Anthony I. Jack, & Tim Shallice (2001).

Anthony I. Jack, & Tim Shallice (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition, 79, 161-196. Ikejiri Yoshifumi 12, Dec., 2005

1. What’s the Problem? 2. The Function of Consciousness 3. Type-C processes4. Introspective Evidences 5. A Framework for Understanding Conscious Processes 6. Argument Defending Physicalism Outline

◆ What is the underlying mechanism and processes that giving rise to conscious experiences? What’s the Problem? ◆ How do we tackle this problem? → Biology as an example → To characterize the properties of consciousness e.g. 1. Introspection as a method 2. NCC approach

◆ What is the function of consciousness? The Function of Consciousness ◆ Why the function is unknown? → No clear agreement about what needs to be explained – no coherent data ◆ How should we do anyway?

◆ “We are conscious of sth..” vs. “We have consciously performed an action.” e.g. 1. the processes underlying attentional selection 2. the control processes such as planning, problem solving, inhibition of pre-potent response, etc. in prefrontal cortex Two Senses of Csns

◆ “Awareness is necessary for intentional action” principle e.g. Jacoby Exclusion Task Conceptual Linkage Between the Two Senses ◆ To be noted, this principle is just a working hypothesis, the aim is to provide a thorough scientific characterization of this principle in information- processing terms.

1. To provide an account of how the principle should be grounded in phenomenology Three Ways to Make a Scientific Characterization 2. Providing precise specification of the relation between perceptual awareness and intentional axn (in information-processing terms) 3. Explain intentional axn in information-processing terms

◆ Introspective evidence is necessary to identify Type-C processes, that can only operate on information available for report and be recruited when tasks involve intentional axn How does Phenomenological Understanding be used? ◆ Is this a HOT model? → No. To be conscious of information,, it is sufficient for any Type-C process to be effectively operating on that information. Thus, subject need not making judgement.

◆ Type-C processes are processes that can only operate effectively on information when normal subjects report awareness of that information. Type-C Processes ◆ The enable and the endow view

1. The process underlies conscious reflection → underlie the ability to categorize one’s own sates of awareness Pre-experimentally characterized Type-C processes 2. The process which underlies the ability to freely report the identity of an unanticipated but known stimulus at the time of presentation → It is the same process whatever type of stimulus is being recognized .

3. The process underlies the re-experiencing of a past event held in memory → The process underlies checking the veridicality of recalled information, or the planning of action

4. The process involved in encoding material into episodic memory – the process that underlies the ability to retrospectively report the identity of the earlier stimulus in a free recall task Experimentally characterized Type-C processes 5. The process of “exclusion” involved in the Jacoby exclusion task

6. The process underlying the discounting of perceptual fluency due to prior exposure of a stimulus → This process underlies the abolition of various “perceptual fluency” effects, such as judgements of familiarity, preference, perceptual clarity, brightness and darkness

7. The process underlying the addition of stimuli to a discriminatory response set → Jack’s paradigm – Incorporation of the stimulus into the response set required conscious identification

◆ A basic assumption underlying the approach is: if on some occasions subjects carry out a task in the absence of awareness of particular information (e.g. the identity of a masked word), then we conclude that Type-C processes are not necessary for processing the information in that manner (e.g. semantic priming) Interim Summary

◆ Main problem: Mis-intepretation & difficult to gain raw data Introspective Evidence ◆ How to avoid? → Use introspective evidence to examine the self- reflective subsystems – the processes responsible for the “model’ subjects have for understanding their mental states – and the effect these processes have on thought and behavior

→ Use introspective evidence to distinguish between mental states – by using the information that is made available to reflective subsystems when subjects introspect However, it should be noted that we do not interpret this information as information about our functional states, rather, we use our won folk-psychological theories

We replace or refine the subject’s model by i) providing a well specified model and ii) re-interpreting the subject’s reports in terms of a testable functional theory

◆ In sum, introspection could be done under these conditions: 1. relevant conscious states can be reliably elicited by varying the stimulus and/or experimental conditions 2. the introspective reports are closely related to objective judgements

◆ High-level operation → Conscious processes Informationally encapsulated processes → Non- Conscsious processes A Framework for Understanding Conscious Processes ◆ The Norman – Shallice model

◆ The model is concerned with action selection. It has three levels: 1. Special purpose processing subsystems 2. Action and thought schemas 3. Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) – to cope with non-routine situations

◆ The Super robot -- Rene Argument Defending Physicalism ◆ If Rene’s self-reflective capacities are to be useful, then its subjective concepts should map onto functional distinctions between its cognitive states. And we could use Rene’s introspective reports as a guide to Rene’s functional organization, as well as providing data on the operation of Rene’s self- reflective subsystems.

Through experiencing “what it is like to” do well specified tasks, we may learn to relate our subjective understanding of our mental states to such objective specifications of those states.

Availability of information to multiple processes • Unity of perceptual experiences • iii) Non-determinism and non-locality • iv) Integration and differentiation of conscious state

◆ Legacy of Behaviorism → Introspection is not reliable ◆ Perception without awareness e.g. blindsight → Introspection is a reliable method for assessing the presence or absence of awareness

◆ Logothetis (binocular rivalry paradigm) – Stimulus remains constant while the conscious percept changes (IT & STS) → necessary ◆ Frith – Stimulus changes while conscious percept remains constant → sufficient ◆ Processes occur in the absence of awareness ◆ Problems for NCC approach – function of csns

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Anthony I. Jack, & Tim Shallice (2001).