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CLIC Workshop 2013 - Accelerator / Parameters & Design activities Session -

CLIC Workshop 2013 - Accelerator / Parameters & Design activities Session -. Topics. Introduction. CLIC Interlock System Principles. Critical Equipment : Look for any equipment failures Inhibit the next pulse => Beam Permit Post-Pulse Analysis:

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CLIC Workshop 2013 - Accelerator / Parameters & Design activities Session -

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  1. CLIC Workshop 2013 - Accelerator / Parameters & Design activities Session - Patrice Nouvel - CERN / Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse

  2. Topics Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  3. Introduction Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  4. CLIC Interlock System Principles • Critical Equipment: • Look for any equipment failures • Inhibit the next pulse => Beam Permit • Post-Pulse Analysis: • Perform beam quality analysis: assert the next pulse quality • Inhibit the next pulse => Next Cycle Permit Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  5. Topics Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  6. Requirements and Challenges Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  7. Requirements and Challenges Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  8. Topics Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  9. Interface with acquisition system CLIC Main Linac X 22 000 CLIC Module (CLIC CDR chap 5.13 Control) Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  10. Interface with acquisition system ** X 48 Example * • *FEC: Front-End Computer • **ACM: Acquisition and Control Module Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  11. Beam Permit Loop • Master node: frequency generation • Other nodes (FEC): switch • Redundancy: defined regarding dependability study Design and Functions • Thresholds comparison • Standardized procedure for all data (equipment and beam quality related) • Thresholds managed as Configuration Data • Global analysis • Concentrator • Glitch mitigation, local rules (masking) Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  12. Architecture Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  13. Topics Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  14. Post-Pulse Analysis at CTF3 • Feasibility of Post-Pulse Analysis and first experience • Software only (JAVA application) • Applying the Post-Pulse Analysis Concept to ramp up the beam • Related Document=> EDMS 1182876 Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  15. Interlock Systems Prototype • Response Time • Beam permit • Post-Pulse analysis • Dependability • Node characteristics (Failure rates) • Extrapolate to determine beam permit loop redundancy Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  16. Wrap up Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  17. Thanks for your attention Questions and remarks are welcome

  18. Spare slides Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  19. CLIC Layout Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  20. CTF3 Layout Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  21. Dependability concept definition Adapted from: “Functional Concepts of Dependability”, A.Avizienis, J.C.Laprie, B.Randell MTL Application Note: An introduction to Functional Safety and IEC 61508 Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

  22. Requirements for Control system: Machine Safety • Failure mode: data corruption on critical interlock request • Tolerable riskof 1 catastrophic event every 104years (1.39x10-13/pulse) • Method 1 (based on operational year 2011) • 48.7% of missions (10h) aborted by critical equipment failures • 6% of missions (10h) aborted by beam instabilities • Probability of Interlock request: 3x10-7/pulse • Method 2 (based on assumptions on availability) – For comparison (don’t include equipment failure) • 1 instable pulse leads to 10s downtime (interlock and ramp up) • Less 10% downtime is acceptable => 1 instable pulse every 100s • 1% of instable pulses are critical (leading to structure damage) • Probability of Interlock request due to critical instable pulse: 2x10-6/pulse • Probability of Control system to corrupt data must be lower than: • 4.6x10-7/pulse (method 1) • 7x10-8/pulse (method 2 – no equipment request) Patrice Nouvel – January 2013

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