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Bioterrorism and Agriculture

Bioterrorism and Agriculture. Regional Bioterrorism Symposium: Risk and Response May 7-8, 2002. Sam D. Holland, D.V.M. South Dakota State Veterinarian. Bioterrorism and Agriculture DEFINITIONS?.

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Bioterrorism and Agriculture

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  1. Bioterrorism and Agriculture Regional Bioterrorism Symposium: Risk and Response May 7-8, 2002 Sam D. Holland, D.V.M. South Dakota State Veterinarian

  2. Bioterrorism and AgricultureDEFINITIONS? (1) Terrorism - (FBI Definition) “Unlawful…force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce…” (2) Agroterrorism - Terrorism at Agricultural targets - Animal/Plant - Chemical - Physical -Biological (3) Bioterrorism - A terrorist activity that employs a biological agent as the means of force Agro-bio-terrorism? Biological agent as unlawful force at agricultural targets

  3. Experience Bioterrorism in Animals Biowarfare WWI 1916-1918 - Germany used Pseudomonas Mallei (glanders) - “German agents in the U.S. probably innoculated horses and mules prior to shipment” WWII 1942-1943 Britain developed and produced Anthrax-infected cattle cakes 1945 - U.S. was within months of bringing Anthrax program on line 1969 - U.S. terminated offensive biological weapons program - 2,000 people were out of work! Took 2 years to destroy stockpiles of agents 1972 - Biological and toxin weapons convention signed by 140 nations (SOME WERE NOT SERIOUS!)

  4. 1970s - Former Soviet Union (FSU) 9 Agents - Mainly the following 6 : • Plague 1500T • Anthrax • Tularemia • Smallpox 100T • Glanders 2000T • Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis 150T 1980s - Iraq • Anthrax • Tetanus • Botulism • Brucellosis • Tularemia (+) Plant Pathogens STATUS — UNKNOWN! United Nations Special Commission believes Iraq preserved capability!

  5. UNSCOM - Iraq - 380,000 liters Botulism - 84,250 liters Anthrax - 3,400 liters C. Perfringens + (2200 liters aflatoxin) + Camel Pox March 2002 COWS SABOTAGED WITH ANTIBIOTICS Java Center, N.Y. — Someone has been sneaking onto dairy farms at night in western New York and putting antibiotics into milk storage tanks and injecting cows with the drugs, police say. The tampering has ruined 44,000 gallons of milk worth $49,000 to farmers, state police Lt. John Hibsch said. Authorities have no suspects in the 14 cases under investigation since the fall, Hibsch said. NO REAL THREAT DIRECTED AT AG ANIMALS IS KNOWN TO HAVE OCCURRED IN THE U.S.

  6. Biological Terrorism Biological Warfare “Biological Terrorism as part of war” “The intentional use of micro-organisms or toxins from living organisms to cause death or disease in humans, animals, or plants in civilian settings” Agro-Terrorism “Biological Terrorism directed at agriculture”

  7. What Are The Risks? Target is Large - Agriculture accounts for 1/6 of USGDP - Largest sector of South Dakota economy - 5 cattle for each person (3.9M cattle, 1.2M swine, .4M sheep) Weapons Are Available - More readily available bioagents for animals than for people. - Many of these agents are quite environmentally resistant - Easy to acquire, legal to possess - Relatively easy to produce Appealing to Terrorists - Animal disease agents can be selected that are not infectious to the developer (FMD, CSF) - Less public emotional response to agro-terrorism than bioterrorism directed at human health - Agents could intentionally be inflicted and made to appear as non-intentional incurrence.

  8. 498,949 Cattle from 44 States & Canada 2002 ANNUAL CATTLE IMPORTS

  9. 1,436,324 From 44 States & Canada 2002 ANNUAL SWINE IMPORTS

  10. Risks Vulnerabilities Prevent Prepare What Are Our Vulnerabilities?  Animals  Production Systems  Food Supply - Food Security  Economic Collapse  Culture of Rural America

  11. Vulnerability Food System Changes with Globalization Concentration, Consolidation Internationalization Research and Development Production Processing/Storing Distribution Trade Agreements, Authorizations ALL These Lead to REAL RISKS For Us [U.S.] [South Dakota]

  12. U.S. CATTLE SLAUGHTER DAILY • Ave = 130,000 / day (Total U.S. Slaughter) • Tyson (IBP) / Excel / Con Agra • Ave = 81,000 / day • Beef Sales = $22.3 B / year • Recently in Kansas: • FMD Minor Scare:  1.50 Limit • = $5 Million / day loss to Industry • direct  in value of Livestock sold • Some Exercises: • Estimate FMD Incurrence = $50 B

  13. $57B 30 60 25 50 20 40 15 30 10 20 5 10 1.8M 8 1940 2000 1940 2000 Food Animal Sales (Billion) People Earning Living on Farms (Million)

  14. Swine: China - 6 X more than U.S. • Cattle: Brazil - 146 Million vs. U.S. 100 million China - 110 Million Argentina - 52 Million Mexico - 27 Million Canada - 13 Million • Sheep: Australia - 118 Million vs. U.S. 7 Million China - 280 Million India - 180 Million New Zealand - 46 Million

  15. Vulnerability Concentration, Internationalization, Trade Agreements Importing Food Supplies Exporting Food Supplies Costs of Production Monetary Differences Policy Differences Infrastructure Differences  Potential for Dependence on Imports for FOOD SUPPLIES Potential for New Food Safety RISKS (e.g.: mass exposure) Potential for New/Emerging Animal Health RISKS  (e.g.: imported pesticides, contaminants, disease agents) 

  16. Vulnerability Emerging Concerns * * (Livestock population totally naïve and susceptible to diseases common throughout the rest of the world.)

  17. Vulnerability Map of Outbreak

  18. RISKS? August 23, 2000 Receive information/request to participate in pilot project importing live cattle from Uruguay October 15, 2000 Uruguay infected with FMD October 29, 2000 Receive report of FMD in Uruguay June 12, 2001 1358 CONFIRMED cases FMD in Uruguay August 2000 US stopped Argentine fresh beef imports based on (+) FMD tests December 2000 US re-opened Argentine fresh beef imports after sending officials to evaluate February 2001 “Rumors” of FMD rampant in Argentina March 13, 2001 Argentina reports one case of FMD June 12, 2001 1105 confirmed cases FMD in Argentina Globalization? 3000

  19. Prevent/Prepare Agro-Bioterrorism Prevent - Prepare - Respond - Reliance on international Peace Keeping - Reliance on Office of Homeland Security - Reliance on Industry Awareness - Reliance on State officials - Reliance on Individual Producers

  20. Prevent/Prepare Preventing Agro-Terrorism —What can I, should I be doing as an individual producer? - Stay informed - Stay involved in commodity organizations - Provide input - express concerns to commodity group leaders, state and federal officials - Personal Operations Biosecurity - entrance to farm/premises controlled-locked? - authorized personnel only - maintain integrity of inventories - inspection for inventory tampering - records of all deliveries, visitors -employee awareness-training - containment procedures for disease, agents - recognize and report:  unusual conditions, disease  mysterious substance, vehicles, persons  missing supplies, chemicals, equipment  vandalism, tampering  unaccountable presence of supplies, chemicals, biologicals, equipment, animals

  21. Know Where To Report - Don’t Hesitate! STATE VETERINARIAN’S OFFICE (605) 773-3321

  22. What Can/Should State Officials Be Doing? Prevent - Prepare - Respond Industry - Information USDA - Emergency Management and Reporting System South Dakota - AHEP - 1998 - FMD Contingency Plan - Emergency Disease Fund - Training and maintaining 30+ Reserve Veterinary Medical Officers - Biosecurity notices sent to over 1500 including markets, dealers, packers, processors, commodity groups, tribes, veterinarians, pharmaceutical companies, retail stores, others - Information to commodity groups *

  23. Preparing to Respond to Bioterrorism - Agroterrorism Federal - Border Inspections Interagency Cooperation - Within USDA: FSIS/APHIS/PPQ/USFS MOU with DOD Cross Train with DOJ South Dakota - Awareness - FMD/BSE Conference - Bioterrorism Conference - Bioterrorism Task Force - WMD Task Force - Homeland Security Office - State Emergency Operations Plan - Animal Health Function - FMD Addendum - Cooperation/Sharing with State Health Department/ Animal Industry Board - National Guard Participation - Other State Agencies Support

  24. FMD CONTINGENCY PLAN For South Dakota

  25. II RESPONSEACTIVITIES(Four Scenarios) A) Scenario I - FMD Confirmed in North America (other than adjacent state) B) Scenario II - FMD Confirmed in Adjacent State C) Scenario III - FMD Suspected in South Dakota D) Scenario IV - FMD Confirmed in South Dakota

  26. A) SCENARIO I – FMD CONFIRMED IN NORTH AMERICA (OTHER THAN ADJACENT STATE) (1) Notify Governor • Secretary of Agriculture • Game, Fish and Parks • SDAIB Members / SDAIB All Staff • Division of Emergency Management – Alert • All State Agencies, Universities and ADRDL • NO TRAVEL TO / FROM AFFECTED AREAS ADVISORY (2) Activate Public Information Officer – Issue Press Release (3) Establish telephone line for inquiries – information (4) Notify via press release, fax, or e-mail direct to industry and veterinarian contacts as listed I (B) of this plan (5) Suspend all import permits from country / state involved (6) Notify all import ports to stop all animal / people / vehicle movements from country / state involved until assessment can be made (Highway Patrol)

  27. (7) Advise all livestock transporters, dealers, markets, producers: NO TRAVEL TO/FROM AFFECTED AREA UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE PLUS NEWS RELEASE TO ALL AFFECTED (8) Appoint FMD coordinator – (9) Appoint FMD epidemiologist for trace in trace out reporting to state veterinarian by telephone (10) Assess manpower needs (11) Move to Step B., C., D. or terminate actions based upon USDA / Emergency Programs / READEO (Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization) reports

  28. Are We Prepared? • Individually? • Commodity — Industry wide? • State? • Nationally?

  29. The Animal Health Safeguarding Review Results and Recommendations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY October 2001 Animal Health Safeguarding  Review

  30. Safe Guarding Review - $100 billion value of livestock industry in the U.S. - Downsizing of Animal Health Infrastructure - “Livestock . . . sector a sitting duck” - “Horse-sized vulnerability to intentional or unintentional introduction of pathogens” - Defense against threats fast becoming overwhelmed - Staffing, equipment, surveillance, detection, research, communications, border security, laboratories, flexibility  EXPERIENCE IS GOOD - Foreign disease prevention - FMD, 1929; West Nile, 1999 - Endemic disease control - screwworm, glanders, brucellosis, tuberculosis, dourine, cattle fever, scab, hog cholera, pseudorabies

  31. THERE IS NO PLACE Thankful for The System We Have, Strong National Leaders, Strong State Leaders The Healthiest Livestock The Safest Food In The World! FOR COMPLACENCY

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