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Mexican War: Zachary Taylor

Mexican War: Zachary Taylor. Lesson 3. ID & SIGs. Taylor, Fort Brown, Resaca de la Palma, volunteers, Monterrey, Meade, flying artillery, engineers, Santa Anna, Buena Vista, Davis, Bragg, Saltillo, Palo Alto. Agenda. Pre-Mexico Army of Observation Fort Brown Palo Alto Resaca de la Palma

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Mexican War: Zachary Taylor

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  1. Mexican War: Zachary Taylor Lesson 3

  2. ID & SIGs • Taylor, Fort Brown, Resaca de la Palma, volunteers, Monterrey, Meade, flying artillery, engineers, Santa Anna, Buena Vista, Davis, Bragg, Saltillo, Palo Alto

  3. Agenda • Pre-Mexico • Army of Observation • Fort Brown • Palo Alto • Resaca de la Palma • Monterrey • Saltillo • Buena Vista • The End of Taylor in Mexico

  4. Zachary Taylor: Pre-Mexico • 60 years old on the eve of Mexican War • Previously served in the War of 1812, the Black Hawk War, and the Seminole War • Combined his military career with farming and owned plantations in Louisiana and Mississippi • Known as “Old Rough and Ready” based on his reputation as disdaining polish but being a good fighter

  5. Army of Occupation • In June 1845, Taylor was ordered to mass 2,000 troops at Fort Jessup, Louisiana • Force represented one quarter of the total strength of the US Army • This “Army of Observation” was designed to be ready for any development in the annexation situation, especially to defend and protect Texas Fort Jessup was just across the Sabine River from Texas

  6. Army of Occupation • On July 4, Texas accepted annexation • Taylor was ordered to move into Texas, making his army now an Army of Occupation • Taylor moved by land and water, landing at Corpus Christi, Texas on July 25 The open fields behind the camp along the beach in Corpus Christi provided a convenient training area

  7. Army of Occupation • Taylor was ordered to receive instructions from Andrew Jackson Donelson, the charge-d’affaires in Texas • Donelson recognized the sensitivities of a general subordinating himself to a diplomat and tactfully established a cooperative relationship with Taylor • Nonetheless, the very idea infuriated Winfield Scott Andrew Jackson Donelson graduated from West Point in 1820

  8. Army of Occupation • Taylor’s vanguard arrived at Corpus Christi on July 25 and his entire command was there by July 31 • The move was fraught with logistical mishaps, prompting Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock, commander of the 3rd Infantry, to consider the landing “little short of a miracle,” attributable to the “mere accident” of a calm bay

  9. Army of Occupation • By the end of October, Taylor’s force had grown to 3,554 men– all of them regulars • Life in camp was fairly comfortable, but also boring • Finally, with the failure of Slidell’s diplomatic effort, Taylor was ordered forward • His orders gave him great latitude to assess the situation and, if he felt a state of war existed, to act offensively Drilling a newly enlisted Regular soldier at Corpus Christi

  10. Army of Occupation • On March 8, Taylor sent out an advanced guard to lead the army overland to Matamoros • The march was uneventful until Taylor reached the Arroyo Colorado, about thirty miles from Matamoros • There Mexican cavalry made a show of challenging a crossing • Taylor crossed without resistance from the enemy, but experienced a delay because of a lack of bridging materials • Had the Mexicans attacked, Taylor would have been vulnerable

  11. Army of Occupation • On March 28, Taylor reached Matamoros and began constructing Fort Texas (later renamed Fort Brown and the current site of Brownsville) • Taylor received supplies ferried from Point Isabel, about twenty miles away

  12. Army of Occupation • Taylor was opposed by General Mariano Arista who demanded Taylor withdraw north of the Nueces River • On April 25, 1846, Mexican cavalry ambushed a dragoon detachment, leaving 11 Americans dead, 6 wounded, and 46 captured • News of the attack reached Polk on May 9, and two days later Congress declared war General Arista

  13. Army of Occupation • Taylor learned Arista planned to cross the Rio Grande downriver from Fort Texas and cut the American supply line • To preempt this, Taylor left 500 men under Major Jacob Brown to guard Fort Texas and took 2,300 men to secure the supplies at Point Isabel • Taylor succeeded in reaching Point Isabel before Arista and loaded 270 wagons of supplies for Fort Texas Major Brown at Fort Texas

  14. Army of Occupation • In the meantime, Arista decided to attack Fort Texas before Taylor’s men could return from Point Isabel • On May 3, Arista advanced on Fort Texas and shelled it for over five days • The Americans held on, but Brown was killed • As Taylor began his move back to Fort Texas, Arista took up positions to block him, leading to the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma

  15. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma • Arista positioned 3,702 men in a line about a mile long with the flanks protected by dense chaparal, a short, thorny underbrush • Taylor advanced with 2,228 men and his scouts spotted Arista’s men • The battle began on May 8 at 2:30 p.m. with Mexican artillery opening fire at a range of one-half mile Typical chaparral

  16. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma • American artillery under Captain William Duncan and Major Samuel Ringgold moved forward and commenced counterbattery fire • The American artillery had greater range than the Mexican artillery and would dominate at Palo Alto • The Mexicans tried to negate the American artillery advantage by several flank attacks, but the American infantry formed a square and repulsed them

  17. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma • By 7 p.m., Arista decided to withdraw • Taylor decided against a night assault • The Mexicans had lost about 400 dead • The Americans had just 6 dead and 40 wounded • However, Ringgold, who many considered the Army’s premier artillerist, was among the dead Samuel Ringgold is sometimes called the “Father of Modern Artillery”

  18. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma • Rather than attacking again on ground that gave the American artillery such an advantage, Arista moved five miles south to Resaca de la Palma • The “resaca” was a dry river bed whose banks were heavily forested • It was a strong defensive position • Arista also ordered his men besieging Fort Texas to join him, bringing his strength to 3,600 The resaca then and now

  19. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma • Taylor left some men to guard his supplies and advanced with 1,800 men • A small group of Americans deliberately exposed themselves to draw enemy fire and pinpoint their positions • Taylor then sent artillery and infantry forward but they became isolated in the heavy chaparral • The scattered elements drove in the Mexican skirmishers but could do nothing against Arista’s main line

  20. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma • Taylor realized a full scale infantry assault would be necessary • He launched a two regiment attack which broke the Mexican right while another force crossed the resaca and turned the Mexican left • With his line collapsing, Arista rapidly retreated

  21. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma • Taylor had been outnumbered two to one and was fighting in terrain that favored the defender • Taylor lost 45 killed and 98 wounded • Arista lost 154 killed, 205 wounded, and 156 missing • It was a decisive American victory, but much more costly than at Palo Alto where the artillery had carried the day • Much of the fighting at Resaca de la Palma was hand-to-hand

  22. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma: Analysis • Showed the value of maintaining a standing professional army • Elevated Taylor to iconic status and promotion to major general on June 29, 1846 • Showed superiority of American artillery • Dense terrain (and Taylor’s leadership style) put the burden of responsibility on junior officers and NCOs leading isolated small units Duncan’s artillery at Palo Alto

  23. After Resaca de la Palma • Arista was court-martialed and replaced by Pedro de Ampudia who decided to withdraw to the south to force Taylor to extend his lines of communication into the heart of northern Mexico • Arista’s failure to defend the northern border also paved the way for Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna’s return from exile in Cuba Santa Anna

  24. After Resaca de la Palma • On May 14, Polk, Marcy, and Scott met to develop a strategy • Polk and Marcy were suspicious of Scott because he was a potential Whig presidential candidate • Still Scott was an acknowledged military expert while Polk lacked significant military experience and Marcy was a poor administrator • Polk micromanaged the process and tried to get Scott to come up with a plan that would win the war in six months • In the end, Scott’s argument that it would take more time to train an army of volunteers prevailed

  25. After Resaca de la Palma • The Plan: • Primary war goal was to fix the southern boundary of the US and integrate California in the nation

  26. After Resaca de la Palma • Four simultaneous operations: • Taylor would move south of the Rio Grande and occupy as much of northern Mexico as possible • 34,000 men under Brigadier General John Wool would march to Chihuahua in north central Mexico to support Taylor • 2,000 men under Colonel Stephen Kearny would march from Fort Leavenworth to San Diego through Santa Fe • The Navy would blockade ports on Mexico’s Gulf and Pacific Coasts

  27. Monterrey • Taylor’s first target was Monterrey, the capital of Nuevo Leon, about 180 miles southwest of Matamoros • Controlling Monterrey would open up avenues southward into Mexico City • Loyalty to Mexico was considered weak in northern Mexico and some planners felt the people there would welcome the Americans as liberators

  28. Monterrey • When Taylor crossed the Rio Grande on May 18, 1846, he learned the Mexicans had withdrawn toward Monterrey • Taylor established a camp at Matamoros and began to receive thousands of state militiamen and volunteers, many who were poorly trained and equipped • Discipline problems quickly arose and tension developed between the regulars and volunteers Soldiers who objected to Braxton Bragg’s authoritative leadership style unsuccessfully tried to kill him by detonating an artillery shell under his cot

  29. Scott’s Impression of Discipline in Taylor’s Army • “But, my dear Sir, our militia & volunteers, if a tenth of what is said to be true, have committed atrocities—horrors—in Mexico, sufficient to make Heaven weep, & every American, of Christian morals, blush for his country. Murder, robbery & rape of mothers & daughters, in the presence of the tied up males of their families, have been common all along the Rio Grande…. Truly it would seem unchristian & cruel to let loose upon any people—even savages—such unbridled persons—freebooters, &c., &c….” • Scott writing the Secretary of War after visiting Taylor’s army (Weigley, “History,” 187-188).

  30. Monterrey • On June 10, Taylor sent a regiment-sized force under Lieutenant Colonel Henry Wilson to Reynosa • A company of Texas Rangers held a drunken celebration on the Fourth of July which angered many regulars • Taylor ultimately decided an approach through Camargo offered a better route to Monterrey • Camargo proved to be a poor site to camp and numerous health problems ensued

  31. Monterrey • On August 19, Taylor’s lead elements left Camargo • Lack of transportation for supplies caused him to limit his force to 6,640 • 8,000 more were left behind, many in hospitals • About 1,500 men (10% of Taylor’s force) had died while camped at Camargo and another 1,400 had been incapacitated

  32. Monterrey • Ampudia commanded some 7,303 Mexicans in the formidable defenses of Monterrey • Reconnaissance by Major Joseph Mansfield identified that the defenders were concentrated inside various fortifications and strongpoints, leaving them somewhat isolated • Additionally, the Mexican cavalry would be ineffective in the open against American artillery

  33. Monterrey • Taylor, with the help of Captain William Bliss, his adjutant, developed a plan to attack Monterrey by a double envelopment • Conducting a siege was not an option because Taylor’s heavy artillery was back in camp • On September 20, Brigadier General William Worth took 2,700 men to cut the Saltillo Road and work his way to Monterrey from the west • Taylor led the rest of his force against the eastern side of Monterrey Taylor and Bliss

  34. Monterrey • Difficult terrain served to prevent Taylor from synchronizing the two assaults • Worth’s attack enjoyed much more success than Taylor’s • Taylor’s men had to cross 500 yards of open terrain covered by at least 30 Mexican guns

  35. Monterrey • Lieutenant Colonel John Garland was acting commander of Twiggs’s 1st Division because Twiggs was ill • Taylor ordered Garland to attack with two regiments-a total of just 800 men • Taylor used just a fraction of his force because he expected his subordinates to use the same direct, personal leadership style he did

  36. Monterrey • Garland’s small force quickly came under Mexican fire, took heavy casualties, and became isolated among the city’s buildings • The American Army had little experience in urban fighting • The attack was led by Major Mansfield, showing the responsibility placed on engineers in the war • Bragg’s 6-pounders did little damage to the heavy walls • By nightfall, Taylor’s men had secured La Teneria, an earthwork built in an old tannery building, but were badly bloodied

  37. Monterrey • The Americans renewed the attack early on September 22 • Worth lunched a surprise attack on Fort Libertad and the Mexicans fled to the Obispado • By midafternoon, Worth drove the defenders from the Obispado into the town and consolidated his positions on the western outskirts of Monterrey

  38. Monterrey • Ampudia withdrew from all his outer defenses except the Citadel and concentrated in the interior of the city • The Americans had learned from the previous day’s fighting and remained off the streets • Instead they smashed holes in walls to move from building to building • It was a slow process, but it resulted in fewer casualties

  39. Monterrey • The Americans advanced to within a few blocks of the city plaza and then lobbed a mortar round into the plaza every twenty minutes • Rather than suffer civilian casualties, the governor of Nuevo Leon requested permission to evacuate noncombatants • Ampudia realized he was encircled and requested terms of surrender

  40. Monterrey • Taylor had the advantage, but also had suffered losses • He offered generous terms, allowing Ampudia one week to abandon the city and allowing his troops to retain their personal weapons and one 6-gun battery • Taylor also agreed to not advance beyond Linares, a town fifty miles to the south

  41. Monterrey • Monterrey was the third time in four months the Americans had defeated a larger, well-defended enemy • However, losses were much greater both from disease and combat • Urban combat was costly and negated much of the American artillery advantage • The volunteers were still creating discipline problems • Taylor had left his heavy artillery behind • Taylor’s attack in the east suffered from poor planning compared to Worth’s attack in the west

  42. Monterrey • The victory further strengthened Taylor’s reputation and made him a serious political rival to Polk and the Democrats • Polk seized upon Taylor’s generous armistice with Ampudia as evidence Taylor could not be rusted to prosecute the war with vigor • Polk began planning for Scott to open another campaign • Scott was also a politically ambitious Whig, but Taylor thought perhaps Scott and Taylor would divide Whig loyalties between them

  43. Saltillo and Buena Vista • Ampudia’s surrender strengthened Santa Anna’s prestige and he began building a large force to attack Taylor • By the end of January 1847, Santa Anna had over 20,000 officers and men

  44. Saltillo and Buena Vista • On November 2, 1846, Taylor received orders from Washington to terminate the armistice • Relations between Polk and Taylor became increasingly tense • Taylor decided to move forward to Saltillo, six miles north of Buena Vista • Taylor initially positioned himself at Saltillo with Wool in command at Buena Vista • In February 1847, Taylor commanded good ground guarding the approaches to Buena Vista but also faced a numerically superior enemy

  45. Saltillo and Buena Vista • Wool focused his defense on the most likely approach (the Saltillo-San Luis Potosi Road) and the most dangerous approach (the “Plateau,” a broad plain to the east), but ignored a relatively narrow ridge that led around his eastern flank to Buena Vista and the American rear • On Feb 22 at 3:00 p.m., Santa Anna attacked both in the center where Wool expected it and in the east where he didn’t

  46. Saltillo and Buena Vista • Taylor had arrived at Buena Vista at 11:00 a.m. • Now he ordered forward two regiments of Arkansas and Kentucky cavalry and a battalion of Indiana infantry as reinforcements • He then returned to Saltillo which he considered the more vulnerable position

  47. Saltillo and Buena Vista • Santa Anna renewed his attack in force the morning of February 23 • Taylor rushed back to Buena Vista at 9:00 a.m. • Wool told Taylor, “General, we are whipped.” • Taylor replied, “That is for me to determine.” • Taylor ordered Davis’s Mississippi Rifles forward from Saltillo to reinforce the crumbling left flank

  48. Saltillo and Buena Vista • Davis, along with the 3rd Indiana Regiment and Bragg’s artillery, readied to receive the Mexican charge in a novel inverted V formation • The shared experience helped forge a relationship between Davis and Bragg that continued into the Civil War • The men held their fire until the Mexicans were within 70 yards and then opened fire all at once • The Mexicans retreated with the Mississippians chasing them with Bowie knives • Only a sudden thunderstorm saved the Mexicans from further damage

  49. Saltillo and Buena Vista • Santa Anna withdrew during the evening of Feb 23, hoping to lure Taylor to more open ground • Taylor did not follow • Instead he fell back to Monterrey, knowing he had survived a close call • The Americans had lost 673 men and had 1,500 desert • The Mexicans lost 2,100 total casualties

  50. Saltillo and Buena Vista • Buena Vista sealed Taylor’s reputation and helped propel him to the presidency, but it was also an unnecessary battle that risked disaster • The American position at Monterrey would have been a better defense • Nonetheless, Buena Vista ended any further Mexican threat against the lower Rio Grande

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