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Political Outlook 2014

Political Outlook 2014. A volitile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment. @ theo_venter. Theo Venter WNNR, Pretoria 30 September 2013. Why the Political Outcomes?. A change in the political environment brings a change in policy, policy priorities and policy implementation;

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Political Outlook 2014

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  1. Political Outlook 2014 A volitile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment @theo_venter Theo Venter WNNR, Pretoria 30 September 2013

  2. Why the Political Outcomes? • A change in the political environment brings a change in policy, policy priorities and policy implementation; • Agriculture as a national or provincial competency. • Key areas in agriculture are vulnerable to policy changes: • Rural development policies • Agricultural development policies • Land reform policy and implementation • Government policy on Trade and Industry (e.g. Poultry Industry) • Labour policies • Urgency of government regarding food security

  3. Dominating Issues • Labour unrest and instability • The weak currency • Poor economic performance and expectations • Weak national leadership • Uncertainty about the country’s political and economic sustainability: Service delivery crisis • Election campaigns already in process

  4. Key uncertainties for 2014 • What will be the health of Nelson Mandela in the next 6-7 months? • What will the economy do? • What will the Vavi-factor do to Cosatu? • Will labour influence the political scene? • Will the Marikana factor play a role? • WillAgang, EFF and WASP play a significant role? • Can the DA maintain solid growth • Is the ANC on a slippery political slope?

  5. Zumanomics Revisited: Raymond Parsons • Global economics • South African economy • The National Development Plan – The new normal • The five deficits – social, fiscal, trade, delivery and trust • Implementing the NDP • The mixed economy and business • The NDP and Zuma’s place in history

  6. Suspended Revolution: Adam Habib • Explaining the transition • Erosion of political accountability • Economic contradictions and inequalities • The viability of a sustainable social pact • The evolution of state-civil society relations • South Africa and the world • What is to be done • The South African contribution to democratization

  7. The Long View: JP Landman • Headlines vstrendlines • What makes a modern society successful? • The economy • Demography • (Un)Employment • Open society • Creative individuals • Learning and unlearning • Inequality • Social capital • Muddle-through economy • Living with ambiguity • A bigger ambition

  8. Labour at issue? Unionised labour has over the past year become increasingly assertive, of late talking deep double-digit wage and benefit demands, encouraged onward by primarily three drivers: • Socially, by demands from workers, many of which can no longer find themselves within the confines of their earning potential defined by their skill sets, education and productivity opportunities. • Institutionally, by the turf wars between brother unions competing not least for the economic (and political) rents accruing to dominant union players. • Psychologically, by political promises of decades, high on feeding expectations but low on delivering the means for these to come true.

  9. The Marikana Factor

  10. Key features of 2012 industrial action

  11. Working days lost 2012

  12. Wages lost due to work stoppages 2012

  13. Work stoppages 2012

  14. The post Mangaung pressures....

  15. The political chop….after Mangaung.

  16. Opposition to NDP building momentum Numsacalls NDP a DA =“neo-liberal” construct Vavi supported by Numsa against NDP Jockeying for positions of power within trade unions: some want Vavi out; NUM vsNumsa; NUM vs AMCU Reticence on part of government leadersto reprimand unions Lack of implementation of NDP until after general election? Ideological divide between socialists & market-oriented ministries Accusations that NDP is “anti-worker”, Blade Nzimande “do not monumentalise the NDP” Business as the enemy

  17. The nature of the beast

  18. The nature of Liberation Governments • Consortia of political interests (A broad church). • The urge to recreate society (Transformation vs. governance). • Opposition weakened through a process of delegitimisation. • Efforts to internalise opposition. • Politics usually contradictory: • Syncretic politics • Political paradox • Multiple prophets

  19. The nature of Liberation Governments • The translation of very high levels of legitimacy to efficiency only comes with pain and time. • A very strong sense of justification build into the dominant ideology. • Liberation culture contagious - spreads easily into crime, opportunism and entitlement. BUT • Liberation governments can be efficient (if disciplined). • Liberation governments can be self correcting.

  20. Farewell to the past The new beginning Turbulence and chaos • Resistance to change • Low innovation • Fear and uncertainty • Double agendas • Conflicts high • No clear vision • Legitimacy crisis • Visionary leadership • Emerging game rules • Ambivalence • Legitimacy increase • Innovation appear • Efficiency increase • Uncertainty level very high • Confusion and chaos • No clear game rules • Anxiety, depression • Polarisation • Need for leadership Power plays Conflict Consolidation The Transformation Venturi

  21. The Dynamics of a Political Spectrum Radical Left Far Left Left Centre Centre Right Right Radical Right Centre Left Far Right

  22. The Dynamics of a Political Spectrum Radical and extreme left: Volitile, noisy and challenge to left of centre Radical and extreme right: Volitile, noisy and challenge to right of centre Social Economic Radical Reactionary Governance The political middle-ground: centripetal of centrifugal – constant pull from the edges or searching for the middle

  23. “I don’t know I came here tonight; I’ve got a feeling something ain’t right; ……….. Clowns to the left; Jokers to the right Here I am Stuck in the middle with you!” Steelers Wheel ‘60s Reservoir Dogs

  24. Registration Statistics Sep 2013

  25. Registration Statistics Sep 2013

  26. The Designer Election 1994 DP 1,7% 1,0% 20,3% 10,5% 62,7% 2,2% 1,2% PAC Voting percentage General election 1994 * No voters list available 86% * No formal voting districts * First election using proportional election (List system)

  27. 1,43% (6) 66,35 % (266) ACDP DP DP 0.17% (1) 8,58% (34) 6,87% (28) PAC 0,54% (2) 0.71% (3) AEB 0.29% (1) UDM 0,8% (3) 9,56% (38) 3.42% (14) The 1999 election outcome

  28. 1,43% (6) 66,35 % (266) ACDP DP DP 0.17% (1) 8,58% (34) 6,87% (28) PAC 0,54% (2) 0.71% (3) AEB 0.29% (1) UDM 0,8% (3) 9,56% (38) 3.42% (14) The 1999 election outcome

  29. 2004: One Party Dominance 1,6% 12,4% 2% 0,5% 7% UDM 2% 1% 69,7% AZAPO 1% PAC 2% Voting percentage 77%

  30. 2004: One Party Dominance 1,6% 12,4% 2% 0,5% 7% UDM 2% 1% 69,7% AZAPO 1% PAC 2% Voting percentage 77%

  31. 2009: ANC slipping? 1,6% 62% 16% 4% COPE 1% 1% UDM 1% 2% PAC Voting percentage 80%?

  32. 2009: ANC slipping? 1,6% 62% 16% 4% COPE 1% 1% UDM 1% 2% PAC Voting percentage 80%?

  33. 2009: The political swing 1,6% 62% 16% 4% COPE 1% 1% UDM 1% 2% PAC Voting percentage 80%?

  34. 2014: Service Delivery Election? 1,6% 60% 20% 4% 1% 1% COPE PAC UDM 3% 1%

  35. ANC Leadership Challenges Zuma’s 2nd term as president of the ANC (2012-2017) Zuma’s 2nd term as president of the RSA (2014-2019)? Zuma’s 1nd term as president of the RSA (2009-2014) Dec 2012 Apr 2014 Dec 2017 Apr 2019 General election Next ANC Conference General election Mangaung Conference Zuma’s 2nd term as ANC president ends in December 2017, but he may still be President of the RSA until 2019. Is this the entry of Cyril Ramaphosa? Zone of uncertainty. Zuma’s 2nd term as ANC president ends. Is this the entry of Cyril Ramaphosa?

  36. Sensemaking

  37. The Tipping Point? • The most dangerous moment for any African country is not the moment of liberation, but the moment when the party of liberation first perceives the prospect of losing power at the polls according to Frederick van ZylSlabbert. • When would that moment be for South Africa? • Given our proportional representation system, it could be when the ruling party's national vote falls below 55%, a sense of real vulnerability will hit it. • That is the tipping point, when those grown accustomed to power are stripped of their complacency and realise they may well be thrown out next time.

  38. Tipping Point (ii) • At that point is when the electorate, the ordinary voters, suddenly feel empowered with the knowledge that the future lies in their hands and that their interests can no longer be ignored. • The ANC has been losing support steadily, from 69,69% of the vote in 2004 to 65,9 % in 2009 to 62% in 2011 municipal election. • A lossloss of 7,69% of the national vote over seven years. • The DA's share of the vote has grown from 12,3% in 2004 to 16,66% in 2009 to 23,9% in 2011 - a total growth of 11,6%. • To bring the ANC's vote down to that critical figure of 55%, the combined opposition has to reduce the ANC's share by only another 7%.

  39. Tipping Point (iii) • Beyond that, the ANC will be in marginal territory, with all the psychological effects that will induce. • It is less than the share of the vote the ANC has already lost since 2004, and less than twice the 3,9% it lost in the two years between 2009 and 2011. • If the DA can maintain only a slightly higher growth rate over the three years between 2011 and 2014 than it did between 2009 and 2011, it would come within a few decimal points of achieving that target on its own. • Add to that the Zuma factor. How much support the president's declining public image will drain from the ANC is hard to determine.

  40. Possible outcomes • The ANC support decline, but not below 60% of the national support; • The DA increase its support but Agang erode growth beyond 20% of the vote. • COPE decline below 2% due to Agang support and Agang goes to parliament with 3% of the vote. • IFP dips below 3% due to ANC and NFP gains in KwaZulu-Natal. • FF plus stays with PAC, AZAPO, APC, EFF and WASP at or below the 1% threshold • Western Cape remains DA and Gauteng ends in the hands of a DA-Agang-COPE and FF Plus coalition. • ANC support remains solid in the FS, EC, NW and MP, but lose support in Limpopo and Northern Cape.

  41. The next windfall (fracking) is a decade away, even while our fractious politics leaves the economy to its own devices, a condition in which portions of the labour force want to rewrite the rules from within even as the world is rewriting our script from without, and many businesses, professionals and households that carry this economy seek diversification in faster growing economies abroad, especially in Africa. (CeesBruggemans, 2013) South African history, the historian CW de Kiewiet once observed, tends to proceed by economic windfall and political disaster.

  42. Thank You

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