A serious democratic deficit

1. A serious democratic deficit “our telescopic faculty is defective, and …we, therefore, see future pleasures, as it were, on a diminished scale.” Pigou 1920 “the future whispers while the present shouts” Gore 1992

2. The sustainability crisis and attitudes to future • Actions today inevitably affect the wellbeing of future generations (FG). • Previously not of overriding importance because assumed that future would resemble the past, i.e. continued growth in per capita incomes, expansion of capabilities, so being better off FG could look after themselves. • But assumption challenged by climate/environmental crisis. • And this has revealed a serious democratic deficit with implications for current decisions and future wellbeing.

3. The environmental crisis Current level 411 (NASA). Estimated safe level 350 -450 ppm

4. The environmental crisis • Leading climate scientists have warned there is only a dozen years for global warming to be kept to a maximum of 1.5C, beyond which even half a degree will significantly worsen the risks of drought, floods, extreme heat and poverty for hundreds of millions of people. Report of IPPC in 2018. • In 2018, global carbon dioxide emissions rose by 1.7% to 33bn tonnes highest ever.

5. 4 of 9 CORE planetary boundaries already crossed in 2015 • Climate change - CROSSED • Loss of biosphere integrity - CROSSED • land-system change - CROSSED • altered biogeochemical cycles (phosphorus and nitrogen) – CROSSED • Stratospheric ozone depletion • Ocean acidification • Freshwater use • Atmospheric aerosol loading (microscopic particles in the atmosphere that affect climate and living organisms) • Introduction of novel entities (e.g. organic pollutants, radioactive materials, nanomaterials, and micro-plastics)

6. Global Planet Index of Species Diversity

7. Caused by current actions – but will mainly affect FG • Increasing no. of catastrophic weather events • Floods • Rising sea-levels • Some parts of the world too hot to survive • Agricultural changes, mainly adverse. • Migration and conflict.

8. Raises two issues • Do we (current generation, or CG) have obligations to FG? What is just distribution across generations? • Shouldn’t FG participate in some way in current decisions because: • For true democracy: people should participate in decisions which affect them. • Instrumentally, to improve current decisions which affect the future

9. Approaches to intergenerational distribution • The scope of justice: A humanist view: people have equal moral worth whenever or wherever they are. • Good general principle but by itself not a great guide: doesn’t tell us what we should redistribute from CG to FG or how much. • Different types of answer from philosophers and economists.

10. Philosophers: Egalitarians • Only an obligation to FG if we believe their position is likely to be worse than CG unless we take action. Hence has only recently become an issue. • Two types of egalitarianism (Parfit): • Inequality always bad (‘telic’) • Inequality bad if due to wrongdoing (‘deontic’) – close to Nozick. • Comes to much the same if we accept that our environment-worsening actions are a form of wrongdoing.

11. Other types of egalitarianism • Luck egalitarianism (Anderson 1999): - countering the distributive effects of luck on people’s lives. • Similar to Roemer definition of equality of opportunity – i.e. variation in incomes should not be due to circumstances over which people have no control. • No control over generation a person is borne into, hence equality across generations.

12. Rawls • Rawls: veil of ignorance may include when a person is alive as well as position in the hierarchy: • ‘imagine ourselves as members of an ongoing society enduring overtime.’ • Would imply maximin type obligation – not complete equality but at minimum sufficient primary goods for FG. But: • Can one have a social contract with FG? Rawls excluded global commitments because of absence of global government; • Non-identity problem (Parfit) – people would/might choose to be alive in the imaginary position.

13. Non-identity problem bedevils most accounts of intergenerational justice: Yet goes against our moral and our common sense. • One response: Depart from thinking about particular individuals to thinking about generations as a group. Whether we adopt A (polluting) or B (non-polluting) different particular populations will result; no reason to privilege either so consider the wellbeing of FG as such, not differentiating between FG –p and FG-np.

14. Prioritarianism– similar to maximin conclusions • Give priority to worst off: Arneson: : ‘It is morally more urgent.. To obtain a one-unit well-being gain for a person, the lower the person’s lifetime well-being would otherwise be’ (2006; 27). FG likely to be in priority category. And also the poorest in CG. ANY REDISTRIBUTION TO THE FUTURE SHOULD NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CG POOR

15. Sufficientarianism (Frankfurt; Page; Gutwald et al.), or ‘threshold approach’ • Everyone should have enough to pursue the aims and aspirations they care about over a whole life. • But what if some people had more grandiose aims and aspirations than others? • Prefer Nussbaum’s CA approach: that everyone (including FG, though she’s not explicit on this) should be above the thresholds in various dimensions necessary to lead a dignified or fully human life.

16. Sustainable developmentFrom Bruntland to Sen • Bruntland: ‘Sustainable development is the kind of development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (1987) • Sen: replace ‘needs’ by ‘capabilities’ or ‘freedoms’ and respect for agency of FG as well as CG. • We can’t decide what capabilities FG will want to pursue and respect their agency. • But at the least we can be sure they will need to meet their basic needs (or ca), as a precondition of achieving other freedoms.

17. In summary • Moral intuitions and philosophical reasoning suggests that CG should consider redistributionary action towards FG. • We don’t know what possibilities/technologies/wants will be, so this has to be formulated in general terms. And a threshold, basic needs or basic ca, approach makes sense. • We know the direction we should go, if not the ‘ideal’ distribution’ (Sennian approach). • And we know the sort of action we should take now (see e.g. Bruntland; Stern and many others).

18. Economists live in a different world • Optimising through time. • Major concern is what discount rate to use for investments affecting FG. “the main divide appears to be between those who believe that its value should reflect the informed preferences of people in general.. . And those who believe that future populations should be given the same weight as the present population” (Spackman 2011: 27).

19. Positive discount rate gives very low weight to distant events • ….the basic arithmetic of exponential growth applied in a cost-benefit analysis implies that, regardless of how small the cost today of preventing an environmental catastrophe that will eventually wipe out the entire economy, it would not be worth this cost to the present generation if the benefits in the future are sufficiently distant. (Lind 1990, S-20).

20. What discount rate? • Market rate: reflects actual time preferences of CG –returns they require to save. • Follows general utilitarian basis of economics: that consumers should choose freely, maximise their utility to achieve Pareto optimum. • No egalitarian considerations. • Social time preference – positive rate justified by • Assumption of rising p. capita income in future – how tenable? • Uncertainties, so any project may not realise its expected returns. • Costs versus efficiencies of delay • Pure time preference : • Some argue for v. low or zero rate (Pigou (1920); Ramsey positive rate is ‘ethically indefensible’ (1928); Stern (1987). • But others (e.g. Eckstein and Marglin; Arrow and Kurz; Boyer and Nordhaus) think SDR should reflect CG’s views.

21. In practice: 1. Developed countries • Private sector uses high rates: typical loans from Lloyds: 14%. For small enterprises, 20%. • In OECD countries private investment accounts for 75%+ of total investment. • UK public sector (2003) uses Social Discount Rate of 3.5%, based on positive expected growth, declining MU of consumption, pure time preference, and risk element. French SDR = 4.5%. • i.e. in private sector $100 today valued near zero in 100 years; in public sector, $3.

22. 2. Developing countries • Informal sector rates vary and can be extraordinarily high: 0-200% p.a. • Microcredit institutions: variable, average 35% • World Bank advocates ‘crowding out’ rate for public investment, i.e. corresponds to estimated returns on private formal sector investment (10-12%). • Others propose sovereign borrowing rate (6.5-8.5%) (Missaka 2014). • i.e. heavy discounting of future, even in public sector. Heavier discounting than developed countries justified by poverty of CG?

23. Economists and philosophers in different realms on CG/FG issue • Philosophers concerned with appropriate objective • Economist with maximizing present value of future income. • Low or zero interest rate would improve position of FG. But no guarantee that it would achieve agreed objective. • If objective defined in terms of capabilities, FG might need MORE income than CG to achieve same capabilities (e.g. airconditioning); or less because of technological change.

24. Major conflict between how we should value FG and practice Shown by breakdown in international agreements and failure to implement Kyoto agreement

25. Failure to give sufficient weight to FG in practice • 2017, $5.2 trillion dollars spent on fossil fuel subsidies. • Obsession with economic growth among policy makers. • growth is a bad measure of progress even for CG, and is blind to distribution towards FG. • discount rates too high. • Discussions of freedoms and capabilities, agency and democracy, centrally concerned with situation of CG. • HDI an (imperfect) measure of current capabilities, nothing about environment or FG. HDI inversely correlated with carbon emissions. • Yet ca approach should be about maximising freedoms for all, whenever people live

27. Yet we have been repeatedly warned • Bruntland, 1987. • International Panel on Climate Change, established, 1990 has produced almos 50 Reports. • Stern Report, 2007. • And many others.

28. Why is there this failure? • It’s a global collective action issue, and we have no global government. • The power of special interests (especially the coal and oil industry). • The myopia of CG about the future. • The absence of FG in decision-making bodies, nationally and globally.

29. A democratic deficit • Democracy a complex concept (Sen; Crocker) • Can be interpreted as: • Representative democracy plus (including freedom of discussion; multiparties etc.) • Or ‘deliberative democracy’ -- public discussion and reasoning. • Or ideally both (Crocker). • ‘All affected’ principle.: ‘all those who are affected by a particular law, policy or decision, ought to have a voice in making it’ (Whelan, 1983). • Broadly agreed that agency and democracy requires that people contribute to decision-making which affects them.

30. Current democracies fail with respect to FG • Representative democracy – elected officials are voted for and accountable to CG above a certain age (18 or 21). FG excluded. • With elections every 5 years (or less), representatives have every incentive to give priority to current voters. • Deliberative democracy - reasoned discussion about alternatives (Crocker), when/if it occurs also confined to (usually adult) CG. • In principle, FG considerations could be -sometime are - brought into deliberative democratic discussions by CG, and by representatives in representative democracy. • But ‘myopia’ towards the future, plus special interests, are powerful obstacles to giving FG sufficient consideration .

31. Designing democratic institutions to include FG • For decisions which clearly affect them in a significant way, e.g.: • Energy policies • Preservation of species • Towards natural resources. • Budgetary balance and debt • Difficult to delineate since almost all decisions will have some effects on FG

32. How? FG cannot be present in personMultiple approaches • Internalising FG interests as values among CG decision-makers: • ‘Incorporated interests’ (as with children –Goodin 1996) • Making people (FG) ‘imaginatively present’ in the minds of deliberators (Goodin 2000). • Could apply to elected representatives and elected and non-elected deliberators. • Would need to be formal part of the responsibility of decision-makers. • Effectiveness questionable as accountable only to CG.

33. Amending the rules of representative democracy • A proportion of seats reserved for people whose duty is to represent FG (Ekeli suggests 5%). • To be elected by normal electorate alongside CG-reps (Ekeli). • Or by ‘sustainability lobby’ (Dobson). • Have delaying powers to force consideration of FG. • At local as well as national levels • Would force more consideration of FG

34. New institutions to represent FG • FG-Ombuds people. • A minister (and department) for FG. • FG-representatives within government departments – e.g. education. • FG-upper house. • A UN Agency to represent FG (UNIFGEN) • A UN Commissioner for FG. • An FG representative on the Security Council.

35. Democratic deliberations to include people selected to bring FG into the discourse • On national commissions • In statistics and economic institutions • In Universities • Giving children more voice and power

36. Likely to improve decisions and give pseudo agency to FG • But would the changes reduce efforts by non-FG reps? • Would those who elect FG-reps truly vote for best FG-reps? • How would one deal with disputes among FG-reps?

37. Testing approaches: Research Institute for Future Design, Koichi University of Technology (led by Yoshi Saijo) • Aim to create ‘futurability’- situation when ‘person experiences an increase in happiness as a result of deciding to forego current benefits so long as it enriches future generations’. [NB ‘happiness’ not necessarily right the word - aim should be to make people want to make such choices.] • Explores use of social mechanisms to change people’s choices.

38. Examples: games show social mechanisms make a difference • Where some participants (Japanese students) represent FG (‘imaginary future person’ -IFP), 28% chose environment- friendly option (E) with no FG-rep, and 60% with FG-rep. (Kamijo et al 2016) • Bangladesh game in two towns (Dhaka and Bogra) with members of community . IFP made a difference in Bogra, not in Dhaka.(Shahrier et al 2017a). • Those looking back 30 years and forward 30 years, more pro-E (Sharier et al. 2017b; Arai and Nagakawa 2018) • More pro-future after deliberative discourse (Hiromitsu 2017). • ‘Nudge’ approach: a simple nudge (default and self-commitment to inter-generational solidarity) raised long-term commitments by 50% (Bohm et al 2018).

39. Yahaba prefecture • Workshops to design ‘Yahaba 2060’ include IFP and CG. • IFP much more imaginative and ‘creative giving the highest priority to the resolution of problems that were the most complicated and time-consuming’. • CG saw future as extension of present: ‘ideas rooted within current conditions and restrictions’. Planned for more nursery schools, reduced waiting times. • Subsequent interviews, IFP retained future perspective and found thinking as IFP ‘a joy’; CG saw FG as ‘outside themselves’. (Saijo, 2018). • Similar findings in some (not all) other cases.

41. Examples show • Getting CG to represent FG (IFP) does make a difference to decisions. • Both representation and deliberation contribute • Some social mechanisms can increase ‘futurability’ in everyone and CG can incorporate interests of FG (as suggested by Goodin): ‘viewpoints of both a current generation person and an imaginary future person could coexist within one individual’(Saijo:17).

42. A few actual institutional examples • Israel: The Commission for Future Generations established 2001 - only lasted until 2006. Focus on the practices of the Knesset and had powers of delay. • UK: All party parliamentary committee on FG • We raise awareness of long-term issues, explore ways to internalise longer-term considerations into decision-making processes, and create space for cross-party dialogue on combating short-termism in policy-making. • Committee for the Future, Finnish Parliament (all party): researches long term issues and comments on government policy.

43. Other institutions for FG: Wales • The Well-being of Future Generations Act, 2015, ‘requires public bodies in Wales to think about the long-term impact of their decisions, to work better with people, communities and each other, and to prevent persistent problems such as poverty, health inequalities and climate change’. • Auditor general can examine whether public bodies are taking long-term view. • Appointment of Future Generations Commissioner for Wales – ‘guardian for the interests of FG in Wales’: can advise, encourage and promote. • Has led to rejection of proposal for a new road.

44. Hungary: parliamentary commissioner for FG, and Ombudsman for FG • duty to ‘safeguard intergenerational justice’. • Significant achievements: • Prevented Monsanto from taking over gene pool of agriculture. • Protected forest • Limited privatization of water • And a number of parliamentary committees for ‘sustainable development’ – e.g. Germany

45. Measurement issues • Greening measure of growth of income • Incorporating sustainability into HDI • Dashboard approach (Sarkozy Commission: Sen, Stiglitz, Fitoussi) inadequate.

46. Need is very urgent: but even with institutional innovations, serious problems • Powerful opposing interests: growth motive overwhelming among politicians; interest groups –reflect present business, not potential. • Global collective action needed. • Policy (and constitutional) reaction too slow, given urgency of situation. • We have not succeeded in getting justice for present poor – who are alive and can potentially represent themselves. • Justice within generations must parallel justice across generations.

47. To conclude: bringing FG into decision-making would contribute to the three major objectives 1. above all moral and political equality, of FG and CG 2. agency freedom of FG 3. and wellbeing freedom of FG

48. Constitution of the Iriquois Look and listen for the welfare of the whole people and have always in view not only the present but also the coming generations, even those whose faces are yet beneath the surface of the ground -- the unborn of the future Nation.