Conceptions, Understanding, and Wisdom John Bengson (ANU/Wisconsin) & Marc Moffett (Wyoming)

1. Conceptions, Understanding, andWisdomJohn Bengson (ANU/Wisconsin)&Marc Moffett (Wyoming)

2. The Starting Point One’s conception of something is how one conceives or thinks, or is somehow inclined to think, of it. • That’s not an analysis or theory, but a way of pointing to a rather familiar phenomenon.

3. We have conceptions of • ourselves, • our environment (e.g., as something sacred), • motion (Newton’s conception differed from Aristotle’s), • how to reason according to modus ponens, • a variety of traditional philosophical topics such as freedom, justice, truth, reference, knowledge, and so forth. What are conceptions? What is their philosophical significance? 3

4. A number of philosophers have claimed that conceptions and their kin (e.g., schemas, stereotypes, perspectives, views, “frames”) are indispensable in a wide variety of areas. 4

5. This talk will develop an account of the M&E of conceptions that may provide the theoretical resources needed to assess such claims. The talk will also explore some of the further significance of conceptions. • We’ll argue that an adequate account of conceptions yields insight into the nature of understanding. • It also introduces a straightforward treatment of the notion of a worldview. • And it illuminates the classical centerpiece of philosophia: the notion of wisdom. 5

6. The Plan Part I: The M&E of Conceptions • Clarify some central features of conceptions and critically examine extant reductionist treatments • Introduce an alternative, non-reductionist theory Part II: The Significance of Conceptions • A new analysis of understanding • A new analysis of wisdom • Extension to other notions: authenticity and intelligent action 6

7. Part I: The M&E of Conceptions§1. Reductionist Theories

8. An Ambiguity • one’s having a conception = a mental attitude (state, event) • the conception that one has = a content Neither has received much attention, at least not as such. This may be due to a widespread yet largely implicit acceptance of reductive views of conceptions (in terms of concepts or propositions). 8

9. Conceptual Reductionism [CRC] Conceptions (the contents) = concepts • concept: non-mentalistic entity (e.g., Fregean sense) [CRA] Conceptions (the attitudes) = mental relations to concepts, or states of grasping concepts 9

10. Assessing [CRC] In general, a conception of  (the content) is not identical to a concept of . • First, it’s plausible that some concepts—perhaps concepts for colors, consciousness, existence—are simple and unanalysable. Even so, it seems possible to have complex conceptions of these things. (Cf. Frege on truth.) 10

11. Assessing [CRC] In general, a conception of  (the content) is not identical to a concept of . • Second, consider Tyler Burge’s arthritis example. Burge has argued convincingly that the patient and doctor share the same concept of arthritis. Regardless, it seems clear that their conceptions of arthritis are quite different (for the confused patient: as possibly occurring in the thigh). 11

12. A possible “move” is to hold that a conception of  is a concept, but not a concept of —it’s a concept of something else. But this introduces a general reason against thinking that a conception is identical to any concept (or set of concepts). 12

13. Consider once again Burge’s doctor and patient. They might possess all of the same concepts, including the concept possibly occurring in the thigh. But they could still have different conceptions of arthritis: only for the patient is this concept “oriented towards” arthritis—it as it were purports to say how arthritis is. The difference lies, not in their conceptual repertoires, but in something else—again, how those repertoires are “oriented towards” the world (here, arthritis). [More on this notion later.] 13

14. Assessing [CRA] For analogous reasons, conceptions (the attitudes) are not identical to states of grasping concepts. • Consider the particular conception of Middle East politics you currently harbor. While this conception plausibly requires grasping various concepts, your current conception of Middle East politics is not (or, not simply) a state of grasping those concepts. You have to as it were put those concepts to use in characterizing Middle East politics. 14

15. These points are compatible with the following ideas: • conceptions (the contents) are structured entities constituted, at least in part, by concepts; • conceptions (the attitudes) require grasping those concepts. Both ideas are plausible. This, together with the observation that conceptions purport to say or characterize how things are, would seem to make them prop- or prop-attitude-like. Perhaps this is why a number of philosophers have been attracted to a propositional reduction. 15

16. Propositional Reductionism [PRC] Conceptions (the contents) = propositions • prop: the semantic value of a full indicative sentence [PRA] Conceptions (the attitudes) = mental relations to props, or prop attitudes 16

17. In Truly Understood, Christopher Peacocke says conceptions are states of knowledge. [Problem: Arist vs. Newton on motion.] • Frank Jackson equates “folk conceptions” with “folk theories”—presumably these are often opinions or beliefs, not necessarily knowledge. • David Wiggins: “A conception of horse is a set of beliefs concerning what horses are, or what it is to be a horse.” • Anil Gupta: conceptions or “views” involve judgments. 17

18. Against a Propositional Reduction While conceptions are certainly like props and prop-attitudes in many ways, there are also several (subtle) differences. For example, propositions are bearers of truth/falsity, the contents of belief, and possible objects of judgment. By contrast, • Conceptions aren’t true or false (rather, they’re correct/incorrect). # ‘The conception of nature as something sacred is true.’ • Conceptions aren’t the contents of belief. # ‘A believes the conception of nature as something sacred.’ • Conceptions aren’t possible objects of judgment. # ‘What I judge to be true is the conception of nature as something sacred.’ 18

19. Interestingly, conceptions are possible objects, not of judgment, but rather of broadly evaluative attitudes like respect, admiration, and abhorrence. ‘I have a deep respect for the conception of nature as sacred.’ Contrast: #‘I have a deep respect for the proposition that nature is sacred.’ 19

20. Further, propositions are introduced by certain expressions involving that-clauses. ‘A believes the proposition that nature is sacred.’ By contrast, conceptions are canonically introduced by certain expressions involving as- or by-clauses. ‘A’s conception of nature is as something sacred.’ ‘A’s conception of how to reason according to modus ponens is by inferring q from (p, pq).’ 20

21. If the preceding is correct, conceptions (the contents) are not identical to props, and conceptions (the attitudes) are not identical to prop attitudes. Of course, it doesn’t follow that conceptions (the contents) are not somehow associated with propositions, and that conceptions (the attitudes) are not grounded in prop attitudes. Both ideas are quite plausible, and a non-reductive theory can accept them. Let’s now try to develop such a theory. 21

22. Part I: The M&E of Conceptions§2. A Non-reductive Theory

23. The Foundations i. Pointer: One’s conception of δ is how one conceives of δ. ii. Relational Constraint: Conceptions (the attitudes) relate thinkers to conceptions (the contents). iii. Constitution Thesis: Conceptions (the contents) are structured entities constituted by concepts. 23

24. iv. Orientation Constraint: Unlike concepts, conceptions (the contents) are “oriented towards” the world. v. As/by constraint: Unlike props, they are canonically introduced with certain expressions involving as- and by-clauses (e.g., as something sacred). vi. Grounding Thesis: They serve as contents of mental states (conceptions, the attitudes) that are distinct from but nevertheless grounded in prop attitudes. 24

25. We think these constraints identify features of conceptions that any theory of conceptions must capture. • In a moment we’ll float a proposal that looks to satisfy this desideratum. Of course, conceptions also have a variety of other features that must be respected. Here are four. 25

26. Some Broadly Logico-semantical Properties of Conceptions a. Non-factivity: A conception of  can be correct or incorrect, and to a greater or lesser degree. • Burge’s arthritis patient b. Non-exhaustiveness: A conception of  can be complete or incomplete, and to a greater or lesser degree. • My current conception of black holes 26

27. c. Diversity: There can be many distinct conceptions of a single . • Aristotle vs. Newton on motion d. Publicity: Two distinct individuals can share a single conception of . • Augustine and Descartes on the soul (as immaterial and immortal) 27

28. In some ways conceptions are proposition-like or prop-attitude-like. In other ways they are more concept-like or grasp-of-concept-like. Conceptions are neither, though intimately related to both. Perhaps they can be viewed as “lying in-between”. At any rate, they belong to their own category. • They have (types of) properties which neither concepts nor props have; they lack (types of) properties which either concepts or props have. 28

29. A Proposal [NRc] What it is for a conception  of  (the content) to exist is for there to be a (possibly ordered or singleton) set C of concepts C1, ..., Cn oriented towards  in such a way as to characterize , where what it is for Cto be oriented towards  in such a way as to characterize  is for there to be some corresponding set P of propositions P1, …, Pn, where P1 = [ is C1], …,Pn = [ is Cn], such that  is wholly correct iff every member of P is true. [NRA] What is it for an individual x to have a conception of  (the attitude) is for there to be a conception  of  (the content) and for x to stand in the having relation to , where what it is for xto stand in the having relation to  is for x to possess a set PA of acceptance-entailing prop attitudes such that every member of PA is true iff  is wholly correct. 29

30. A Proposal [NRc] What it is for a conception  of  (the content) to exist is for there to be a (possibly ordered or singleton) set C of concepts C1, ..., Cn oriented towards  in such a way as to characterize , where what it is for Cto be oriented towards  in such a way as to characterize  is for there to be some corresponding set P of propositions P1, …, Pn, where P1 = [ is C1], …,Pn = [ is Cn], such that  is wholly correct iff every member of P is true. [NRA] What it is for an individual x to have a conception of  (the attitude) is for there to be a conception  of  (the content) and for x to stand in the having relation to , where what it is for xto stand in the having relation to is for x to possess a set PA of acceptance-entailing prop attitudes such that every member of PA is true iff  is wholly correct. 30

31. These theses offer a substantive characterization of conceptions which captures their core features and connects them to concepts and props (non-reductive but not “brute”). These are some of the specific virtues of the proposal. 31

32. Broader Virtues The theory also has a variety of potential theoretical implications and applications, showing that conceptions are not explanatorily idle. Some were mentioned earlier: a priority, anti-individualism, conceptual analysis, imaginative resistance, meaning, and perception. Here, we’ll focus on the theory of understanding, then turn briefly to wisdom. 32

33. Part II: The Significance of Conceptions§3. An Analysis of Understanding

34. Varieties of Understanding We’ll focus on objectual understanding, not propositional or factual understanding. • understanding global warming vs. • understanding that global warming is thus and so. (NB: We realize there may be a difference between understanding  and an understanding of . Our primary concern is the former, if and when they diverge.) 34

35. Arguably, understanding-that may serve as a useful means when the comparatively more fundamental end of achieving a general understanding-of. • For example, to understand that global warming is partly caused by the accumulation of CFC’s in the atmosphere may be of some help in achieving an understanding of global warming. But clearly more is wanted. • What else? What is understanding-of? 35

36. A Proposal To understand  is to have a certain type of conception of : a noetic conception. 36

37. Noetic Conceptions Like all conceptions, noetic conceptions come in degrees, e.g., degrees of correctness and completeness. This is desirable, for understanding comes in degrees. • One can understand better or worse, or have a greater or lesser degree of understanding. • Correspondingly, one’s conception may contain greater or fewer gaps and errors, which may be corrected and completed (or vv). • Specifically, one can correct one’s conception by adding suitable true props to P. One can complete one’s conception by adding suitable concepts to C. • So the proposal makes sense of how one’s understanding may change: improve, strengthen, weaken, regress, etc. Noetic conceptions also have several distinctive features. 37

38. To explain what is distinctive about noetic conceptions, two notions are needed: • the notion of the core of a conception • the notion of a central attribute (property, relation, etc.) 38

39. The Core In general, what a conception of  does is characterize : it specifies attributes of  (corresponding to various members of C, e.g. C1). Part of the conception characterizes what  is: it specifies what attributes are part of what it is to be  (corresponding to different members of C, e.g. C2). This is the ‘core’ of the conception. For example, it might be part of my conception of the rainforestthat it has been inhabited for most of human history, and so it is appealing to people as a natural habitat. But its being an appealing natural habit isn’t part of the core of my conception of the rainforest, of what the rainforest is. As we shall see, much of what’s distinctive of noetic conceptions concerns what’s happening in the core. 39

40. Central Attributes Central attributes may be context sensitive in various ways. They are sometimes essential attributes (what  is essentially), as perhaps in the context of Descartes’ project in the Meditations. Other times they are not essential, but central in some other relevant way. For instance, accumulation of CFC’s may be a central attribute of global warming given our current overuse of fossil fuels. However, different technological developments might generate global warming in different ways and in those circumstances other (bio)chemical mechanisms may be central (given our interests and concerns). Very roughly, noetic conceptions “place” the central attributes in the core. 40

41. Unlike other conceptions, noetic conceptions are: 1. Correct in the core • their core does not include any of ’s non-central attributes Suppose that the failure to plant lots of trees is not a central attribute of global warming (e.g., because planting trees is not by itself an effective means to reducing carbon). This should be reflected in a noetic conception of global warming: to conceive of global warming otherwise is to harbor a confusion. To include non-central attributes in the core is to conceive of  incorrectly. Having such a conception indicates a certain kind of error in understanding. 41

42. Unlike other conceptions, noetic conceptions are: 1. Correct in the core 2. Complete in the core • their core does not omit any of ’s central attributes Suppose that A1, …, AM are central attributes of global warming. This should be reflected in a noetic conception. A conception of global warming that omits any of these central attributes from the core is lacking or deficient in a crucial respect. To omit central attributes from the core is to conceive of  incompletely. It indicates a certain kind of gap in understanding. 42

43. Unlike other conceptions, noetic conceptions are: 1. Correct in the core 2. Complete in the core 3. Internally connected • their core identifies substantive connections between ’s central attributes Suppose that planting trees doesn’t offset increased carbon caused by widespread deforestation, unless the planted trees manage to be carbon-neutral (e.g., they enter the geology or become part of a self-sustaining forest). Identifying such connections (here, centered on carbon) may be important to understanding global warming. 43

44. Unlike other conceptions, noetic conceptions are: 1. Correct in the core 2. Complete in the core 3. Internally connected 4. Externally coherent • their core coheres with their non-core, as well as with related conceptions (in particular, with conceptions of ’s central attributes themselves) Suppose one conceives of global warming as the result of excessive carbon; at the same time, one conceives of carbon as a chemical element that is very rare and precious. This tension may impede one’s understanding of global warming. 44

45. To summarize, noetic conceptions are: 1. Correct in the core 2. Complete in the core 3. Internally connected 4. Externally coherent Other conditions (e.g., anti-luck) might be proposed. We demur, and in any case regard (1) - (4) as “centerpieces”. 45

46. The Proposal, Restated To understand  is to have an internally connected and externally coherent conception of  that is correct and complete in the core. • This is perfect understanding (this assumes an upper bound is coherent). • There is also imperfect understanding, or degrees thereof—which are approximations of perfect understanding (this assumes some scale is coherent). 46

47. A Comparison: Kvanvig’s proposal “Understanding requires the grasping of explanatory and other coherence-making relationships in a large and comprehensive body of information. One can know many unrelated pieces of information, but understanding is achieved only when informational items are pieced together by the subject in question.” —Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge . . . (2003, 192) Whether this is plausible, presumably it’s not meant as an analysis. The shift from understanding to grasping is hardly an advance. In any case, it would just move the question: what is ‘grasping’? One can interpret our analysis as doing away with the need to appeal to ‘grasping’. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as explicating such ‘grasping’ in terms of noetic conceptions. 47

48. This is of course just the beginning of a full theory of understanding. If it is correct (at least in outline, even if not in detail), then explicating understanding is one important job that conceptions might do. Analyzing wisdom and related notions is perhaps another. 48

49. Part II: The Significance of Conceptions§3. Wisdom, Worldview, and Related Notions

50. Wisdom It’s sometimes suggested that the aim of philosophy is wisdom. If understanding is constituted by a noetic conception, then wisdom is plausibly constituted by an appropriate noetic conception—for instance, a noetic conception of the world and one’s place in it. • Call this a noetic self-world conception. One could just be wise about this or that (domain-specific wisdom). In such a case, we can regard one as having a noetic conception of  and ’s place in the world: a noetic -world conception. • We’ll focus on wisdom (full stop). 50