120 likes | 241 Vues
This document outlines key discussions from the NATO Security Conference held in Berlin on February 10, 2004, focusing on the security challenges in the intermodal transport chain post-9/11. Klaus Ebeling from EIA emphasizes the importance of collaboration between the US and EU, the need for common security standards, and the evaluation of risks to infrastructures such as ports and ships. The document highlights the financial implications of security measures and the necessity of a unified approach to ensure the security and efficiency of international transport amidst evolving threats.
E N D
Security in the Intermodal Transport Chain NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Introduction • Modern Times: Free Trade and open borders • Setback: 11th September 2001 • Reaction in US: « virtual wall » • Embarrassment in EU • Dialogue US – EU • EIA: officials with professionals • Intention: Agreement US - EU NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
American approach – European objections • US: starting point: European Harbours (unilaterally) • EU: holistic view = the whole Transport & Logistic Chain; all modes; global approach • Co-operation with International Organisations • EU needs Agreement between Member States NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Risk categories (I) • Threats to ships and harbours • ISM and SOLAS (by IMO) • ISPS 1st of July 2004 • Control of ships (Security Plan is checked and approved bay RSO = Recognised Security Organisation, International Ship Security Certificate valid 5 years) NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Risk categories (II) • Threats to key infrastructure • Ports: Security plans (including emergency response plan) • Terminals • Contact points (+responsibility) • Annual review of the plan • The whole logistic chain! NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Risk categories (III) • No common security standards • Minimum standards for international transport service providers • Secure actors (like in aviation) • Regulated agent • Known shipper • Advance information NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Risk categories (IV) • Technical equipment • Secure locks and seals (f. i. electronically) • Secure handover procedures • No co-ordination of control of national activities • Common risk assessment methodologies • Classification of security incidents NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Some specific aspects • Data protection • Personal • Business • Storage how long? • Measures should not be more dangerous that the threat itself • Sky marshals NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Financial impact and possible economic result • US measures 1980 – 2001:logistic costs dropped from 16,1 % of GDP to 10,1 % • Financial impact of the security measures after 2001 on the costs per container are estimated at 50 to 100 $ (Hapag Lloyd). • Target: Win-win-situation NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Dimension and Importance • There were always pirates, thieves, smugglers etc. = much bigger security risk than terrorists • But terrorist’s threat more spectacular and important per case • Political leverage effect to get what always was wanted and needed: an efficient and secure intermodal transport chain NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Conclusions • No exaggeration! A reasonable and pragmatic approach is appropriate • The transport business sector is in principle agreeable to security measures – but common sense! • The harbours preceded, the chain will follow NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA
Next steps • EU Commission: Consultation paper (23.12.03) – Comments until 27.2.2004 • Negotiations EU with US • Final target: a Worldwide Security Agreement NATO Security Conference, Berlin 10.2.2004 - Klaus Ebeling, EIA