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Criticisms of Bentham’s Quantitative Hedonism. Not all pleasures are qualitatively the same. Not all pleasures are intrinsically good. Pleasure and absence of pain are not the only components of well-being. Problem of Plural Values. Mental State Theories.
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Criticisms of Bentham’s Quantitative Hedonism • Not all pleasures are qualitatively the same. • Not all pleasures are intrinsically good. • Pleasure and absence of pain are not the only components of well-being. • Problem of Plural Values
Mental State Theories • You might deny welfare hedonism while still clinging to the view that one’s well-being consists in and only in some mental states. Kagan calls this view “mental state theory.” Welfare hedonism is just one version of mental state theory. • The intrinsically valuable mental states may include calm states of mind, artistic experiences, catharsis, resignation etc. • As Kagan admits (p.34), mental state theories have some appeal. “What you don’t know can’t hurt you.”
Mental States are Not the Only Component of Well-being (?) • Mental State theories, e.g., welfare hedonism, have been criticized. • The critics argue that there are other things that make our life better off.
Nozick’s Experience Machine • Suppose that you are connected to an “experience machine” that electronically stimulates your brain, giving you whatever experiences you say most valuable. It will feel exactly as if you succeeded in business, being respected by people, being loved by a dream boy- or girl- friend, or what have you. Once you are hooked up, all memory of reality will disappear: so you will not know your experiences are merely appearances. The machine keeps your body safe and sound.
Continued • Question: Is the life connected to the experience machine well off? • Mental state theories, e.g., welfare hedonism, entail that the life is well off. The life is filled with what the theories take to be the only component of well-being: intrinsically valuable mental states. • However, many people (though not all) think that this life lacks something that makes a life well off. • Then, something other than mental states--- what we can get only in the real external world---is the component of our well-being. Perhaps, really being respected and loved, really achieving something, and so on, makes us well off. This view entails the rejection of mental state theories.
Preference Theories (AKA Desire Satisfaction Theories) • The satisfaction of a person’s desires makes the person’s life well-off. Thwarting a person’s desires makes the person’s life badly off. • A desire is satisfied just in case the very thing that is desired actually occurs. • Don’t confuse the satisfaction or realization of a desire with the feeling of satisfaction. The satisfaction or realization of your desire can occur even when it does not give you any feeling of satisfaction (e.g., when you do not know your desire is satisfied).
Two Attractions of Preference Theories • Many people think that a person’s well-being or happiness has a close connection with what the person desires, likes, or dislikes: generally speaking, if what a person desires or likes happens, the person will become well-off. • Some people might desire not only pleasure and absence of pain, but also other things---including the life of a developed person or what we can attain only in the real external world. Preference theories hold that these things are also good for those who desire them. Thus, preference theories can incorporate Mill and Nozick’s insights (in addition to the view that pleasure and absence of pain make life well-off).
The Need of Restricting Types of Preferences (Kagan, 37) • A person might have desires for things that have noting to do with the person’s life. It seems that their satisfaction fails to make the person’s life well off. • E.g.: My desire that the total number of atoms in the universe is a prime. • Whether the total number is a prime does nothing to do with my life. It is implausible to say that it will make my life well off. • Preference theorists need to restrict types of desires to desires for things that have a certain relation to their possessor’s life. • It is hard to say what this relation consists in.
Criticism: Misinformed and Ill-made Desires do not Make the Person Well-off (The blue part is the answer to Q1.) • It seems that satisfying the following desires often fail to render the possessor well off: • Desires based on inaccurate or inadequate data; • E.g.: Makoto wants a “buff bod” because he thinks that Sophie, whom he fancies, likes men with such bodies. But he is wrong. Sophie likes the nerdy, intellectual type. It seems that getting a “buff bod” doesn’t enhance Makoto’s well-being because he wants it only to help him get Sophie and it doesn’t do this. • Desires created under unfavorable conditions---through inattention to facts, irrational thinking, chemical addiction, discouragements, pressures from others, or medical manipulation.
Desires Created under unfavorable conditions • E.g.1: A drug addict desires to have more drugs. • E.g.2: A doctor invents a desire creating and satisfying machine. It only creates (and satisfies, if necessary) desires that can easily be satisfied, such as a desire for being hooked to the machine, for being on the earth, for being controlled, for feeling good, and so on. • It appears that the satisfaction of these desires do not make the person’s life well off.
Actual vs. Ideal Preference Theories • Thus, many preference theorists abandon actual preference theories and adopt ideal preference theories. • Actual preference theories hold that aperson’s well-being consists in the satisfaction of the desires that the person actually has. • Ideal preference theories hold that a person’s well-being consists in the satisfaction of the person’s desires in ideal conditions: that is, the desires that the person would have if the person were accurately and fully informed, and were under no unfavorable condition.
Actual Desires vs. Desires in Ideal Conditions • In the ideal conditions, you might not desire some of the things you actually desire. • E.g.: In ideal conditions, you might not have desires that you will see some celebrity you now like, or that you keep up with the fashion. That is, if you knew that the celeb is a jerk, or if you were not influenced by peer pressures, you might cease to want them. • In the ideal conditions, you might have desire for some of the things you do not actually want or even hate. • E.g.: Many people do not want to eat ethnic food like sushi, to listen to hard rock, rap etc., or to live in a certain way (e.g., perhaps in their parent’s way). But they might want to do so if they were fully and accurately informed of the nature of these things.
Not All Satisfaction of One’s Desires Make Him Well Off • One of the criticisms against welfare hedonism still remains. • According to preference theories, the satisfaction of one’s sadistic desires makes him well off. Some think that this is unacceptable. • Of course, preference theorists argue, as hedonists do, that it is acceptable because they can say that the satisfaction of sadistic preferences is on balance bad (because it has bad consequences).
Subjective vs. Objective Theories • Preference theories are subjective theories: they hold that what constitutes well-being depends on the conative states of the agent. (Conative states are states such as desiring, valuing, caring about and so forth.) • Some people think that subjective theories, e.g., preference theories are misguided in thinking that a person’s subjective state, e.g., his or her desire, makes things valuable for the person. • Why? They think that subjective theories, e.g., preference theories, put the cart before the horse. They say that things are desired because they are valuable, not the reverse (i.e., they are valuable because they are desired). • They claim that desires in ideal conditions---desires informed and created through favorable processes---are mere guides to recognize valuable things.
