Review and Assessment of the Korea Rail ’ s Safety Performance using Risk Assessment Models

International Railway Safety Conference 2009, Sweden Review and Assessment of the Korea Rail’s Safety Performance using Risk Assessment Models Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi National Railway Safety R&D Program Office, Korea Railroad Research Institute

Contents I Introduction II How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance? III Safety Performance IV Conclusion

1. Introduction Background • Cyclic occurrence of major train accidents • - 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities • - 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities • - 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities • Environmental changes in Korea • - KTX (Korea Train eXpress) operation at 2004 • - Structural reform of railroad industries • - Electrification of conventional lines • - Preparation of TCR & TSR • “Railway Safety Act” announced in 2004 • - Focused on the risk-based safety management • - Nation-wide railroad safety program & safety regulations • - Hazard analysis, risk assessment & control

1. Introduction Research Objective Since Oct. 2005, KRRI has developed the common hazard analysis & risk assessment models for the Korea Railway. Research Objective is to introduce - Developing procedure of the risk models - Application of the developed model to the Korea railway - the Korea rail industry’s safety performance against some defined risk areas

2. How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance? Risk Assessment Procedure Hazard Identification Defining the Initiating Hazardous Events Development of Accident Scenarios Casual Analysis Consequence Analysis Railway Accident Progress Scenarios Railway Accident Appearance Scenarios Hazardous Events FTA Model ETA Model Risk Evaluation & Reduction

2. How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance? System & Boundary Definition Typical railway system configuration proposed in SAMRAIL project • According to the accident classification of “Railway Accident Report Regulation”, • The scenarios were divided into the five main areas • 1) Train collision accident, • 2) Train derailment accident, • 3) Train fire accident, • 4) Level crossing accident, • 5) Railway (traffic/safety) casualty accident.

2. How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance? Risk Measure Method Risk assessment model : the form of a cause and consequence analysis : using fault trees and event trees. Collective Risk (Average Number of FWI/year) = Frequency (Average frequency at which the scenario sequence occurs) X Consequences (the number of FWI/scenario sequence)

2. How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance? Data Population • Industry safety data: safety related incidents within industry database. • Incidents recorded range from train collisions to passenger burns from coffee spills • Many thousands of recordsare reviewed and classified • Where data was not available, • Use was made of: • - Human error probability assessments • : using a revised Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) • - Safety expert judgmentsfrom in-house expertise within Korea railway. • - Statistical methods including Monte Carlo simulation and Bayesian uncertainty distributions.

3. Safety Performance Risk Areas Engineering Passenger Behaviors Rolling Stock Suspected Suicide Infrastructure Inside Station Equipment On Train Workforce Behaviors Boarding/Alighting Train Crew Outside Station Train Driver Shunter and Signaler Level Crossing Station Staff Public Behaviors Rolling Stock Engineer Suspected Suicide Infrastructure Engineer Energy/Signal Engineer Regulation Violation Level Crossing Worker Level Crossing Office Worker Carelessness Railway Associate Employee Irregular Employee

3. Safety Performance Risk Profile • Most of the risk is to members of the public. • Passenger risk arises from a number of sources. • Workforce risk arises largely from areas that are under the control of the workforce. • Relatively few non-fatal public injuries are recorded. • Most of the risk arises from factors being primarily the responsibility of the injured party.

3. Safety Performance Recent Safety Trends Passenger-km increases 2% every year. Considering this factor, the safety performance has improved. • The risk in 2007has been decreased by more than 55% over 2003 year. • The harm to members of the workforce has been maintained at the lower levels. • Fatalities and weighted injuries to members of the public decreased from year to year.

3. Safety Performance Risk Profile by Risk Areas Public Behaviors Passenger Behaviors Workforce Behaviors Engineering

3. Safety Performance Train Accidents Serious train accidents are rare, trends in train accident precursors were analyzed. • The train accident precursors have been decreased by more than 34% over 2003. • The increment of the train accident precursors in 2004 and 2005 is largely due to the introduction of the Korea Train eXpress (KTX) operation.

3. Safety Performance Passenger Safety Main Passenger Risk Areas

3. Safety Performance Main Risk Areas of the Passenger Safety Passenger Suspected Suicides Inside Station Passenger Violation & Carelessness Inside Station Passenger Violation & Carelessness on Train

3. Safety Performance Public Safety

3. Safety Performance Level Crossing The number of level crossing had decreased from 1,657 in 2003 to 1,455 in 2007. 92% of level crossings has automatic protection equipments. • The risk in level crossings has been decreased by more than 30% over 2003. • The risk level associated with level crossings is average 12.32 FWIs per year. • Pedestrian risk accounts for 45% of all risk associated with level crossings. • The risk caused by “road vehicle breaking through or detouring the barrier" governs the most part of the road vehicle occupant fatalities.

3. Safety Performance Workforce Safety Main Workforce Risk Areas

3. Safety Performance Trespass and Suspected Suicide Fatalities

3. Safety Performance F-N Curve: Annual Korea Railway F-N curve

3. Safety Performance Comparison Between UK's F-N Curve and Korea’s F-N Curve

4. Conclusion • This study • Developed the common risk assessment model for the Korea railway • Reviewed the Korea rail industry’s safety performance against defined risk areas • The risk including suspected suicides in 2007 • Was 125.44 FWIs • Has been decreased by more than 55% over 2003 year • The developed model will provide a generic model of the safety risk on the Korea railway • which will • Increase the industry’s knowledge of the risk from the operation and maintenance • Allow the identification of areas of railway operation that need further risk controls • Allow sensitivity analyses to be carried out to determine the risk reduction • Allow cost benefit analysis of proposed changes

Thank you!

Review and Assessment of the Korea Rail ’ s Safety Performance using Risk Assessment Models