Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779)

1. Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) Three preliminary questions: What is meant by "natural religion"? "Natural" as opposed to what? How did Hume respond to criticisms of this book? Who speaks for Hume in the Dialogues? Why is this question important?

2. The Prologue:The main subject of discussion will be the nature and attributes of the Deity, not Its/His existence (p. 2) Why? Can the one really be discussed without the other?

3. Philosophical Skepticism (Dialogues Part I) Part I: A discussion of the competency of human reason to settle the great questions of natural theology. The Dialogues begin precisely where the Enquiry ends: with a discussion of skepticism. Why might it be important to address the issue of skepticism right at the beginning of an inquiry into the philosophical credentials of natural theology?

4. Philo's Skeptical Position: "When the coherence of the parts of a stone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended ... are so inexplicable ... "with what assurance can we decide concerning the origin of worlds or trace their history from eternity to eternity?" (pp. 4-5) In other words, if we can't even understand rocks (with which we have plenty of experience), how can we possibly understand the origin of the world, with which we have no experience? Human reason is too weak for such inquiries.

5. Cleanthes' "Arguments" Against (Total) Skepticism (pp. 5-6): Skeptics are insincere (they always leave by the door rather than the window). It is impossible to adhere to skeptical principles for more than a few moments. In short, skepticism is an unlivable philosophy.

6. Philo's Responses: Right. Each of us lies under an "absolute necessity" of acting. Nonetheless, skepticism still has beneficial practical effects on thought and action. Speculations about matters beyond our common experience are special: In theological matters we are "like foreigners in a strange country to whom everything must seem suspicious" (p. 7).

7. Cleanthes' Response: The skeptic is inconsistent in believing claims in natural philosophy (e.g., Newton's explanation of the rainbow, Copernicus' theory, etc.), but in rejecting theological claims as beyond human experience. Scientific and religious beliefs are on a par. The sort of reasoning that works in the former case works in the latter as well.

8. Cleanthes' Argument Against Skepticism: P1: Even the skeptic, if he is to be taken seriously, has to be consistent. P2: The skeptic rejects the possibility of natural theological knowledge. P3: The skeptic uncritically accepts natural philosophical knowledge. P4: There is no significant difference between the two kinds of knowledge. C: The skeptic is inconsistent, and should not be taken seriously. Question: What part (premise or reasoning) of this argument could the skeptic dispute?

9. The Design Argument (Dialogues Part II) Preliminaries: Demea's mysticism and Philo's a priori argument, with cautions. Demea's mysticism: God surely exists, but given the infirmities of human understanding, the nature of God is "altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us" (p. 13). But if so, then what is the "content" of the claim that "God exists"?

10. Philo's a priori argument, with cautions: "[T]he question can never be concerning the being but only the nature of the Deity. The former truth ... is questionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God, and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection" (p. 14). BUT, "as all perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature" (p. 14). P1: "Our ideas reach no farther than our experience.“ P2: We have no experience of divine attributes and operations.“ C: Ergo:

11. Cleanthes' Riposte: "Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lessr machines.... Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence" (p. 15).

12. Cleanthes' A Posteriori Argument: P1: The world is one great machine, composed of lesser machines. P2: The world and its parts resemble productions of human contrivance. P3: The "rules of analogy" instruct us that similar effects bespeak similar causes. C: Therefore, the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed.

13. Philo's Concise Version of the A Posteriori Argument (p. 18): P1: "From similar effects we infer similar causes." P2: "The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of human contrivance." C: "The causes, therefore, must be resembling."

14. The Basic Structure of Cleanthes’ Argument: Human Minds ------> Human Contrivances | similar to | Author of Nature <------------- Nature

15. Philo's Principle:"[W]henever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of cases, you diminish proportionately the evidence; and may at least bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty" (p. 16).

16. For Example: Semi-plausible: Circulation of Blood in Humans --------> Structure of Human Bodies | similar to | Circulation of Blood Structure of Non-Human in Non-Human Animals <------------------ Animal Bodies

17. Less plausible: Circulation of Blood in Animals --------> Structure of Animal Bodies | similar to | Circulation of Sap in Trees <------------- Structure of Plants

18. Plausible?: Human Architect ------> House | similar to(?) | Divine Architect <------ Universe

19. Philo's Counter-Argument: P1: "Experience alone can point out ... the true cause of any phenomenon" (p. 17). P2: We have no experience of world making (p. 22). C: Therefore, we cannot reason to the true cause of the world.

20. Cleanthes' Rebuttal (Dialogues Part III) Cleanthes' "Vegetating Library Argument": P1: Books bear the undeniable mark of intelligent design. P2: Natural objects (e.g., living things) bear even stronger marks of intelligent design than books. P3: If it must be admitted that books are the product of design, the same must be admitted for natural objects. P4: It must be admitted that books are the products of design. C: Therefore, it must be admitted that natural objects are the products of thought and design. How does this "rebuttal" avoid simply begging the question? How does Demea respond to Cleanthes' arguments?