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Multi-Dimensional Range Query over Encrypted Data

Multi-Dimensional Range Query over Encrypted Data. Authors: Elaine Shi, John Bethencourt, Hubert Chan, Dawn Song, Adrian Perrig Slides borrowed from Michael Chen and revised. Motivation - Network Audit Logs. Network gateway. Data center. An Ideal Solution. Network gateway. Data center.

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Multi-Dimensional Range Query over Encrypted Data

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  1. Multi-Dimensional Range Query over Encrypted Data Authors: Elaine Shi, John Bethencourt, Hubert Chan, Dawn Song, Adrian Perrig Slides borrowed from Michael Chen and revised

  2. Motivation - Network Audit Logs Network gateway Data center

  3. An Ideal Solution Network gateway Data center

  4. Auditor Query: (100 · port · 200) Æ ( ip 2 128.1.*.*) Trusted authority auditor

  5. Auditor Query: (100 · port · 200) Æ ( ip 2 128.1.*.*) Capability: (100 · port · 200) Æ ( ip 2 128.1.*.*) Trusted authority auditor

  6. Security Query: (100·port ·200) Æ (ip 2128.1.*.*) • Can decrypt all matching entries • Cannot learn additional information for non-matching entries • Except for the fact that they do not match

  7. The Challenges • Current practices: • No encryption • All-or-nothing decryption • Challenge: • How to design such an encryption scheme • Efficiency • Security

  8. Related work • Search on encrypted data (SoE) • Not clear if can be extended to range query over multiple attributes. • Anonymous hierarchical IBE (AHIBE) • Could be used to implement MRQED, encryption cost O(TD) • Concurrent work • BonehWaters06: Complex query over encrypted data. More expensive public key size, encryption cost, cheaper decryption cost and shorter decryption key size.

  9. Different from general DB range query • Data is discrete (a small cardinality) • Search is still linear scan • Need to check multiple decrypt keys • Multiple linear scans

  10. Generalized Problem Definition • Time-stamp t, source address a, destination port p • A tuple (t, a, p) can be viewed as a point x in 3 dimensional space. • Query for flows with • Hyper-rectangle B in space • x is in B ?

  11. Generalized Problem Definition • KeyGen • Key generation • Encrypt • Encryption • DeriveKey • Compute a decryption key • QueryDecrypt • Attempt to decrypt using a capability

  12. KeyGen (, n) • Input • k: security parameter • n: bit-length of x • Output • public key PK & master private key SK KeyGen(, n) Trusted authority

  13. Encrypt(PK, x, msg) x: a point Cipher_Text à Encrypt(PK, x, msg)

  14. DeriveKey(PK, SK, B ) DKB t1 B : “hyper-rectangle” t2 r1 r2

  15. QueryDecrypt(PK, DK, C) • Output • msg if • if

  16. Roadmap • Trivial construction • AIBE – MRQED1 • Efficient representation for ranges • 1 dimensional scheme • Extension to multiple dimensions

  17. Trivial Construction • 1 dimensionOne public key pair for each possible range - O(T2) public key pairs - O(T2) cipher texts and decryption keys for each range: the same message is encrypted many times! Performance of D dimensions T: # different values along each dimension D: # dimensions

  18. Roadmap • Trivial construction • AIBE – MRQED1 • Efficient representation for ranges • 1 dimensional scheme • Extension to multiple dimensions

  19. Identity based encryption (IBE) Master PK + ID (e.g., a string)  ID-specific PK ID + SK_manager  ID-specific SK Benefit: needs only to maintain one MasterPK; can invalidate the specific ID at anytime. For details of IBE, check • Dan Boneh and Matthew Franklin. Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. SIAM J. Comput., 32(3):586–615, 2003.

  20. AIBE – MRQED1 • Try to decrease storage and computation cost • Efficient representation of range: - Define Interval Tree tr(T) as a binary tree over [1, T], each node represents a range - ith leaf node: cv(ID) = i - non-leaf node: cv(ID) = cv(ID1) U cv(ID2) in which ID1 & ID2 are its children nodes

  21. AIBE – MRQED1– cont’d • Set of IDs covering a point x - if , ID covers x if . - Define P(x) to be the set such IDs. - P(x) includes all nodes on the path from leaf x to root. • Range as a collection of IDs - Define (s, t) to be the minimum set of nodes that cover range [s, t].

  22. AIBE – MRQED1– cont’d [0, 7] [0, 3] [4, 7] [0, 1] [2, 3] [4, 5] [6, 7] 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [1, 7]

  23. AIBE – MRQED1: Encrypt C0=Encrypt(PK, IDA, msg) A C1=Encrypt(PK, IDB, msg) B C2 C3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

  24. AIBE – MRQED1: Encrypt C0 O(logT) ciphertext size C1 C2 C3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

  25. AIBE – MRQED1: DeriveKey 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [2, 6]

  26. AIBE – MRQED1: DeriveKey [2, 3] [4, 5] [6, 6] 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [2, 6]

  27. AIBE – MRQED1: DeriveKey SK SK SK 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [2, 6]

  28. AIBE – MRQED1: DeriveKey O(logT) decryption key size SK SK SK 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [2, 6]

  29. Observations: • If x 2 [s, t], then | P(x)Å(s, t) | = 1 • If x2[s, t], P(x) Å(s, t)=; AIBE – MRQED1: QueryDecrypt

  30. AIBE – MRQED1: Decrypt C0 C1 C2 C3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

  31. AIBE – MRQED1: Decrypt C0 C1 SK SK C2 SK C3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [2, 6]

  32. AIBE – MRQED1: Decrypt C0 C1 C2 C3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

  33. AIBE – MRQED1: Decrypt C0 C1 SKB C2 C3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [0, 3]

  34. AIBE – MRQED1: Decrypt C0 C1 SKB C2 C3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [4, 7]

  35. AIBE – MRQED1: Performance T: # different values along each dimension D: # dimensions

  36. AIBE – MRQEDD – Encryption D = 2 dimensional example To encrypt point x = (3,5)

  37. AIBE – MRQEDD – DeriveKey Query range: [2,6] x [7,3] 1st dimension: (2, 6) 2nd dimension: (3,7)

  38. AIBE – MRQEDD Performance • O(1) PK size • O(D¢logT) • Encryption cost • Cipher Text. size • Decryption key size • O((logT)D) decrypt. cost • Good performance, but has a serious vulnerability – prone to collusion attack

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