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Computational Modeling in the Social Sciences

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30 diapositives · 447 Views · Oct 02, 2014

This overview explores computational modeling in social sciences, focusing on various types including agent-based modeling. It highlights achievements, promises, and limitations of these models, emphasizing the trade-offs between simplicity and complexity. Key examples such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Schelling’s segregation model illustrate the potential of these models to provide predictive insights and conceptual clarity. The document also discusses modeling goals, the evolution of game theory, and the interplay between computational and mathematical models, offering a comprehensive guide for understanding their impact on social science research.

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  1. Computational Modeling in the Social Sciences Ken Kollman University of Michigan

  2. Overview • Modeling in the social sciences • Comparisons and definitions • Types of computational models • Agent-based modeling • Achievements • Promise • Limitations

  3. Models • Disciplined story-telling • “a precise and economical statement of a set of relationships that are sufficient to produce the phenomena in question” (Schelling). • Complicated enough to explain something not so obvious or trivial, but simple enough to be intuitive once it’s explained (Schelling) • A difficult tradeoff

  4. Two Levels of Simplicity • Simple models---Prisoner’s Dilemma, Edgeworth box, Supply and Demand • Not so simple, but profound---Arrow’s theorem, Chaos theorems, Nash theorem

  5. Goals of Models • Prediction • Insight • Conceptual clarity • Sometimes things “pop out”

  6. Some Want Models to • Have an equilibrium • Have theorems (closed-form solutions) • Be rigorous • Be deductive • Have rational agents • Have rational individuals

  7. Types of Modeling • General equilibrium • Differential equations (egs., arms race models) • Decision theoretic • Game theoretic (cooperative, noncooperative) • Social choice • Adaptive • Computational • Agent-based

  8. Game Theory Currently Dominant • Theory of interdependent decisions • Study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation among intelligent, rational decision-makers (Myerson) • Rational---optimizing Bayesians • Intelligent--decision-makers know and understand everything they do and we do (NOT complete information) • Example of non-intelligence--price theory (agents don’t know the model)

  9. Great Strides in Economics and other Social Sciences • Rich theory • Cumulative • Widely applicable • Some design successes (eg., auctions)

  10. Three Types of Computational Models • Simulations--numerical examples, usually of an equilibrium outcome • Computations--numerical approximations of equilibria that cannot be solved analytically (Judd) • Agent-based models--diverse, interacting, boundedly-rational, adaptive agents, not necessarily an equilibrium

  11. Agent-based Models • “Analysis of simulations of complex social systems” (Axelrod) • Purpose? “To aid intuition, ” not to analyze the consequences of assumptions (Axelrod) • Often, but not always, computational • Schelling’s segregation model as an example • Can be reduced form (pick up where modeler left off) or can be platform for artificial world (calculates each agent’s behavior and aggregates)

  12. Schelling: Moving Dimes and Nickels

  13. Simple Model by Page of Gender in Professions “We keep hiring women scientists but they keep moving to management or leaving the firm.”

  14. Page Tipping Model • Two gender types • Utility=comfort level + interest + ability • Agents can move professions • Feedback

  15. Reality

  16. Model: Initial State

  17. Model: End State

  18. “If you didn’t grow it you didn’t show it” (Epstein)

  19. Kollman, Miller, Page Models of Political Competition • Political parties competing for support • Each voter has a favorite policy position in the space of possible policies • Parties move in the space to win votes • Receive feedback from opinion polls, and adapt according to information • Hill-climb toward higher vote totals

  20. Adaptation on Electoral Landscapes

  21. Computational Models Can • Equilibrate • Cycle • Lead to perpetual novelty • All three

  22. Computational Models Can • Complement mathematical models • Predict • Provide insight • Offer conceptual clarity • Have things “pop out”

  23. Complexity Models, Complex Adaptive Systems Models • Santa Fe Institute • Emergence • Adaptation • Non-equilibrium • Agent-based • Feedback

  24. From More General to Less • Models • Computational models • Agent-based models

  25. Achievements • Segregation (Schelling) • PD games (Axelrod) • Feedback in markets (Epstein and Axtell, Tesfatsion, Arthur et al) • City Formation (Krugman) • Disease transmission (Simon)

  26. Achievements (cont’d) • Organizational hierarchies and feedback (March, Harrington) • Political competition (Kollman, Miller, and Page) • Diversity and decision-making (Hong and Page) • Emergence of complex societies (Padgett and Ansell) • Spread of culture or empire (Nowak, Cederman) • Industrial Organization (Harrington)

  27. Promise • Answering difficult questions other approaches cannot---multi-layered institutions, diversity, learning, feedback, spontaneous emergence, path dependence • Simulation and prediction • Robustness under bounded-rationality assumptions

  28. Limitations • Elusive standards • Not always intuitive • Undisciplined modeling • Agents not smart enough

  29. Opposition • Those opposed to modeling • Those opposed to bounded-rationality approaches • Those opposed to non-equilibrium models

  30. One Funeral at a Time…..