1 / 16

The Shapley Value: Its Use and Implications on Internet Economics

The Shapley Value: Its Use and Implications on Internet Economics. Richard T.B. Ma Columbia University Dah-ming Chiu, John C.S. Lui The Chinese University of Hong Kong Vishal Misra, Dan Rubenstein Columbia University. Outline. ISP Practices and Associated Problems

urielle-salinas
Télécharger la présentation

The Shapley Value: Its Use and Implications on Internet Economics

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. The Shapley Value: Its Use and Implications on Internet Economics Richard T.B. Ma Columbia University Dah-ming Chiu, John C.S. Lui The Chinese University of Hong Kong Vishal Misra, Dan Rubenstein Columbia University

  2. Outline • ISP Practices and Associated Problems • Profit Sharing and Shapley Value • Shapley Mechanism and Incentive Properties • Future work

  3. What is an Internet Service Provider (ISP)? • The Internet is composed of Autonomous Systems (ASes). • An ISP is a business entity. • Might comprise multiple ASes. • Provide Internet access. • Objective: maximizeprofits. ISP

  4. Different classes of players • Eyeball ISPs • Provide Internet access to customers: • Place Large investment in infrastructure. • E.g. AT&T, Verizon … • Content ISPs • Provide contents via the Internet. • Serve customers like: • Transit ISPs • Tier 1 ISPs: global connectivity of the Internet. • Provide transit services for other ISPs. • Cover a large geographic area.

  5. ISP Settlement Problems: a Macro Perspective Net Neutrality Debate: Whether or not to provider Service Differentiation? Service Differentiation Information Neutrality Eyeball Content Providers Transit Network Balkanization: De-peering between ISPs Transit Transit zero-dollar peering How to appropriately share profits among ISP?

  6. ISP Practices: a Micro Perspective Provider ISP Three levels of decisions • Interconnecting decision E • Routing decisions R (via BGP) • Bilateral financial settlements f Settlement faffects E, R Interconnection withdrawal provider charges, customer might want to save money Hot-potato Routing Customer/provider relationship Route change Peering relationship Source Destination Shortest Path Routing Customer ISP Customer ISP

  7. How to share profit? -- the baseline case • Consider a PC market with only one operating system provider and one micro-processor provider. • Egalitarian profit sharing:

  8. How to share profit? -- more players • Symmetry: two micro-processor providers obtain the same profit. • Efficiency: summation of three companies’ profit equal V. • Balanced Contribution:

  9. How to share profit? -- eyeball and content ISPs • The unique solution (Shapley value) that satisfies EfficiencySymmetry and Balanced Contribution:

  10. Results and implications of ISP profit sharing • Each ISP’s profit is • Inversely proportional to the number of ISPs of its type. • Proportional to the number of ISPs of the opposite type. • Intuitions and explanations • The more of the same kind provide substitutions. • The less of a kind can obtain more leverage.

  11. $$$ j(E,R) $$ $$ A clean-slate multilateral settlement Provider ISP Recall: three levels of decisions • Interconnecting decision E • Routing decisions R • Bilateral financial settlements f The Shapley value settlements j jcollects revenue from customers jredistributes profits to ISPs E, R follow fromj Settlement faffects E, R Customer/provider relationship Peering relationship Customer ISP

  12. Individual ISP’s selfish behavior Each ISP makes local interconnecting and routing decisions. Given:j Local decisions:Ei,Ri Objective: to maximizeji(E,R) Ei Ri

  13. Incentive results -- optimal routing • Assumptions: • Aggregate Profit = Total Revenue – Total Routing Cost. • Profits are distributed via the Shapley value solution. • Fixed interconnecting topology. • ISPs locally decide routes to maximize their profits. • Theorem (Incentive for routing): Any ISP maximizes its profit by locally minimizing the global routing cost. • Implication: ISPs adapt to global min-cost routes. • Corollary (Nash Equilibrium): Any global min cost routing decision is a Nash equilibrium for the set of all ISPs. • Implication: global min-cost routes are stable. Surprise: Selfish local behavior coincides with global optimal solution!

  14. Incentive results -- interconnecting • Assumptions: • Aggregate Profit = Total Revenue – Total Routing Cost. • Profits are distributed via the Shapley value solution. • For any topology, ISPs use global min-cost routes. • ISPs locally decide interconnections to maximize their profits. • Theorem (Incentive for interconnecting): Both interconnecting ISPs have non-decreasing profits. • Implication: ISPs have incentive to interconnect. • Does not mean: All pairs of ISPs should be connected. • Redundant links might not reduce routing costs. • Sunk cost is not considered.

  15. Summary • Ideal profit-sharing solution – the Shapley value • Efficiency,Symmetry and Balanced Contribution. • Additivity, Strong Monotonicity, Dummy … • Close-form solution for eyeball/content ISPs. • ISP incentives under the Shapley value solution • Incentive to use global optimal routes. • Incentive to interconnect.

  16. Future Work and New Results • Include Transit ISPs • General Internet Topology • Implications for Bilateral Agreements among ISPs

More Related