech Specialist Program Analyst • Douglas Low John Muhlestein • Budget Analyst Program Analyst • Maria Robles Paul Sibal • Contracting Specialist/Officer Business Management Specialist • Donna Spencer • Quality Assurance Engineer • Rodney RoysterLauren Martinez • Information Security Specialist Public Affairs Specialist • (shared with SSO) (shared with SSO) FTEs authorized/approved: 26 On-board: 23 ** = SSO shared position with BSO November 1, 2008

20. BSO Continuous Improvement • Oversight • Increased Emphasis on Field Oversight of Programs/Projects • Federal Project Directors have Line Management Responsibility for Safety • Increased field presence with a focus on ES&H • Focus on compliance with applicable directives (i.e. DOE O 413.3 and 226.1A) • Institutional Program Oversight (Sense of the Laboratory) • Increased Emphasis on Tracking and Trending to aid in the Development of Future Oversight Activities • Increased integration of Safety into all aspects of BSO oversight

21. BSO Continuous Improvement • Staffing • Increased use of the ISC to: • Provide SMEs • Augment Onsite Skills, as needed • Serve as a “Fresh Set of Eyes” • Additional Emphasis on completing Technical Qualification Program Requirements • Processes and Procedures • Implementation of new Site Office Processes and Procedures will be a continued focus as a result of: • Adapting to Office of Science Management Systems (SCMS) • New Staff in all Divisions • Increased Efforts Focused on a Disciplined Operation • Feedback and Continuous Improvement

22. BSO Summary • The overall goal is to have an organization that: • Values safety • Integrates compliance, safe behavior, and safety features into all our work processes • Replicates successful outcomes • Continues improvement • This review is viewed as a mechanism for BSO to gain feedback that will aid improvement.

23. Integrated Safety Managementat LBNL Dr. Steven Chu

24. Integrated Safety Managementat Berkeley Lab Steven Chu, Laboratory Director December 3, 2008

25. WHY DO WE WORRY ABOUT SAFETY? 1. Our Lives are at stake. • A subcontractor sheet metal worker has forearm burned from exposed live 480 and 277 volt lines. • A post-doctoral visitor is hit by a bicyclist at night moving at ~ 20 - 25 mph. • Nitrogen dewar top hits scientist between the eyes at the Advanced Light Source.

26. WHY DO WE WORRY ABOUT SAFETY? 2. Training future scientists and engineers. • LBNL employs ~800 students, grad students & post-docs • We have a responsibility to train them to embrace a proper safety culture. • If successful, we will have enormous impact beyond LBNL.

27. Define work Feedback, improve-ment Analyze Hazards Perform work Develop controls INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT & SCIENCE EXCELLENCE

28. Define work Feedback, improve-ment Analyze Hazards Perform work Develop controls INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT & SCIENCE EXCELLENCE If something unexpected happens,stop and think.

29. OUR GOAL A fundamental change in our safety culture “IF IT ISN’T SAFE, IT ISN’T DONE”

30. Recent Events • We had been making improvements in safety, but the rate of improvement was not fast enough. • The BSO helped us realize that there were (and still are) noteworthy deficiencies in fully implementing ISM. • Weak at analyzing hazards and developing controls • Self-assessments and our other assurance mechanisms have let us down.

31. Positive changes: • Substantive Safety discussions lead off every Division Director Meeting • In the September, 2008 annual senior management retreat, we made safety a major focus.

32. Evidence of effective implementation of ISM • Enhanced visibility of the senior manager ownership of safety • We have a strong reporting culture • Innovative “near hit” program • Comprehensive program to prevent ergonomic injuries. • Aggressive construction safety program. • Innovative approach to safety management with students, post docs and guests - “Work Lead”

33. Evidence of effective implementation of ISM • Enhanced visibility of the senior manager ownership of safety • We have a strong reporting culture • Innovative “near hit” program • Comprehensive program to prevent ergonomic injuries. • Aggressive construction safety program. • Innovative approach to safety management with students, post docs and guests - “Work Lead”

34. Focus on Ergonomic Injury Prevention • Hired professional ergonomists • Ergo Advocates in each Division • On-line computer ergo self-assessment/training • Ergo equipment lab • Ergo in design of office furniture • Ergo in design of software • Aggressive JGI management response • Month-long stand-down

35. Evidence of effective implementation of ISM • Enhanced visibility of the senior manager ownership of safety • We have a strong reporting culture • Innovative “near hit” program • Comprehensive program to prevent ergonomic injuries. • Aggressive construction safety program. • Innovative approach to safety management with students, post docs and guests - “Work Lead”

36. Excellent Construction Safety Record • 3 years w/o a construction related DART • No TRC or DART in FY08 on 80 projects ($200 M) involving 80,000 hours of sub-contractor labor.

37. Evidence of noteworthy weaknesses in the implementation of ISM • Nearly 50% of events (e.g. recurring electrical safety and surface penetration) indicate need for improved work planning. • Discussion of near “hits” confirm our work planning is deficient. • Self-inspections, walk-throughs, and other assurance mechanisms did not find many existing weaknesses. Full implementation of ISM throughout the laboratory has not been achieved

39. LBNL welcomes the HSS review, and we look forward to learning from your feedback.