Power in International Politics

1. Power in International Politics State Power/Power Politics Balance of Power International Systems

2. Key Concepts • Anarchy and self-help. • The security dilemma. • Security dilemma within a society of states. • Power Politics: whereas power is unequally distributed, each state must provide its own security, and whereas one state’s security is another’s threat, states continually vie for power to be secure. • PP includes diplomacy, alliance, BoP, War, Peace, even IL and IO. Primacy is Power.

3. Types of State Power • The form of PP changes, but the nature of state relations remains the same. • Great Powers have five features. (Roman, Napoleonic, British empires, USA/USSR post 1945). • Middle Powers: GPs value its resources, strategic position and military value added. (Regional MPs: France, Indonesia). • Small Powers: do not affect BoP (Netherlands), are most insecure, can be flashpoints (Israel).

4. Nature of GP Power Politics • Status Quo vs. Revolutionary GP’s. • Tools: national power, alliances, diplomacy. (Classical vs. Cold War: Structural Realism {K. Waltz}) • GPs may seek concert for world domination. • GP may seek universal empire. • Former GPs may be submerged in power structure of supplanter: Holland-England, A-H Empire-Germany, UK-US, ?USA-China?

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6. Balance of Power: various meanings • Historical/descriptive assessment of power. • BoP not as conscious state policy but as a function of systems equilibrium. • Grotian (Liberal) Balance: enlightened self-interest makes near equilibrium a founding principle of the society of states (eg: Concert of Europe), used to limit conflict, grant compensation, and avert hegemony, eventually overcome war. • Machiavellian Balance: BoP is inevitable. States only have permanent interests: maintaining the scales in their favour. BoP is inherently unstable. • Immanuel Kant: reject ‘the power trap’, both as practice and as prescription.

7. Realist Rules for BoP • Always increase capabilities, but choose diplomacy over war. (Morton Kaplan) • War rather than a loss in capabilities. • Oppose preponderance by one GP. • Avoid uncertainty of eliminating other GPs (Versailles, Gulf 1991) or allowing a new order not based on Power Politics.

8. Preponderance rather than Balance • Preponderance of Power school of thought. (balances are unstable, benevolent hegemony is better {Cold War}, war is likely when hegemon declines or challenger closes the gap). • Hegemonic stability theory: hegemon underwrites rules of trade and diplomacy which creates stability • Declining hegemons/stability causes war or systems change

9. International Systems • The type of configuration of power in a time and geographical framework. • Holsti’s five IS aspects: boundary, units, interaction, norms, structure. • Structure: number of GPs, nature of their power, alliances. • Neo-realism (K. Waltz) makes int’l structure the key explanation of all international politics.

10. Types of Structure • Unipolar (tether pole). National or bloc power: Roman Empire. • Multipolar (merry-go-round). National power and alliances. (1648-1814 Europe), South Asia today. • Bipolar (see-saw). National power and alliance blocs. Triple Alliance {Ge, It, A-H, 1882) and Triple Entente {Eng-Fr-Rus. 1907}, and Cold War. • Each has its own type of dominant security problem: challenger/assimilation; shifting alliances; escalation/zero-sum conflict

11. Conflict Potential and Risk calculation • Deutsch and Singer definition of stability (no dominant, all GPs remain, no large-scale war) • Multipolar: potentially many conflicts, but also countervailing alliances and BoP holder. • Bipolar: potential zero-sum and high risk of escalation, but more political control.(offset by ideology and MAD) • Structure of IS is also contextual: rules of war and diplomacy change.

12. Today’s International System • Boundaries: global strong points • Units: democracies vs. the rest • Interaction: eco, pol, mil, cult. • Structure: unipolar and multipolar mixed.

13. Complicating Factors • Non-state actors and intrastate wars. • Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). • Trade blocs vs. WTO • USA is not a traditional empire. It is a mixture of: primus inter pares, benevolent hegemon, globocop, and traditional GP. • ‘Triumph’ of Liberalism and instant communication challenges legitimacy of national interest and possibility of limited war.

14. Conclusion • Does the end of territorial aggrandizement mean the end of GP Power Politics? • Does the presence of Nuclear Weapons mean the end of GP Power Politics? • Does Globalization? • Can regional or global organization (NATO/UN) prevent/overcome GP politics? • Each GP has its own power and normative context. • Today’s Power Politics: The Role of one Hyper Power.

15. Future System Watch • Will a multipolar MAD be as stable as the Cold War MAD? • Will missile defence replace deterrence? • Will WMD replace Nuclear Weapons? • Will rigid trade blocs emerge from globalization? • Will the state system weaken from quasi states and global economics? • Will civilization/religion clashes replace inter-state war?