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Teacher Pensions, Incentives, and Labor Market Behavior: A Descriptive Analysis

Teacher Pensions, Incentives, and Labor Market Behavior: A Descriptive Analysis Michael Podgursky, University of Missouri - Columbia Robert Costrell, University of Arkansas – Fayetteville Mark Ehlert, University of Missouri- Columbia

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Teacher Pensions, Incentives, and Labor Market Behavior: A Descriptive Analysis

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  1. Teacher Pensions, Incentives, and Labor Market Behavior: A Descriptive Analysis Michael Podgursky, University of Missouri - Columbia Robert Costrell, University of Arkansas – Fayetteville Mark Ehlert, University of Missouri- Columbia Center for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research (CALDER) National Center for Performance Incentives (NCPI) REL Directors Meeting Washington DC Feb. 7, 2008

  2. Why study teacher retirements? • Teacher retirements generate vacancies • Teacher retirements generate costs • Teacher pensions • Retiree health insurance • Incentives in retirement systems may have significant effects on labor supply and mobility • Pension system incentives are large • Retirement systems can affect the quantity and quality of the teaching workforce

  3. New Vocabulary for Ed Policy and School Finance • OPEB’s • UAAL • PLOP, DROP • Present value • Discount rates • GASB 43,45

  4. Recent Reports • Promises with A Price: Public Sector Retirement Benefits (Pew Foundation) • http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/State_policy/pension_report.pdf • Funding Pensions and Retiree Health Care for Public Employees California Public Employee Post-Employment Benefits Commission • http://www.pebc.ca.gov/images/files/final/080107_PEBCReport2007.pdf

  5. Fiscal Context: Increasingly Expensive Ohio Teacher Retiree Benefit Costs

  6. Research literature • Large labor economics literature on pensions and retirements • Very small literature on teachers • Furgeson, Strauss, Vogt (2006), PA teachers • Brown (2006), CA teachers • Harris and Adams(2007), CPS • Absence of basic data • Character of systems (incentives) • Type of benefits and costs (esp. retiree HI, NCS) • Parameters of systems (NEA and NASRA incomplete, Loeb and Miller, 2006)) • Incentive structure of teacher pensions • Teacher labor market data • HRS (too small for teachers) • SASS TFS • Longitudinal state data (SEA records linked to pension data)

  7. Teacher Pensions: Stylized Facts • Mostly state-wide systems • Roughly 70 percent of teachers are in Social Security. Generally state decision. • Nearly all teachers are in Defined Benefit (DB) plans. DC and CB options very limited • DC = Defined Contribution (e.g., IRA) • CB = Cash Balance • Mean retirement age is well below Social Security and Medicare ages • 58 years (retired and stopped teaching, SASS TFS)

  8. Incentives in Teacher Pension Systems • In public sector DB pension systems accrual of pension wealth is highly non-linear and back-loaded • State systems generally have sharp “spikes” in accrual rates • Pull teachers to spike • Push out after • Not inherent in DB pension systems. • “cash balance” (IBM and other firms) • Can smooth spikes

  9. Typical DB teacher pension Annual Pension = S x FAS x r(S,A) S = service years FAS = final average salary r(S,A) = replacement factor When do payments start? (A/S)

  10. Table 1 Key Features of Selected State Defined Benefit Teacher Pension Plans Lots of moving parts… Sources: State pension fund web sites. * An additional 2% contributes to a supplemental defined contribution plan.

  11. Pension Wealth(Annuity) Pension Payment Pension Wealth

  12. Compute pension wealth at each year of work life • Compute growth of pension wealth from an addition year of work • Representative teacher • Enters at 25, continuous spell of work • Standard assumptions concerning PV of pension wealth. (see Costrell and Podgursky (2007) )

  13. Ohio, Columbus Teacher Salary Schedule Age of pension draw Age at separation

  14. Ohio

  15. Addition to pension wealth from an additional year of Teaching (in dollars)

  16. Addition to pension wealth from an additional year of Teaching (as % of earnings)

  17. Increment to PV of Pension Wealth from Working an Additional Year: Missouri

  18. Source: Costrell and Podgursky (2007)

  19. Source: Costrell and Podgursky (2007)

  20. Source: Costrell and Podgursky (2007)

  21. Ohio

  22. Intended Consequences • Do pension incentives affect retirement behavior?

  23. Missouri Longitudinal Teacher Data File (excluding KC and STL districts) 2005-06 1990-91 A + E ≥ 45 Full-Time Teachers N= 31,060 21,240 Retirements

  24. Distribution of Age + Experience: Missouri 80

  25. Increment to PV of Pension Wealth from Working an Additional Year: Missouri r = 2.5% S ≤ 30 r = 2.55% S ≥ 31 Changed in July 2001

  26. Distribution of Years of Experience at Retirement Before and After 2001 Change In Replacement Rate

  27. Unintended Consequences I • Retiree Health Insurance • Medicare eligibility at 65 • OPEB/ GASB 43, 45 • Usually unfunded • Initial estimates very large for some districts/states • Ohio, combined contribution 24%, STRS requests 5 percent increase • LAUSD $10b UAL (100 % coverage – teacher and spouse)

  28. 2006 GASB 45 Estimates, LAUSD http://notebook.lausd.net/pls/ptl/docs/PAGE/CA_LAUSD/FLDR_ORGANIZATIONS/COMMITTEE_MAIN/ABT_HOME/ABT_AGENDA/ITEM %203%20-%20HWACTUARIAL.PDF

  29. What OPEB’s have been promised? • What is their cost? • NCES survey on (1) • GASB 43, 45 require reporting of (2)

  30. Unintended Consequences II • Retired (Collecting teacher pension) • Retired and not teaching • “Double Dipping” • DROP • withdrawal • change pension systems • part time teaching • How extensive (???)

  31. Structure of SASS Teacher Follow Up Survey Current Teacher Survey SASS Teacher Follow-Up Survey 2003-04 Former Teacher Survey Collecting Teacher Pension?

  32. Cumulative Distribution of Teacher Retirement Ages: Teacher Follow Up Surveys, Schools and Staffing Surveys, 2001 and 2005 58

  33. Retirement Age in Missouri and the US: Missouri and SASS Teacher Follow Up Survey 2001.

  34. 100.0 MO Age - 90.0 Retired 80.0 MO Age - Retired & Quit Working 70.0 TFS 2001 60.0 Cumulative Percent 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 53 54 57 58 61 62 65 66 69 51 52 55 56 59 60 63 64 67 68 70 or older 50 or younger Age Source: Schools and Staffing Surveys: 2001 & 2005 Teacher Follow Up Retirement Age in Missouri and the US: Missouri and SASS Teacher Follow Up Survey 2001.

  35. Labor Market Experience of Teachers Who Retired in 2000-01: Percent of Teachers Working Full and Part-Time in Missouri Public Schools in Subsequent Years

  36. Structure of 2004-05 SASS Teacher Follow Up Survey 5.3% (4.9% of total pop.) 91.6% Current Teacher Survey Collecting Teacher Pension? SASS Teacher Follow-Up Survey 2003-04 8.4% Former Teacher Survey MO 1.2 % of current teachers are collecting pensions

  37. What’s Needed • Facts, facts, facts…. • What’s been promised? • What are costs? • What are options? • Literature reviews / case studies • Studies of state teacher data • Policy simulations • Transparency • Regulatory space for experiments • Pilots & evaluations • Strategic compensation policy

  38. References • www.caldercenter.org • Costrell and Podgursky(2007) • Podgursky and Ehlert (2007) • www.educationnext.net • Costrell and Podgursky(2007) • Ohio report (Fordham foundation) • http://www.fordhamfoundation.org/institute/publication/publication.cfm?id=371

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