By Stijn Claessens Professor of International Finance Policy, University of Amsterdam Assistant Director, Research Depa

1. Current Challenges in Financial Regulation for Emerging Markets Keynote speech at the 2nd EMG Conference“Emerging Markets Finance”May 15-16, 2008 , London By Stijn Claessens Professor of International Finance Policy, University of Amsterdam Assistant Director, Research Department, Financial Studies Division, International Monetary Fund

2. Structure of Speech • Importance of financial sector development • Drivers of financial sector development • Current challenges in finance regulation • Issues facing emerging markets • Conclusions

3. 1. Importance of financial sector development • Finance operates through multiple channels • Pooling resources, subdividing shares • Transferring resources across time and space • Managing risk • Generating and providing information • Dealing with incentive problems • Resolving competing claims on wealth generated • Empirically, finance shown to matter for • Growth, Volatility, Poverty, Inequality, etc. • Entry channel especially important in emerging markets

4. Private Credit and GDP per capita growth

5. Finance and Volatility

6. Finance and Poverty e(Growth in Headcount | X) e(Private Credit | X) Residuals Fitted Values

7. Finance and Inequality e(Growth in Gini Coefficient | X) e(Private Credit | X) Residuals Fitted Values

8. 2. Drivers of financial sector development: knowledge to date Financial development depends on: • Macro-economic and fiscal stability • Real sector • Legal and judicial system • Proper regulation and supervision • Access to credible information • Competitive & contestable markets

9. A. Macro-economic, fiscal stability • Stable macro-economic environment • Moderate, positive real interest rates • Appropriate exchange rate regime • Stable fiscal environment • Low fiscal deficits to avoid crowding out • Limited direct role of the government in financial intermediation • Low financial sector taxation

10. Private Credit and Inflation

11. B. Real sector • Finance input for real sector and vice-versa • Vicious and virtuous relationships • Development and effectiveness of financial and real sector depend on many similar factors • Yet still separate finance reform agenda • Additional positive effect of finance on growth • Financial sector represent allocation of control rights, link to general political economy of reform

12. C. Legal and judicial system • Good property rights, laws • Effective legal system very important for financial markets, financial intermediation • How equity and creditor rights affect financial development, external financing, dividend patterns, growth, firm valuation, etc. is well documented • Includes a well-functioning judicial system that enforce these rights

13. Private Credit and Creditor Rights

14. Stock Market and Shareholder rights

15. Private Credit and Contract Enforcement

16. D. Regulation and supervision • Regulation and supervision of intermediaries, markets • Financial sector is highly regulation dependent • Regulation differs from supervision. Regulation needs to balance market discipline and government supervision • Without checks and balances, too much power in the hand of supervisors/regulators retards financial development and creates risks

17. What Works Best for Banks?Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern, James Barth, Gerard Caprio and Ross Levine, Cambridge University Press, 2006 Given typical institutional and political environment… Avoid relying only on official oversight, restrictions etc. Emphasize private monitoring / incentives Stress Basel II’s third pillar (not capital / official oversight) Increases in deposit insurance generosity increase moral hazard and thereby increase fragility Supervisors have crucial role Support market discipline, not supplant it Foster / force information disclosure

18. E. Access to credible information • Information is essential for risk management, access to finance, efficiency of intermediation • Information to be available on borrowers, consumers and financial intermediaries • Quality of accounting & auditing, rating agencies, credit bureaus, key components of informational infrastructure • Information infrastructure has to be contestable

19. Better creditor information sharing increases private credit and eases external financing

20. F. Competitive & contestable markets • Contestability of financial system key • Contestability matters more than market structure • State-owned institutions hinder • Entry (including foreign institutions) helps stability, efficiency, access • Structure (bank versus markets) matters less than having right fundamentals and open systems • Banks complement securities markets--in financing, corporate governance--and vice-versa • Most financing depends on similar determinants • Balanced development can, however, provide a spare wheel

21. Competitiveness depends more on contestability than market structure

22. Lower private credit with higher share of government-owned banks

23. Firms are less likely to rate high interest rates and access to long-term loans as major obstacles with more foreign banks

24. Yet countries vary greatly in openness(WTO Commitments Index Value) n/a n/a n/a

25. Stock markets and banks complement each other in growth and development

26. 3.Current challenges in finance • Triggers and changes • Overall approach • Changing special nature of banks • Competition policy • Consumer protection • Costs of regulation • Harmonization

27. A. Triggers and changes • Financial services are changing rapidly • Deregulation: within markets and products, across markets, geographic, including cross-border • Technology: advances in information, particularly internet and increased remote delivery • Factors are changing financial services industries structures and altering forms of provision • Banks and finance becoming less special; increasingly more substitutes available; more remote delivery possible; local markets less relevant; lines between products and financial institutions blurring • Globalization accelerating: increased (gross) capital flows, cross-border financial services, foreign bank entry, listing in financial centers

28. Changing real world has implications also for financial intermediation • Nature of the firm altering • Intangibles, new economy, network-type assets more important for production and productivity • Investments to be financed changing • Investors invest in “ideas”, rather than fixed assets • Ideas need more protection for investors • Yet often not suited for organized/formal markets • Implications for financial sector • Fewer fixed assets: makes debt more difficult • Higher risk: requires other financing structures • Greater importance of corporate governance • More VC-type, more equity markets for VC to exit

29. B. Overall approach • Overall approach: reaffirming fundamentals • New evidence confirms crucial role of fundamentals • Yet need to revisit continuously fundamentals • Greater emphasis on enabling environment • Property rights, information infrastructure, etc. • Reduced, but more focused role of government • Do not expect government to solve all problems • But neither will market always • Focus on core role of government, with some market-friendly interventions

30. C. Special nature of banks • Greater substitutes for bank liquidity available • Reducing specialness of banks • New roles for banks and increased conglomerates • More risk managers, as within financial conglomerates • Introducing new risks and oversight challenges, e.g., LCFI • Revisit prudential and institutional-oriented approaches • Revisit tools/approaches used for managing risks  Basel II • Higher transparency, better corporate governance  Pillar III  • Protect more core elements (payments system) against spillovers • Less cylinder approaches, stress more common elements • Reduced special nature of banks implies less need for public safety net and requires adjustment of standards

31. D. Competition policy • Competition is important in the financial sector • As in other sectors, competition affects efficiency, costs and incentives of institutions & markets to innovate • Competition in finance, however, is complex, w/tradeoffs • Access to credit depends on franchise value, but degree of competition can negatively/positively affect access • Too much competition can undermine stability → crises • Structure matters, but in complex ways, e.g., effects of entry/exit rules, economies of scale/scope, networks, etc. • Financial services industries are continuously changing

32. Competitive landscape is changing

33. More and better competition policy both possible and needed • Finance and banks particularly less special • Global and across types of services/institutions • The (new) competition policy paradigm to involveThree Pillars • Better approach to competition policy • Better institutional arrangements • Better (new) tools to be used • Ultimate goal: (new?) paradigm • Competition policy to be functional, global • To resemble other network industries (e.g., telecommunications, energy)

34. Approaches • Competition policy to combine three approaches • Institutional: assure contestable markets by “proper” entry/exit of institutions, domestic and cross-border • Functional: assure contestable markets by leveling playing field (in all dimensions) across similar financial products & services • Production: assure efficiently provided, equal accessible, affordable network services (information, distribution, settlement, clearing, payment, etc.) • So far: Institutional: Big barriers have been removed, but many small remain. Functional: long way to go Production: less discussed so far

35. More gains to be gotten from institutional and functional approach • Furtherliberalize/harmonize across markets, sectors, products, by functions so locations/labels not matter • Complex, since: • Costs of regulation hard to assign to specific functions, products, e.g., payments services • Path dependency, e.g., tax differences in savings products • Subtle distortions/benefits, e.g., safety net, LoLR • Policy responses • More integrated/single supervisors may or may not help • Global standards can help, but still country differentiation • Competition—between markets, sectors, products and regulators—key to force more effective harmonization

36. Institutional arrangements • Competition policy to be given more weight • Competition policy to be (more) separate from supervision • Effective competition authority with good enforcement • Competition policy to be more harmonized • Horizontal and vertical across various financial services • For specific inputs/links, including other, non-financial • Competition policy to be more coordinated • Integrate with overall information/technology competition policy • Many markets are global, but competition policy not yet • Existing mechanisms can be used more: WTO (all GATS modes), FTAs

37. Tools to analyze competitiveness • Analysis is, and will remain, difficult • Market and product definitions: will become even harder • Barriers to entry complex: may arise fromsunk costs, economies of scale and scope, externalities • Network effects exist in supply, demand, and distribution • Tools far behind and need to be adjusted • Borrow more from traditional IO or other (services), but adapt to “special nature” of financial services • Less market structure, more conduct analysis • More focus on access pricing and policies for key market infrastructures (e.g., payments systems, information, credit bureaus, trading systems)

38. E. Consumer protection • Assuring proper business conduct • Long-standing issue, but recent events show that small “distortions” hurt consumers and negatively affect integrity • Limit conflict of interests, increase oversight, especially in capital markets, of key issues (e.g., A&A), take strong actions (e.g., NY SEC) • Protecting individual consumers • Can no longer assure “fairness” of products and markets • “Buyer beware” to be matched by increased “truth in advertising” requirements, liability and means of users to take legal actions • Assuring consumers obtain the greatest benefits • Increased choices and complexity not (yet) matched by knowledge • Requires more financial education, starting at an early age

39. F. Costs of regulation • Deregulation followed by reregulation: now too much regulation and too intense oversight? • Direct and indirect (compliance) costs have increased • With possible adverse effects, e.g., • SOX may lead to migration of US IPOs to UK; fewer new listed firms • AML/CFT can affect access of households • Markets players and governments have recognized this • e.g., EU Action Plan streamline regulations, US competitiveness reports • Proper policy responses • More formal cost-benefit analysis needed • More transparency and greater consultation to balance tradeoffs • Without inviting capture, need to have broad(-er) representation of producers and consumers in processes

40. G. Harmonization • Big barriers have been removed, but many small remain • Further harmonize across markets, sectors and products, by functions, so that labels no longer matter. Complex as: • Costs of regulation hard to assign to specific functions/products • Path dependency, e.g., tax differences • Subtle distortions/benefits, e.g., safety net, LLR • Policy responses: • More consolidated/single supervisory authorities may help • Standards help globally, but country differentiation unavoidable • Better data and more transparency on prices and costs • Competition—between markets, sectors, products and regulators—key to force more effective harmonization

41. U.S. Regulatory Regime: Multiple, Overlapping, Inconsistent and Costly Regulation Justice Department Federal Courts Financial Holding Company • Assesses effects of mergers • and acquisitions on • competition • Fed • OTS • SEC • Ultimate decider of banking, • securities, and insurance • products Umbrella or Consolidated Regulator “Dual Banking” Primary/ Secondary Functional Regulator • OCC • FDIC • State BankRegulators • FDIC and/or • Fed • OTS • FDIC • 50 State InsuranceRegulators plusDistrict of Columbia • and Puerto Rico • FINRA • SEC • CFTC • State Securities Regulators • Fed • State Licensing(if needed) • U.S. Treasury forsome products Key CFTC – Commodity Futures Trading Commission FDIC – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Fed – Federal Reserve FINRA - Financial Industry Regulatory Authority OCC – Comptroller of the Currency OTS – Office of Thrift Supervision SEC – Securities and Exchange Commission • OCC • Host County Regulator • Fed • Host County Regulator • OTS • Host County Regulator

42. 4. Issues facing emerging markets • International financial integration • Stability and volatility • Cross-border activities • Access concerns • Development strategies • Application of international standards • Adaptation of international standards • Corporate governance • Political economy

43. A. International financial integration a) stability and volatility • Developing countries, emerging markets especially, subject to rapid financial integration • Large capital flows, foreign bank entry, capital market migration • Forcing adjustment faster than in current developed’ past • Need for more rapid institutional development • Intermediate level of (financial) development/openness most risky • Integration → more stability, but at times also volatility  • Greater emphasis on measurement and management of risks • May need to keep toolkit to intervene (e.g., capital account controls, circuit brakers, tighter restrictions)

44. The many links between capital flows and domestic cycles

45. b) Cross-border activities • Increased foreign bank presence, foreign capital markets activities on- and offshore, raising specific questions • Costs of regulation and supervision increase with (multiple) coordination with home countries • Yet capacity of emerging markets lower and effects of banking failure and financial crisis higher • Foreign investors/financial institutions not internalize all issues • Lack of paradigm more costly for emerging markets • Rule for cross-border bank resolution, capital markets oversight ambiguous in some respects • Inefficient responses, e.g. subsidiaries, create additional costs/risks

46. Foreign Ownership of Banks Varies Greatly n/a n/a

47. Access concerns Starting point: Access vs. Use Users of formal financial services No need Population Voluntary self-exclusion Cultural/religious reasons not to use/indirect access Non-users of formal financial services Insufficient income/high risk Involuntary exclusion Discrimination Contractual/Informational framework Access to financial services No access to financial services Price/Product features

48. Use of finance around the world varies greatly

49. Financial use relates to financial depth, but is not the same

50. SMEs complain the most