1 / 36

governing the commons

Alberto De Luigi 14/03/2013. governing the commons. CHAP III. Elinor ostrom (1990). What ARE THE cpr S (COMMON POOL RESOURCES). The CPRs are natural or man-made resource system : The use and benefits of CPRs are not excludable , without costs , to potential beneficiaries

mahala
Télécharger la présentation

governing the commons

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Alberto De Luigi 14/03/2013 governing the commons CHAP III Elinorostrom(1990)

  2. What ARE THE cprS(COMMON POOL RESOURCES) The CPRs are natural or man-made resourcesystem: • The use and benefits of CPRs are notexcludable, withoutcosts, to potentialbeneficiaries • The overexploitation of CPRs can harm the stock of resourcesitself (tragedy of the commons) In-dephtanalysis

  3. Examples of cprS • Fisheries (seas or rivers) • Grazinglands (meadows) • Forestsprovidingtimber • Irrigationsystems (water,canals)

  4. How to avoidthe tragedy of the commons • CENTRALIZATION: the state imposessanctions and punishments, ensuringthateveryonecooperates.Problems: no complete informations, costs in monitoring and administration. The state couldfail. • PRIVATIZATION: assigning the property rights on theseresourcesProblems: 1) itpresumes the existence of a central authority and itscosts2) it’sdifficult to create property rights to fugitiveresources 3) dividing the commonsmayimpoverishwho benefits from them

  5. The THIrd way • The third way isrepresented by the long-enduring, self-organized and self-governedCPRs • They are actuallycommons, with a system of appropriation and the parallelexistence of private property:appropriators use or consumeresources, or «immediatly transfer ownership of resourceunits» • Long enduring: theysurvived for long periods. They are «robust» or in «institutionalequilibrium» asmeant by Shepsle (1989): changes in according to an ex ante plan • Self-organized and self-governed: wewillseethesefeaturesthrough the examples

  6. Törbel in switzerland Mountain meadows and forests • Uncertainenvironment:Differentmicroclimates due to:1.Steepness of slope and wide range of altitude2. Paucity of precipitation3. Exposure to sunlight

  7. Törbel in switzerland Mountain meadows and forests • Social structure:All the citizensvote the villagestatutesthatprovidean alpassociation(originallyestablished in 1483)with annual meeting to manage the alpThe associationelectofficials: theyhire the alp staff, impose fines (theykeep ½ of the fine for themselves), organizethedistribution of manureand annualmaintenance work (paths, corrals..)

  8. Törbel in switzerland Mountain meadows and forests • The «cow rights»: in summer (period for grazing) each cow sent by a family to the mountain must be counted. The amount of cowsdetermine:1. The portion of landthey can appropriate for grazing2. The amount of cheese and timber(wood for construction and heating)the family willreceiveat the annualdistribution

  9. Törbel in switzerland Mountain meadows and forests • Cuttingtrees for timber:1. The officialsmark the trees ready to be harvested2. The householdsorganize work teams for cuttingtrees (dividing the work equally)3. The timberiscollected in equalstacks4. A lotteryassignparticularstacks to the households

  10. Törbel in switzerland Mountain meadows and forests • Inheritancesystem: appropriationrights and provisionduties are inherited by individualmaleswhoown private property in the village ad remaincitizens of the village • Population-control measures:late marriages, high rates of celibacy, long birthspacing, considerableemigration

  11. Features of the Törbelcommons • Uncertainenvironment • Appropriation and private propertygoes side-by-side • Individuals live side-by-side yearafteryear, theyexpecttheirchildren and grandchildren to inherittheirland: theirdiscount ratesare low • Theyspend time governingthemselves, but the rules and monitoringsystemsrequirerelativelylowcosts • (more the 5 Nettingconditions)

  12. Villages in japan Mountain meadows and forests • Uncertainenvironment: manydifferentmicroclimates • Social structure: a villagethatcontains a definednumber of households (sinceatleast 1600) • Inheritancesystem: an household (with rights on the commons) cannot divide itselfwithout the permission from the village • Population-control measures: households with manymembershaveconsiderabledisadvantages in theiraccess to the commons (pop. growthextremelylow)

  13. Villages in japan Mountain meadows and forests • Land for winterfodder are assigned with annualrotation. The cuttingstartsas the belltolls; the haycutiscollected in equalbundles and assigned by lottery • There are writtenrulesabout the obligation of eachhousehold to contribuite a share to the collective work (ascreatingfirebreaks for annualburning) • Detectiveshired by the villages (or eligiblemales rotate intothese positions) patrol the commonslooking for unathorizedusers

  14. Villages in japan Mountain meadows and forests • Punishments for the offenders:Fines are imposed with escalation penalties, depending on the pastbehaviour of the offenderFines are paid to the detective (cash and saké for light infractions)The contrabandedharvestisretained by the villageuntil the violator haspaid an extra fine to the villageThe mostserioussanctionis the banishment from the village

  15. Huertairrigationinstitutions in spain Irrigationsystems Uncertainenvironment: limitedquantity of rainfall and variation from year to year. All the systems are successful: • Valenciahas the leastefficientsystem • Murcia-Orihuelais in the middle • Alicanteis the mostefficient(nationalauthoritieshavehere more control)

  16. Valencia in spain Irrigationsystems • Social structure: • Farmersmeetseverytwo (or three) year(since 1435)to elect: 1. the syndic for their canal (managewaterworks, fines) 2. otherofficials3. The Junta de gobierno (an executive commitee)The Tribunal de lasaguasisa water court that for centuriesmeetseverythursdaymorning

  17. Valencia in spain Irrigationsystems • Distribution of water:Each farm receives water in a rotationorder, from the head to the tail end of the canalIf a farmerfails to open hisheadgatewhen water arrives, he misseshis turn. No oneknowsexactlywhenitarrivesWhen water arrives the farmer can take all the water he want (withoutwastingit)In periods of drought: rotationschemeismodified, givenpriority to farmswhosecrops are in the mostneed of water

  18. Valencia in spain Irrigationsystems • Monitoringsystems: Elected by farmers, watchthe ditch-riders, impose fines to the farmers, managewaterworks Review the decisions of syndics; iscomposed by the syndics Syndics Tribunal de las Aguas Consult with the sindycs Executive committee Elected by the farmers Irrigators Ditch-riders Sincetheydon’tknowwhenexactly water arrives, whilethey are waitingthey can monitor ditch-riders and otherfarmers patrol the canals, paidby the farmers

  19. Murcia and orihuela in spain Irrigationsystems • Distribution of water:Eachfarmerisassigned a «tanda», a period in which he maywithdraw waterIn case of drought the officials post a new schedule for rotation • Justice:- Murcia: The Council of Good Men is a water court composed by 5 syndics and 2 inspectors (chosen by lottery over 30 communities)- Orihuela: court with only 1 judgeProcedure: oral, public, summary and cheap (as in Valencia)

  20. Alicante in spain Irrigationsystems • Rights to withdraw water separated from ownership • Private water companies sell rightsto the water supply • Price of water variesin relation to the amountavailable • Whohascontribuited to the construction of the new Tibi Damhasrights to the «new water» supplycreated by the dam • Rights to «old water» supply (previouslyacquired) can nowbe sold or rentedonly to thosewhoownlandeligible to receive «new water»

  21. Alicante in spain Irrigationsystems • Social structure:a general assemblymeetsannually to approve budget and taxes, assessedagainst the holders of water rightsthe assemblydecidesmattersbroughtbeforeit by the executive commissionboth are costantlylooking for new water and contractualarrangements with private firms

  22. Alicante in spain Irrigationsystems • Whenpurchasingscrips (rights on water supply):- Informal market on Sundaymorning- The formalauction on Sunday- On market days • Whenfarmerwants to irrigate, tells to hisditch-rider, whoopens the headgate (in the otherhuertasfarmers do itthemselves) • Given the water, scripwill turn in

  23. Zanjerairrigationcommunities in the philippines Irrigationsystems • Social structure:The Zanjerafederationincorporatesmanyzanjeras, the smallestone with 20 members, the larger 73 (1980 data)The federationisformally a «private corporation», ithas the status of «juridicalperson» in the Philippine Water Code and thereforeiseligible to obtainwater rightsEachzanjeraisresponsible for itsownfinancial and internalaffairs and owes no financialobligations to the federationEachonehas a border of directors, the chairman iscalledmaestro. Theyelectalso a cook and otherofficials

  24. Zanjerairrigationcommunities in the philippines Irrigationsystems • Zanjeramembership(«sharing of the land»contract):they band togheter to construct the irrigationsystemeachatarholder (it’slike a farmhouse) hasone vote and the right to farm a plot (usufruct)eachoneisobligatedto contributemanyday’s work and celebration per year (1980 data: 86 max, 32 min), plus a share of the materialrequired for construction.

  25. Zanjerairrigationcommunities in the philippines Irrigationsystems • Eachfarmerisassigned a plot in eachsection • Plots at the tail end are assigned to officialsaspayment for theirservices(enhanceincentives to get water at the tail end) • In draughtperiod the bottom section of landisnotirrigated

  26. Zanjerairrigationcommunities in the philippines Irrigationsystems • Constructionsof irrigationsystem: • Everyyear (evenfourtimes per year) the river wash out the dum, and the irrigationsystem must be rebuilt! • Eachzanjeraforms a teamwork, all the teams build the dum jointly • The cookspreparefoodduring the exhaustingworkingperiod (theybuild a dum betweenswirlingwaters) • The maestromotivates the team (persuasive power and sanctions)

  27. Zanjerairrigationcommunities in the philippines Irrigationsystems • Attendance rate at the work for community: 94% (1982)(amazing, given the fact of no directmonetarypayment) • Lowlevel of finesimposed, almostalwayspaid • The system of water allocationcould be more efficient, butmanymembers of lowerzanjerasalso partecipate in otherzanjeras, adjustingimbalances. Theydon’tperceive the allocation of water like a problemFurthermore, costsavoided in:- decidinganotherarrangement (time, energycost)- adjusting to an externally-imposed procedure

  28. Similaritiesabout long-enduring self-governingcprS • Uncertainenvironment • Appropriationand the parallelexistence of private property • Discount ratesare low: individualslive side-by-side yearafteryear, theyexpecttheirchildren and grandchildren to inherittheirland • Theyspend time governingthemselves, but the rules and monitoringsystemsrequirerelativelylowcosts • Changes in according to an ex ante plan • (rememberthe 5 Nettingconditions)

  29. The design principles of cprS (speculative, notnecessary conditions) 1.Clearlydefinedboundaries:close to outsiders: more potentialappropriators = more discount rate and probableoveruse. • Congruencebetweenappropriation and provisionrules and local conditions: good-fittingrules to localconditions 3.Collectivechoicearrangements:1)peopleaffected by the operationalruleshavethemselvesoriginallydesigned and initiallyagreed to the rules (evenifcenturies ago)2) they can nowparticipate in modifyingtheserules3) Repeatedsettingwhenreputationisimportant and norms are shared

  30. The design principles of cprS (speculative, notnecessary conditions) 4. Monitoring: 1) monitorsare accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators2) punishing(monitoring) iscostly and punishment produce public goodsavailable to everyone. Butnotwhere the twoactorsmostconcerned with cheating are in directcontact with oneanother 5. Graduatedsanctions: 1) Sanctionsdepending on the seriousness and context of the offense2)«quasi voluntarycompliance» (Margaret Levi, 1988): theychoose to complywhenthey are notbeingdirectlycoerced; the non compliant are subject to coercion, ifcaught. Ithappensbecausetheyperceivethat the collectiveobjectisachieved and otherscomply (no one «sucks»)

  31. The design principles of cprS (speculative, notnecessary conditions) 6. Conflict-resolutionmechanism:1) appropriators and officialshaverapidaccess to low-costlocalarenas to resolveconflicts2) whomakehonestmistakemay be allowed to make up theirlack of performances 7. Minimalrecognitionof rights to organize:the rights of appropriators are notchallenged by externalgovernamentalauthorities, evenwhenappropriatorsdon’t create formalgovernamentaljuridictions 8.Nestedenterprises(for CPRsthat are part of largersystem):differentnestedlevelin wichfacingdifferentproblems (differentlevels in the Philippinefederation for main canal or lateral canal)

  32. bibliography In order of publication: • Netting, Robert McC., What Alpine Peasants have in Common, in Human Ecology 4(2): 135-146, 1976 • Levi, Margaret, Of Rule and Revenue, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1988 • Shepsle, Kenneth A., Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach, Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (April): 131-147, 1989 • Ostrom, Elinor, Governing the Commons, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990

  33. END

  34. DIFFERENT KIND OF GOODS NOTE: LUCA MARIO HAS COPIED IT FROM ME xD back

  35. The discount rate • When (CC-DD) / (DC-CC) is large the discount rate islow • Lower discount rate (1) • Higher discount rate (1/3) similarities Torbel Back back

  36. commonsratherthanindividualproperties – the conditions (according to Netting, 1976) • Value production per unit of landislow • Frequency of use and yeldislow • Possibility of improvement or intensificationislow • A large territoryisneeded for effective use • Large groups are required for capital-investment The exampleof Törbel in Switzerland, or the villages in Japan (meadows and forestsasCPRs) reflectsthese conditions similarities Torbel Back Back

More Related