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Explore risk assessment methods based on interconnections of technical infrastructures, basic services, and external threats. Understand the importance of identifying and managing complex interdependencies to enhance the security of supply chains and critical functions. Published in Finnish by Hannu Sivonen.
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Risk assessment based on interdependencies Helsinki, Finland Hannu Sivonen, Senior Researcher MANMADE Castellanza 28-29 June 2007 Hannu Sivonen
National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) • Fund, independent of the state budget • Public Private Partnership coordinator (23 branches, 800 experts) • Government defines objectives for security of supply • NESA finances security of supply when not provided by the market mechanism • Focus areas: • Critical technical infrastructure • Food supply • Energy supply • Logistics • Critical medical substances and supplies • Defence related industries • NESA balance is 1000 million € Hannu Sivonen
Risk assessment based on interdependencies • A method for assessing the risk caused by interdependencies between technical infrastructures, basic services, and threats • Linear mathematical model similar to that used by Google • Simplifying assumptions • Complex interdependencies and accumulating effects and risks handled • Information system failures and weather conditions are major risks in Finland • Published in Finnish • Yhteiskunnan huoltovarmuuden kannalta keskeisten toimintojen riskiarviointi • http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/julkaisut/esittely/?id=72 Hannu Sivonen
Finnish government decision 305/2002 • Technical infrastructures (14) • energy supply • communications • information systems • Basic services and supplies (29) • food supply • transport logistics • mass media • health care • financial services Hannu Sivonen
Threats from outside the infrastructure and services (17) • economic threats • threats to information systems • crisis in international logistics • weather phenomena • structural damage • strikes • environment and health threats • national security threats Hannu Sivonen
Interdependencies • = reasons • for failures recurrent (ratio 1) expected (ratio 0.1) rare (ratio 0.01) theoretical (ratio 0.001) nonexistent Hannu Sivonen
Input: Interdependencies (sample) Hannu Sivonen
recurrent (< 1 year) expected (1-10 years) rare (10-100 years) theoretical (>100 years) nonexistent Mean time between failures Hannu Sivonen
Input: Duration and mean time between failures Hannu Sivonen
Output: Relative risks pertinent to inter-dependent infrastructures Hannu Sivonen
Output: Relative risks pertinent to outside threats Hannu Sivonen
Relative component risks in food logistics *) operator = processing plant + logistics operator Hannu Sivonen
The model applied to criticality of ICT functions • 72 functions, 6 scenarios (3x2): • Duration of failure • short term (hours) • medium term (days) • long term (months) • Dependency type • cause of failure to others • obstacle to recovery of others • No assessment for MTB, just interdependencies = potential effect, criticality Hannu Sivonen
Top ten critical functions from 6 scenarios Hannu Sivonen