Building a cctld Support Organisation Developing the ICANN Bylaws Peter Dengate Thrush Montreal, 22 June 2003
ICANN IRP CHAIR: VINT CERF 4 ccSO 3 DNSO 3 PSO 3 ASO 4 VB’s GAC 5 @ Large Domain Name Support Org. Protocol Support Org Address Support Org At LargeMembership176,837 Becky BurrBob ShawChristopherWilkinsonWIPOOthers Names Council (21) AddressCouncil ISPS ITUIETFETSIWWWC Trade Marks Business RIPEARINAPNIC Non-Commercial Registries Registrars Country Code Managers General Assembly ICANNThe Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers President & CEO: Mike Roberts November 1998 - 9 Member Virgin Birth Board
ICANN -Reform: The ccTLD SO Saga • ccTLD meeting November 2000 supports a ccSO - working group proposed • DNSO reform begins, Melbourne, March 01 • PDT cc rep on Names Council working group on Reform • June 2001 - cc’s announce withdrawal from DNSO in Stockholm
Presentation by E. Porteneuve at Montevideo • ccTLD « Countries Village » • Reality of the World • Policy rules are devised locally by a Local Internet Community including local government • Each ccTLD operated under its national law and jurisdiction
Presentation by E. Porteneuve at Montevideo • Rich world of ccTLD (1) • Various business models • Private companies, public organizations, governmental agencies • Private for profit and private not for profit • Registries forbidden to act as Registrars or cooperatives of Registrars and ISPs • Naming authority inside and outside of Registry • Loosly contracting with Registrars or developing accreditation policies
Presentation by E. Porteneuve at Montevideo • Rich world of ccTLD (2) • Trustee for a Nation • Developing Local Internet Community • Working together with local government • Providing arbitration services for various disputes • Following ICANN process and acting as information center in national language
Presentation by Peter de Blanc at Montevideo • The Credibility and Balance • ICANN needs ccTLD to provide credibility. • Without ccTLD ICANN is clearly US-centric • ICANN will attempt to make individual deals with strong countries one by one. • In some cases ICANN may succeed with this. • This could increase “Internet colonialism” • A strong ccTLD is the key to balance of money, power, credibility.
Presentation by Peter de Blanc at Montevideo • The cart and the horse • Top down: ICANN decides ccTLD relation: • ICANN sends down documents to ccTLD • ICANN creates contract for ccTLD • Bottom Up: ccTLD creates organizations • ccTLD agrees on documents- sends to ICANN • ccTLD agrees on general form of contract • Individual ccTLD may modify as needed • Relationship becomes peer-to-peer • Agreements negotiated by “equals”
Montevideo -September 2001 • Representatives of 60 country code managers met in Montevideo, Uruguay on September 6 and 7, 2001. • It will be recalled that in our Stockholm Communiqué of June 2001, the ccTLD constituency reported that members there present had unanimously agreed to form a ccSO and to begin to work with stakeholders in ICANN on implementing that decision.Members in Montevideo have developed a number of key principles that will be influential in the formation of the ccSO. Subject to further development, they are;
There is a carefully definable set of global issues which can be put through the SO to the ICANN policy making process. Each ccTLD is solely responsible for it’s decision making except for that carefully defined list of global issues mentioned above, when ccTLDs agree to be bound by policies formed through the ICANN process. The ccSO Articles, bylaws and MoU with ICANN, and any contracts signed between individual ccTLDs and ICANN must ensure the integrity of the consensus decision making process including limiting that process to the set of issues, and to those issues within the ICANN mandate of technical co-ordination of internet names and numbers. Montevideo -Principles of an SO
Montevideo -SO Principles 2 • The purpose of the ccSO is to protect and promote the common interests of ccTLD managers and their local internet communities; to give advice to ICANN on identified global policy issues, within the context of maintaining global internet stability and interoperability. • Mechanisms for maintaining good communications with the other Support Organisations will be established
Montevideo - SO structure • The members of the SO shall be individual ccTLD managers. • Members shall be able to give their proxies to regional or 'other' groupings within the SO. • A member cannot be a voting member of more than one Regional or 'other' organisation for ccSO purposes"Border" ccTLDs may choose which ICANN geographic region they wish to join (self-selection)
Montevideo - SO structure • There will be a role for Regional associations, and other forms of association which may develop: initial responsibilities for the existing regional associations are the running of elections to the ccSO 'Council', and integral part of any drafting process for "Policy" recommendations to ICANN; • There shall be a ccSO Council, composed of three members elected by each region.The ccSO council shall be responsible for conducting the election of ICANN Board members.
ICANN Reform • February 2002, Stuart Lynn - “Icann is failing..” • 2nd Draft Application to form a ccSO posted • March 2002 Board forms “Evolution and reform Committee (“ERC”) in Ghana • ERC publishes papers leading up to the “Blueprint” in June 2002
3 seats elected to ICANN Board Officers: VP’s for Works, L&R, Membership, F&A Secretariat Regional associations by contract LACTLD APTLD AFTLD CENTR NATLD Latin America Asia Pacific African European North America Member ccTLDS (March 2002)International Councilseats: 3 per Region 15 seats: 3 per Region Chair elected by Council International Assembly Interface with other SO’s
Notice of Policy Request Issue List automatically created by Secretariat/VP Notified. Specified period. Remits for further work Policy Development Process : ccSO June 2002 (see www.wwtld.org/documents) International Council Vice President, Works (Policy Development) GNSO International Assembly An Open List for the discussion of ccTLD matters, announcements, Minutes etc Rapporteur provides synthesis Implement as Policy Council reviews Establish a Working Group (plus outside Representatives)
ICANN CHAIR: VINT CERF * Nom Com 5 Liaison 8 “At Large” 2 GNSO 2 ASO Generic Support Org Address Support Org Standing committees g Registries g Registrars c Registries RIR’s ISP’s Large business users Small business users IP organisations Academic/Public Consumer groups Individual Nameholders IAB/IETF TAC GAC 4 unspecified Selected by the Nominating Committee* Names Council (16) AddressCouncil TACIAB/IETFRSSACSACGAC ISPS Registries Voting members commit to ICANN policy development Registrars RIPEARINAPNICLACNICtbd Non-Commercial International Council (number unspecified) Trade Marks Business Country code Support Org Others ? General Assembly ICANNThe Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers President & CEO: Stuart Lynn Board seats 2 CCSO
ERC PROPOSAL - June 2002 The Country Names Council Unspecified number of regionally elected voting Councillors Unspecified number of regionally elected voting Councillors 1/3 of Council by : - appointments by Nominating Committee (voting), - 1 GAC appointee (non-voting)
Recent Events • 18 September ERC announces ccAG • 4 October 1st AG report • 22 October AG publishes “ScopeMatrix” • 29 October ccTLDs withdraw from DNSO • 11 November ccPDP published • 10 December Membership paper published • 24 December Council paper published
Recent Events • 28 January Structure paper published • 24 Feb. APTLD’s AGM response to AG • 26 Feb. AG Compiled Recommendations posted. • 13 March Icann explanations posted • 25 March ccTLD Rio Resolution adopted
Recent Events • 22 April ERC 5th report posted • 13 May CENTR response posted • 16 May APTLD response posted • 16 GAC response posted.
APTLD’s response • “…work should begin on implementation..” • no Nom. Com appointments to Council • deferral suggested until more cctld delegates on Nom. Com. • Exemptions unless 66%council opposes
APTLD’s response -2 • Separation of SO membership from IANA services • Launch group should be geodiverse cctld appointments • Members of Launch Group not eligible for Council* ( .jp and .au disagree) • APTLD willing to be regional organisation
CENTR’S response • “ substantially in support of the idea of a self-determining SO within the ICANN process” • needs to be open to all cctld managers • payments only on an audited,approved budget
CENTR’S response -2 • Scope needs further definition • process must be “bottom up” • Board cannot make ccTLD policy • clear separation of IANA operation from Icann policy forums -the SO’s
CENTR’S response- 3endorsing the Rio Resolution • 40 not 20 members • joining process -no letter of intent needed • counsel’s opinion not wanted on “value” • no rules as to quorum • assertion of exemption, not request
CENTR’S response- 3endorsing the Rio Resolution • One Nom Com delegate not enough • Launch group should be all willing managers who wish to help • Council elections after sufficient members, not simply 120 days • no PDP on issues outside the Scope
The GAC response • General approval ….“sound basis”…well balanced”… “ provides guarantees”… • Clarity required for scope • scope must be limited to stability issues • Assumption that policy is local -need to prove its global to involve ICANN
The GAC response- 2 • Consultation with GAC essential • Delegation and re-delegation is a question for national governments to decide, according to local law” • no managers from “contested” cctlds on Council
The GAC response-3 • SO staff, including Issues Manager, should not be Icann employees • no commitment to global policy development through Icann should be a membership requirement • Current cctld managers should be members, not necessarily the IANA data base -no vote where contested
Latest developments • 30 May ERC replies to comments • 10 June APTLD responds • 15 June Centr responds • 13 June Draft Bylaws published • 18 June Icann explanation published • 22 June cctld meeting in Montreal to review
ICANN Bylaws -Mission • ARTICLE I: MISSION AND CORE VALUES • Section 1. MISSION • The mission of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems.
ICANN Bylaws- Mission • In particular, ICANN: • 1. Coordinates the allocation and assignment of the three sets of unique identifiers for the Internet, which are • a. Domain names (forming a system referred to as "DNS"); • b. Internet protocol ("IP") addresses and autonomous system • ("AS") numbers; and • c. Protocol port and parameter numbers. • 2. Coordinates the operation and evolution of the DNS root name server system. • 3. Coordinates policy development reasonably and appropriately related to these technical functions.
ICANN Bylaws- Values • Section 2. CORE VALUES • In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN: • 1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet. • 2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN's activities to those matters within ICANN's mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global coordination. • 3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that reflect the interests of affected parties. • 4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision-making.
ICANN Bylaws - Values • 5. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment. • 6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest. • 7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process. • 8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.
ICANN Bylaws - Values • 9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected. • 10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness. • 11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments' or public authorities' recommendations.
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO 1. There shall be a ccNSO… for “developing and recommending to the Board substantive policies relating to cctlds The Recommendations said: 1. Develop policy recommendations to the board 2.Nuture consensus among the ccNSO community, and 3.Co-ordinating with other SO’s and ICANN entities
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • 2. The SO shall consist of managers that agree in writing to belong, and a Council responsible for managing the Policy development Process (PDP).
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • 3. The council shall be: • 3 from each geographic region = 15 • 3 appointments by Nom. Com.18 • 1 GAC Liaison 19 • 1 At Large Advisory Liaison 20 • 5 Regional cctld org’s Liaison 25 • Plus ASO and DNSO observers 27 • Bucharest, Shanghai and Rio resolutions oppose “intellectual property” proposal
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • Councillors term -3 years (staggered) • Removal for non attendance (3 meetings) or “inappropriate behaviour” -66% council vote. • Manage annual meeting and PDP • Elect 2 members to the ICANN board by majority affirmative vote
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • Not less than 4 open* meetings ( can be online) each year, including an Annual Meeting, one with the Board or other ICANN SO • Council to determine rules for membership and for operating procedures • Membership:those managers in “sponsoring organisation” field of IANA d/b • *Council can choose to go into “closed” meeting in special cases
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • Membership application on a form designed by Council, members commit to: • recognise the role of the ccNSO in ICANN • adhere to membership rules • abide by policies adopted by the board • pay ccNSO membership fees set by Council • Members may resign
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • Access to or registration in the IANA database is not conditional on membership of the ccNSO • Membership of the SO is independent of existence (or absence ) of any contractual relationship between a cctld and ICANN • Members are in the “Geographic Regions” defined in ICANN bylaws • Managers can appoint a person, organisation or entity to represent them in the SO
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • Policies that are adopted by the Board after a ccPDP are binding on members for the duration of their membership of the SO. • No PDP is binding in the face of contrary national law • Exemptions will be granted on grounds that policy is contrary to custom, religion or domestic national policy, unless 66% of Council opposes
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • Council will designate regional cctld organisations by 66% vote. • Council may use ICANN staff, or fund the employment of its own. • ICANN will provide admin. and operational support for the SO, on request but excluding travel funding
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • Policy shall be developed using the PDP • Changes to the PDP need to go through the PDP and be approved by the Board. • The scope of the PDP is not finalised, but is to be defined by a PDP and approved by the board. That PDP is to be based on the principles and method of analysis described in the Framework for the Scope of the ccNSO.
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • The Framework is the written description of the Scope Matrix, and forms Appendix C to the Bylaws. • It is designed to assist in “delineating relevant global policy issues” in the “complex relation between ICANN and cctld managers/registries with regard to policy issues” • Scope “cannot be established without reaching a common understanding of the allocation of authority between Icann and ccTLD registries.”
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • The Framework defines 2 “core functions” a Data Entry Function (DEF) and a Name Server Function” (NSF). • For each of those, it identifies a policy making role, an executive role in carrying out the policy, and an accountability role, for whom the policy is made and by whom approval is required.
ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO • “Policy role” means the ability and power to define policy. • “Executive role” means the ability and power to act upon and implement the policy • “Accountability” means the ability and power to hold the responsible entity accountable for exercising its power
ICANN Bylaws • In the NSF, for the cctld name servers, • Policy role lies with the ccNSO-PDP • The executive role is held by the cctld manager. • Accountability is to “part ICANN (IANA), part Local Internet Community, including local government”