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TrustBuilder: Automated Trust Negotiation in Open Systems

TrustBuilder: Automated Trust Negotiation in Open Systems. Kent Seamons Brigham Young University Internet Security Research Lab seamons@cs.byu.edu. 3 rd Annual PKI R&D Workshop, Gaithersburg, MD, April 12, 2004. Outline. Trust establishment in open systems Overview of trust negotiation

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TrustBuilder: Automated Trust Negotiation in Open Systems

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  1. TrustBuilder: Automated Trust Negotiation in Open Systems Kent Seamons Brigham Young University Internet Security Research Lab seamons@cs.byu.edu 3rd Annual PKI R&D Workshop, Gaithersburg, MD, April 12, 2004

  2. Outline • Trust establishment in open systems • Overview of trust negotiation • Sensitive credentials and access control policies • Research directions • TrustBuilder • TLS-based trust negotiation protocol • Future work

  3. Trust Negotiation Collaborators • Theory • M. Winslett, UIUC • T. Yu, NCSU • N. Li, Purdue • W. Winsborough, GMU • J. Mitchell, Stanford • Systems • K. Seamons, BYU • C. Neuman, T. Ryutov, B. Tung, USC/ISI • H. Orman, Purple Streak • Applications • W. Nejdl, U. HannoverEducational consortia • J. Basney, V. Welch, NCSAGrid computing • Funding • DARPA (Dynamic Coalitions Program) • NSF (ITRs on TN, disaster response) • Industry (ZoneLabs, Dallas Semiconductor, Network Associates Laboratories)

  4. Trust Establishment in Open Systems • Problem: Identity is not relevant • Solution: Access control decisions are based on attributes of both the client and server (mutual trust) • Client attributes: citizenship, security clearance, job classification, annual salary, affiliations, etc. • Server attributes: membership, privacy policy, customer satisfaction, result of recent security audit, etc.

  5. Digital Credentials • A credential is the vehicle for carrying attribute information reliably • A credential contains attributes of the credential owner asserted by the issuer (attribute authority) • Properties: verifiable and unforgeable

  6. 1 Credentials Sensitivity • Credentials may contain sensitive information and should be treated as protected resources

  7. Access Control Policies • Credential disclosure is governed by an access control policy • Specifies credentials that must be received from another party prior to disclosing the sensitive credential to that party

  8. Trust Negotiation • The process of establishing trust between strangers in open systems based on the attributes of the participants

  9. Trust Negotiation Approaches • Naïve: • Disclose all credentials with each request for service • Trial and error • Disclose all credentials that are not sensitive, disclose sensitive credentials after required trust is established • Informed • Disclose relevant policy first, then only disclose credentials necessary for a successful trust negotiation based on the trust requirements within the policy • Advanced cryptography • Demonstrate attributes without disclosing credentials

  10. Alice Bob Service Step 1: Alice requests a service from Bob 2 1 2 1 Step 2: Bob discloses his policy for the service Step 3: Alice discloses her Visa policy Step 4: Bob discloses his BBB credential Step 5: Alice discloses her Visa card credential Step 6: Bob grants access to the service Service Trust Negotiation Example

  11. Research Directions • Policy languages • Requirements (Seamons, Winslett – Policy 2002) • Compliance checker requirements • Policy language design • IBM TPL – (Herzberg et al., Oakland 2001) • RT - (Li, Mitchell, Winsborough, Oakland 2002) • Delegation of attribute authority, role mappings between organizations • PeerTrust (Nejdl et al., ESWS 2004) • Policy analysis tools (Li, Winsborough, Mitchell) • Finding credentials at run time (Winsborough, Li) • Preventing leaks/attacks during negotiation • Hidden credentials (Holt et al, WPES 2003) • OSBE (Li et al., PODC 2003) • Ack policies (Winsborough et al., Policy 2002) • Policy filtering (Yu et al.) • Support for sensitive access control policies (Seamons, Winslett, Yu) • Negotiation protocols & strategies • Wireless and mobile device architecture for trust negotiation – surrogate TN • Testbed implementations - HTTPS, TLS, content-triggered TN, ...

  12. Security Domain B Client Access Control Policies Server Access Control Policies Enterprise-wide Access Control Policies Security Domain A Security Domain C TrustBuilder Architecture • Goal – Ubiquitous trust negotiation • TrustBuilder integrates into existing Internet technologies • Current Deployments - HTTPS, TLS, SSH, SMTP

  13. Trust Negotiation in TLS (TNT) • TLS-based protocol for trust negotiation • Resulted from an analysis of the SSL/TLS handshake protocol for its suitability as a protocol for trust negotiation • TLS provides an option for client/server authentication using certificates • Goal: extend TLS client/server authentication to support trust negotiation

  14. Client Server ClientHello ServerHello Certificate CertificateRequest ServerHelloDone Certificate ClientKeyExchange CertificateVerify ChangeCipherSpec Finished ChangeCipherSpec Finished TLS Handshake Protocol using RSA Key Exchange

  15. Limitations of TLS for Establishing Trust between Strangers • Certificates are exchanged in plain text • Client and server each disclose only one certificate chain • Server can specify a list of trusted certifying authorities; client cannot • Server always discloses its certificate first • Server certificate ownership is not yet established when the client discloses its certificate

  16. Extend TLS Authentication to Support Trust Negotiation • Extend the TLS handshake protocol to function as a trust negotiation protocol • TNT leverages existing and proposed features of the TLS handshake protocol • Client hello and server hello extensions • TLS rehandshake • Session resumption

  17. TLS Rehandshake • In the context of an encrypted TLS session, either the client or the server may initiate a rehandshake. • The server desires further certificates from the client for purposes of authentication or authorization. • Cipher suite upgrading • Replenishment of keying material • Trust negotiations involving sensitive credentials and policies must be conducted over a secure channel in order to remain confidential. The initial TLS handshake is not confidential. • TNT is designed to occur in the context of a TLS rehandshake.

  18. TNT Protocol Client Server HelloNegotiationRequest ClientHello ServerHello Certificate * Overview: CertificateVerify Policy * ServerTurnDone + Certificate * CertificateVerify Policy * ClientTurnDone NegotiationDone ChangeCipherSpec Finished ChangeCipherSpec Finished

  19. BROWSER SERVER REQUEST REQUEST RESOURCE NEGOTIATE YES! PROTECTED? RESOURCE SUCCESS TLS HANDSHAKE REQUEST TRUST NEGOTIATION TrustBuilder TrustBuilder RESOURCE CREDENTIAL REQUESTS AND CREDENTIALS CREDENTIAL REQUESTS AND CREDENTIALS ENCRYPTED TUNNEL TE TPL TTG RT TE TPL TTG RT TNT TNT

  20. TNT Implementation • A prototype of TNT has been developed for the TrustBuilder architecture • TNT implementation is an extension to the Java PureTLS toolkit developed by Eric Rescorla (see http://www.rftm.com/) • Policy language and compliance checker is built using the IBM Trust Establishment system developed at the IBM Haifa Research Lab (RSA Security Conference 2001)

  21. Future work • Integrate emerging trust negotiation policy languages (RT, PeerTrust) into TNT to determine if the protocol is general purpose • Policy creation tools • Requirements for real-world applications • Grid computing, Semantic Web • Privacy protection during trust negotiation • Trust negotiation in Kerberos PK-INIT • Architectures for mobile devices – surrogate trust negotiation

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