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Contracts and Effort

Contracts and Effort. Cumming and Johan (2013 Chapter 15). 1. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary. Motivation. Corporate finance literature dominated by “incentive effects” Vast theoretical literature Scant empirical literature

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Contracts and Effort

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  1. Contracts and Effort Cumming and Johan (2013 Chapter 15) 1

  2. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Motivation • Corporate finance literature dominated by “incentive effects” • Vast theoretical literature • Scant empirical literature • Significant need for empirical assessment • The fundamental basis of all work in venture capital and private equity 2

  3. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Chapter Objectives • Do contracts affect effort, and if so, how? • Focus on venture capital contracts, syndication, legal environment • Assess total effort • Distinguish between advice and monitoring 3

  4. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Particular Features in this Chapter • Measure actual hours of work contributed by VCs to each investee • Distinguish between VC advice and monitoring • Assess the role of specific contractual details, & syndication across VC funds, etc. • Provide very specific empirical details • Contract structures, portfolio size, entrepreneurial firm, VC, exit outcomes, etc. • Relate results to vast theoretical literature 4

  5. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Theoretical Focus in VC Literature • Cash flow rights • Control rights • Legal Systems • Control variables 5

  6. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary 1. Cash Flow Rights • Casamatta (2003 JF), Schmidt (2003 JF), Farmer and Winter (1986 JF) • Bilateral moral hazard in VC finance • Role for convertible preferred shares • Hypothesis 15.1a: Venture capital fund managers provide more effort and advice to entrepreneurial firms financed with convertible securities (instead of common equity or debt). Moreover, the effort exerted by the venture capital fund manager and advice provided is directly correlated with the venture capital fund’s ownership percentage. • Concern with endogeneity • Frequent use of non-convertibles outside the US 6

  7. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary 1. Cash Flow Rights (Continued) • Cornelli and Yosha (2003 RES) • Convertible securities mitigate signal manipulation in staged financing • Hypothesis 15.1b: There are fewer venture capital fund manager-entrepreneur conflicts within entrepreneurial firms financed with convertible securities. • Concern with endogeneity • Competing behavioral finance ideas 7

  8. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary 2. Control Rights • Chan et al. (1990 IER); Kirilenko (2001 JF) • Control is related to project risk • Hypothesis 15.2a: Venture capital fund managers provide more effort and advice for entrepreneurial firms for which the venture capital fund has been allocated greater control rights. • Hypothesis 15.2b: Venture capital fund manager-entrepreneur conflicts are more likely among investee firms for which the venture capital fund has been allocated greater control rights. • Concern with endogeneity • Heterogeneous allocation of control across firms 8

  9. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary 3. Legal Systems • Hypothesis 15.3: Countries with better legal systems mitigate the scope for venture capital fund manager–entrepreneur conflict as better legal systems facilitate more certainty in the enforcement of contracts, as well as the interpretation of incomplete contracts. 9

  10. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary 4. Control Variables • Type of VC (captive / non-captive) • Portfolio size / VC Manager • Capital Managed / VC Manager • Staging • Entrepreneur stage of development • Entrepreneurial firm industry • Entrepreneur experience • Exit outcomes 10

  11. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Control Variables (Continued) • Syndication • Lerner (1994 FM), Brander et al. (2002 JEMS), Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007 JFI) • Effort complementarities • Expect VCs work more when syndicated investors work more • Endogeneity concerns 11

  12. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Hand Collected Sample • 121 investment rounds • 74 entrepreneurial firms • 14 VC funds • 7 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands) 12

  13. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary OLS, Ordered Logit and IV Estimates • Dependent Variables • Hours/Month, Advice Rank, # Disagreements • Explanatory Variables • VC characteristics, ENT characteristics, Exits, Contract Terms, Risk Measures, legality, etc. • Instruments • Year of investment and exit dummies, MSCI returns over investment period • Correlations (Tables 3 and 4) work “fairly” well, but not 100% perfect 13

  14. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Tables 15.5 – 15.7 • Table 15.5: DepVar: Hours / Month • Table 15.6: DepVar: Advice Rank • Table 15.7: DepVar: # Disagreements • 5 Models per Panel to show robustness • Regressions with and without instruments • Regressions with different sets of explanatory variables 14

  15. ‘+’ refers to robust positive effect, ‘-’ refers to robust negative effect, 0 refers to no significant impact, and ‘+ / 0’ refers to positive but non-robust estimates.

  16. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Summary • Rare direct look at investor activities • Important aspect of most theory papers • Prior empirical papers tend to look at effect of effort, not actual effort • Novel empirical approach in distinguishing between advice and monitoring • Advice: congruent with entrepreneurial interests • Monitoring: dissonant with entrepreneur interests 19

  17. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Key Findings (1) • Cash-flow and control rights enhance advice but not monitoring. • Supports Casamatta (2003 JF), Repullo and Suarez (2003 RES), Schmidt (2003 JF), De Bettignies (2008 MS) • Does not support Cornelli and Yosha (2003 RES), although not a direct test of that model 20

  18. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Key Findings (2) • Complementarities in VC Syndicate effort • Supports Lerner (1994 FM), Brander et al (2002 JEMS) • Complementarities in VC-Entrepreneur effort • Supports Casamatta (2003 JF), Cestone (2013 RF), Repullo and Suarez (2004 RF) 21

  19. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Key Findings (3) • Strong and robust negative relation between VC portfolio size/manager and involvement • Funds with larger portfolios per manager tend to provide less effort in both advising and monitoring. • Consistent with • Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2004 JCF, JBF) • Keuschnigg (2004 OEP) • Cumming (2006 J Bus) 22

  20. Motivation Theory Data Regressions Conclusion/Summary Key Findings (4) • Better legal systems mitigate VC-Entrepreneur conflicts • Consistent with evidence in other parts of book on the importance of legality in the development of VC markets 23

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