1. Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and humanitarian international law Responsibility to protect

2. Part III- case study – Haïti case • WhyHaiti in 1991-1996? Whyspecifically 1993-1994? • Facts • On 1990 Jean-Bertrand Aristide electeddemocratically as President of Haiti state • Coups d’état in 1991- Aristide expelled • OAS and UNSC condemned the coup

3. UN reactionthroughreso. Of SC concerningHaiti • 1993: economic sanctions • res. 841 §1, SC acting underChapter VII takes into account all previous GA + OAS res. + § 5-9 trade embargo • res. 875 §1, SC under chapter VII and VIII calls all MS to halt inward maritime shipping as necessary in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations

4. UN reactionthroughreso. Of SC concerningHaiti -II • 1994, res. 917 againeconomic sanctions §2-10 • res.940 by SC: • «  Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States »

5. How SC linkeddemocracywithchapter VII Res. 841: Due to the failure of OR efforts, humanitarian crisis, number of refuges and that the legitimate grnm was not reinstated, SC under chapter VII threat of international peace and security. But , is important that SC (res. 940) acting under chapter VII : authorize the use of all means for the “departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement and return of the legitimately elected President” In this case, SC “stretched” the concept of humanitarian intervention so as to include democracy.

6. Darfur case • WhyDarfur? • Holocaustafter GF, Rwanda, Kosovo, Srebrenica, Bosnia-Hertzegovina = « neveragain  » • Darfuris a case when media + CS and others first invoke to R2P • Mainly cause is the first test for r2p • Facts • 2003 SLA + JEM attackedgovernmentmilitary installations • Governmentreplied by arming +supporting janjaweed militias • Severalattempts to negotiate a ceasefire on late 2003 • 300,000 dead and 2,5 million of displacedpersons by this conflict • Darfurpeace Agreement on 2006

7. SC (in)actions in Darfur case? • 2004 • 1547 §6: to bring an immediate halt to the fighting in Darfur • 1556 §6: Demands that the Government of Sudan fulfill its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias; • Is like giving the r2p for darfurians to the Sudanese government • 1590 §7: Emphasizes that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur • 2005 • 1593 §1: Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the ICC

8. Darfur case and R2P • Res. which« referred » to r2p • 1755, 1828, 1870, 1881, 1919, 1935, • whichreaffirms the provisions of the United Nations World Summit Outcome document 2005 • UN High-Level Mission report on HR Darfur is using R2P as a framework to analyze the failure of Sudan to protectitsowncitizens (§2) • The refusal of Sudanesegovernment • §138 is applied: Sudanesegovernment is unwilling or unable to protectitscitizens • §139 is also applied: at least crimes againsthumanity (even genocide in the USA opinion and others)

9. Why international communitydidn’treact? Strategicinterest of the permanentmember of SC (Russia, China) Not enough pression, cause therewas a fear for peaceprocesswith South Skepticism about humanitarian intervention Military actions will worsen the situation UN immature in r2p concept, it was too early + problem of whose responsibility (UN, AU, Sudan, League of Arab States?) Selectivitywas made part of r2p framework, cause r2p not intended to be applied in all imaginable crisisworld-wide.

10. Conclusion M. Sassoli: « R2p: Une obligation juridique ou une promesse politique? » Toujours le même problématique: est-ce que les résolutions de l’AG ont une portée législative?