AGENDA

1. K3 Industri Kimia AGENDA • 5-4-11 silabus, pembagian tugas, Intro safety • 12-4-11 Safety at BP Tangguh (guest lecture, HSE engineer) • 19-4-11 Chemical Process Safety • 26-4-11 Safety Analysis • 3-5-11 Ujian • Reference: • Safety Analysis: Principles and Practice in occupational safety, Lars Harms-Ringdahl • Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications

2. TUGAS • Buat file pptx • No absen 1-13 masing2 bab 1-13 buku chemical process safety • Misal no absen 1: bab 1 • No absen 14-20: bab 1-14 buku safety analysis (per dua bab) • Misal no absen 14: bab 1-2, no absen 15: bab 3-4 • No absen 21: bab 15 • Dikumpulkan dengan nama file : • No absen-nama-bab.pptx, Contoh: 1-heri-bab1.pptx • Kirim ke kangheri@yahoo.com, paling lambat hari minggu jam 16 by email • PIN: 233FAA46 • Penilaian • Tugas: 20% • Absensi: 10% • Ujian: 20%

3. INTRODUCTION AGENDA • Safety Philosophy • Personal Protective Equipment • Safety Manner (safety induction dll) • Accident, Incident (fire, explosion, third party) • Emergency response (procedure) • Investigation (internal, external, forensik, analysis) • Safety Awareness (training, manner, SOP)

4. SAFETY HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTALPOLICY STATEMENT Kangean Energy Indonesia Limited is committed to manage the Safety, Health and Environmental (SHE). Effective SHE performance is crucial to the success of the business. The Company goal is to avoid any accident by improving personnel behavior. Prevention of pollution, management of natural resources for sustainability and continual improvement are vital components and key to our success. In fulfilling this commitment, the Management will: • Develop SHE Performance Management Standards and ensure its compliance with all relevant laws and regulations and other requirements to which oil and gas business subscribes. • Foster open communication with employees, contractors, neighbors, public interest group and those who work with us. • Openly and periodically report SHE performance, good and bad, evaluate and review it and promptly take necessary corrective actions accordingly. • Recognize those who contribute to improve SHE performance This SHE policy is in effect and become the responsibility of everyone who works for Kangean Energy Indonesia Limited to Adhere. Keisuke Inoue President & General Manager August 2008 Kangean Energy Indonesia Ltd.

5. PPE

13. Process Verification Proj.Spec Discipline Comments P&ID IFA P&ID IFC Company Comments HAZOP SIL Study, etc. Field Change Feedback Detail Design Feedback Vendor Data Input P&IDAs Built How to Develop/Finalize P&ID IFH

14. HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies) AGENDA HAZOP is a systematic and highly structured study with a critical approach to examine the process and engineering intentions of the process design. HAZOP is used to identify all possible causes of deviation from normal safe operation that could lead to any safety and fire hazard, environmental risk or operability problems. Some of the causes may be unrealistic and so they will be rejected as not meaningful. Some of the consequences may be trivial and would be considered no further. However there may be some deviations with both causes that are conceivable and consequences that are potentially hazardous. These potential hazards are then noted for recommendations/ action.

15. The important terms used in the HAZOP study

16. The primary aims of HAZOP AGENDA • To identify the cause of all deviations or changes from the design intent; • To determine all major hazard and operability problems associated with these deviations; • To decide whether action is required to control the hazard or operability problem; and, • To ensure that the actions decided upon are implemented and documented.

17. HAZOP GUIDE WORDS & EXAMPLE CAUSES

18. HAZOP Steps • Select and confirm the scope of a node. • Explain the general design intentions and operating conditions of the node. • Specify process parameters for node. • Select a process parameter (Flow, Pressure, etc.) and specify the design intention relating to this parameter. • Apply a deviation (more, less, etc.) to the parameter and develop a meaningful causes/ hazards of the deviation from the intention. • Identify all scenarios causes / hazards of the deviation from the intention. • Identify all major consequences associated with each cause without regards to safeguards. • Specify predominate safeguards against each consequence. • Identify existing level of risk by selecting severity and probability in agreed risk matrix (attachment-1) • Make recommendations to mitigate the consequences if the severity is unacceptable. • Identify risk level if recommendations have been implemented, again by selecting severity and probability in agreed risk matrix. • Repeat above steps for other guide words. • Repeat above steps for other process parameters. • Repeat above steps for all other nodes in review. • Document all recommendations agreed by the HAZOP team.

19. HAZOP Steps • Select and confirm the scope of a node. • Explain the general design intentions and operating conditions of the node. • Specify process parameters for node. • Select a process parameter (Flow, Pressure, etc.) and specify the design intention relating to this parameter. • Apply a deviation (more, less, etc.) to the parameter and develop a meaningful causes/ hazards of the deviation from the intention. • Identify all scenarios causes / hazards of the deviation from the intention. • Identify all major consequences associated with each cause without regards to safeguards. • Specify predominate safeguards against each consequence. • Identify existing level of risk by selecting severity and probability in agreed risk matrix (attachment-1) • Make recommendations to mitigate the consequences if the severity is unacceptable. • Identify risk level if recommendations have been implemented, again by selecting severity and probability in agreed risk matrix. • Repeat above steps for other guide words. • Repeat above steps for other process parameters. • Repeat above steps for all other nodes in review. • Document all recommendations agreed by the HAZOP team.

20. ! Effect: No production Existing safeguards : PSH installed at every prod well Closed P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Both 2 gate valves 150# at 16” Incoming line of Gas Boot is closed. No flow to Gas Boot

21. Existing safeguards Closed P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Both 2 gate valves 150# at Gas Boots’ 16” liquid outgoing line are unintentionally closed. No Flow to Wash Tank ! Effect : Liquid level increase

22. Incoming header rupture ! Effect : No production & Oil spill Existing safeguards : Operator regular check P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Production Fluid’s incoming header ruptures due to corrosion or hit by car. No flow to Gas Boot

23. ! Effect : Pressure in the Gas Boot increase, Closed Existing safeguards: PSV installed P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Two 12” gate valves at Gas Boots outgoing lines are unintentionally closed. No flow to scrubber.

24. Closed ! Effect : Pressure in Gas Boot increase Existing safeguards P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0002Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Any of 12” gate valve on gas line to PCV V51 is unintentionally closed and at the same time the Gas Plant Compressor is down. No Flow to Flare.

25. Black Out P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001Deviation : No FlowPossible Cause : Black out which makes all producer wells down. There is no fluid enters the gas boot & no production to Shipping Tank Existing safeguards : LSL installed at all tanks, LSL and PSL are installed at Transfer Pump & Shipping Pumpand by-pass valve should not be opened

26. Scale P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001Deviation : Less FlowPossible Cause : Scale at incoming line to Gas Boot. No consequences to Pager GS. Flow bottlenecks at off-plot line.

27. More well pop P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001Deviation : More FlowPossible Cause : More well POP or New Fields going in Consequences : Overflow in the surge Tank. Water quality decrease. * Capacity of GS is 180,000 BPD, higher than peak forecast production at 125,000 BPD.

28. Existing safeguards : PSV installed at tank & scrubber P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001Deviation : More FlowPossible Cause : If one of incoming valve to Gas Boot accidentally shut-in, more fluid will be flowed to second boot. ! Effects :One Gas Boot will handle more liquid. More gas would be carried under to wash tank and gas blanket scrubber. Wash Tank pressure will increase and separation efficiency would be lowered. May blow-up the tank’s roof.

29. PCV V51 will set pressure at 10 psig and let excess pressure to flare. PSV at Gas Boot. LCV V1/2 will regulate to set liquid level at set point P&ID No : BB-GS01-PGER-PI-0001Deviation : More PressurePossible Cause : Gas Plant Down. ! Effects : Pressure at Gas Boot increase. Liquid level decreases. Gas may blow under

30. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE Proposed ERP outline EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE (ERP) • EMERGENCY • SITUATION • Definition • Infrastructure • Organization • Action • Identification of • Hazard • EMERGENCY • RESPONSE • PROCEDURE • ERP for Gas • Leakage • 2. ERP for Fire/ • Explosion • INVESTIGATION • PROCEDURE • Preparation • Report and • Recommendation • 3. Analysis • 4. Data Collection • EMERGENCY • RESPONSE • AWARENESS • Training • Simulation • Hazard Control

31. EMERGENCY SITUATION • Definition An unexpected or undesired extraordinary event that might endanger human being, environment and the company business. Type of Emergencies Type of Emergencies Major Emergency Minor Emergency

32. EMERGENCY SITUATION Emergencies situation based on type of accident Gas leakage Emergency Gas Leakage Emergency is an emergency that threatens human safety and or property. Fire or explosion Emergency Fire or Explosion Emergency is a fire explosion incident that threatens the personnel safety and/or results in the loss of properties

33. EMERGENCY SITUATION • Infrastructure Emergency Control Centre (ECC) Equipment • Coordination and responsibility • Information Receiving and Follow Up • Communication for Emergency • Control Centre • Maintaining Liaison • Public Education • Hospitals • ECC • Accident Investigation

34. EMERGENCY SITUATION • INFRASTRUCTURE Emergency Control Centre (ECC) A place in company, usually in the control room, where reports and commands are centred to take control

35. Authority that should be appointed to control operation: EMERGENCY SITUATION • INFRASTRUCTURE • Coordination and Responsibility Responsibilities of the highest authorities: • Appointing official of related function to handle such accident and/or supervise operations on site. • Ensuring that all necessary action is taken without neglecting the safety of life and property. • Ensuring that appropriate resource are available and adequate to deal with the accident. • Ensuring that communication is maintained properly between the area office and emergency scene, including the completion of the accident report as soon as possible. Fire Chief Fire Marshall on Site Support Controller Head Office

36. EMERGENCY SITUATION • INFRASTRUCTURE Information Receiving and Follow Up • Information • Name, address number of reporter • Time and date • Reported location • Action taken • Receiver • Give immediate response • Report to the Fire Chief Communication for Emergency Control Centre • Equipment in ECC : • Telephone • Facsimile machine. • Radio call signs and pager numbers for operational staff.

37. EMERGENCY SITUATION • INFRASTRUCTURE Maintaining Liaison Each SBU/District office must establish and maintain liaison with Fire Department, Police, and other public service officials Public Education Each SBU/District must establish an education program for customers, the public, appropriate government organization etc about the manner they are expected to respond to a gas pipeline emergency situation. Hospitals Each SBU/District must prepare a list of hospitals or other medical facilities in its area

38. EMERGENCY SITUATION • INFRASTRUCTURE Equipment In ECC • A whiteboard; • A telephone or cellular; • Communication radios; • A computer and e-mail account; • Printer; • A camera and Handy cam Digital; • Facsimile; • Megaphones; • Gas proof flash lights; • Tables and chairs • Fire Extinguisher. • A wall clock; • A calendar; • Complete network maps • A Tape recorder; • First aid boxes; • An Overhead Projector; • A typewriter; • A filling cabinet; • Administration facilities; • A waste basket; • ECC Mobile.

39. EMERGENCY SITUATION • INFRASTRUCTURE In Accident Investigation • Phone list • Area and city maps • Note book • Measuring tape • Tape recorder and cassette • Report form • Investigation checklist • Gas Detector • Tool kit • Preliminary witness form • Clip board with plastic cover • Pencils and pens • Compass • Camera and its apparatus • Label • Sealable plastic bags • Small bottles, boxes • Perimeter marking tape • Danger and caution tag • Company work order • List of expert for assistance • Magnifying glass

40. EMERGENCY SITUATION

41. EMERGENCY SITUATION • ORGANIZATION Objective • Give guidelines to personnel involved in the Emergency Organization about their functions and duties. • Give guidelines to every authority in the Emergency Organization about his responsibilities and authorities. • Give guidelines to the personnel involved in the Emergency Organization about the positions or locations where they should gather upon receipt emergency news or information.

42. EMERGENCY SITUATION • ORGANIZATION Procedure Emergency situation Emergency pickets some of the team members identify the incident report ECC If major emergency Emergency Organization Related centres Emergency Response Procedure

43. EMERGENCY SITUATION • ORGANIZATION Organization of Emergency

44. EMERGENCY SITUATION Identification of hazard Identification Classification variety of Hazard Leakage outside Structure Fire and Explosion Escaped Gas inside Structure High Pressure Load Shedding Emergencies and Pressure Reduction

45. EMERGENCY SITUATION • IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD Identification Dangerous situation or not? Incident Requires immediate action or not? Emergency procedures including the plan to control emergency situations and the action to be taken by the employee

46. EMERGENCY SITUATION • IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD Classification Class I Emergency An interruption or decrease in gas supply at one or more off-take stations, resulting in a serious reduction of the availability of gas to be supplied at one or more sectors. Class II Emergency A failure of the high-pressure system or any incident requiring an immediate interruption of a sector of the system, which may have a serious effect on gas supplies in the area Class III Emergency Major emergencies associated with the low pressure system caused by loss of gas supplies affecting a number of customers

47. EMERGENCY SITUATION • Repair: • Repairing affected facilities • Not to damage other facilities. • Make temporary or permanent repair ACTION Repair & Restore • Restore: • Restore any service outage • Check service leakage • Carry out a final site check . • Perform the inspection in person. Action Evacuation • Turn off the main electrical switch • Evacuated Structure which could be effected by an explosion. • ECC must be informed • Made an arrangements for the welfare of evacuees. • Traffic and pedestrians must be kept well clear of the site. • Evacuated property must not be reoccupied until safe.

48. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE

49. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE ERP for Gas Leakage To effectively control a gas leakage so that it can be immediately localized or controlled, so that the lost of life, property and serious damages can be minimized.

50. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE Major Gas Leakage Emergency