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Iran’s Nuclear Strategy: Understanding Tehran’s Acquisition Pathway

Iran’s Nuclear Strategy: Understanding Tehran’s Acquisition Pathway. Patrick Disney Yale University July 7, 2011. Four Basic Contentions:. Iran currently possesses a latent nuclear weapons capability Iran’s leaders exhibit signs of nuclear ambivalence Iran’s nuclear M.O.:

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Iran’s Nuclear Strategy: Understanding Tehran’s Acquisition Pathway

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  1. Iran’s Nuclear Strategy:Understanding Tehran’s Acquisition Pathway Patrick Disney Yale University July 7, 2011

  2. Four Basic Contentions: • Iran currently possesses a latent nuclear weapons capability • Iran’s leaders exhibit signs of nuclear ambivalence • Iran’s nuclear M.O.: • Create options → Delay → Wait for consensus • Iran’s leaders respond to provocation with provocation

  3. Iran’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle UF6 Yellowcake Uranium Conversion Uranium mining and milling Enrichment Fuel Fabrication Other R&D Missile Technology Reprocessing Fuel Rods Spent Fuel Reactor

  4. Iran Already Possesses a Nuclear Weapons Capability Nuke Agency Says Iran Can Make Bomb September 18, 2009 Iran experts at the U.N.'s nuclear monitoring agency believe that Tehran has the ability to make a nuclear bomb and worked on developing a missile system that can carry an atomic warhead, according to a confidential report seen by The Associated Press.

  5. Iran Exhibits Signs of Nuclear Ambivalence • I. Abraham (1998, 2006, 2009) –Leaders may not have well-developed intentions regarding weaponization; may be persuaded either way • 2007 NIE (2011 update): Iran has not yet taken the decision to weaponize, largely because it has not needed to • Serious divisions exist among political elite • Chemical weapons precedent from 1980s

  6. Iran’s Decision-Making Process • Create widest possible range of options • Delay controversial decisions • Wait for consensus to emerge “[Khamenei] has ruled the country by consensus rather than decree.” – KarimSadjadpour

  7. Provocation Begets Provocation • Consensus most likely to emerge in response to provocation • May 25, 2011: IAEA Report → June 8: Triple 20% Enrichment • Nov. 28, 2009: BoG Censure → Nov. 30: Announcement of 10 new enrichment facilities “We had no plan to build many nuclear sites like Natanz but…the West adopted an attitude toward Iran which made the Iranian government to pass the ratification on construction of ten sites similar to the Natanz enrichment facility.” -Ali-Akbar Salehi

  8. This Means Trouble for the US • US Policy: Delay Iranian acquisition of a bomb • Misaligned with reality in Iran • Abraham warns: Seeking to dissuade ambivalent actors from that which they do not intend to do can backfire • “Rally ‘round the flag” • Likely to encourage an Iranian push for a bomb

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