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Comments by John Hassler IIES, Stockholm University

Comments by John Hassler IIES, Stockholm University. Visby. Sailing to Gotland. Västervik. Fårö. Sailing to Gotland. ?. Västervik. Prudent Navigation. Fårö. Västervik. Prudent budget planning. Does this apply to government budget planning?

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Comments by John Hassler IIES, Stockholm University

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  1. Comments byJohn HasslerIIES, Stockholm University

  2. Visby Sailing to Gotland Västervik

  3. Fårö Sailing to Gotland ? Västervik

  4. Prudent Navigation Fårö Västervik

  5. Prudent budget planning • Does this apply to government budget planning? • Most likely does uncertainty increase expected marginal cost of taxation. • Concerns about future uncertainty should be; • Larger the higher expected future taxes are. • Lower the better the financial position of the government is. • Leads to recommendation of more positive expected surplus than otherwise and a build up of government financial assets. Very similar to the case of an individual who accumulates a buffer stock of savings. • BUT; • This has nothing to do with ”deliberate underestimation of income”, ”exaggeration of costs” and ”pessimism”. • Perfectly in line with Barro’s smoothing of tax distortions, marginal cost of taxation today set equal to expected future marginal costs of taxation.

  6. Prudent budget planning - Costs of government buffers • Theoretical argument for debt; debt is good since it can be used by households to build buffer stocks against idiosyncratic shocks. • Probably not relevant for small open economy where individuals have acces to world capital markets. • Surplus/deficits is one way to transfer taxation and spending over time. Considering long periods also between generations. • How much – how costly is it? • Requires elaborate model and value judgments to answer. • Here, some back-of-the-envelope calculations on the size of buffer stocks and intergenerational transfers.

  7. Simple numerical example • First two things to note: • A reduction in surplus leads to less government assets in future requiring increasing taxes or falling spending, • Government assets as a share of GPD will not explode if surplus is positive for ever. Long run expected debt is: • Intuition -- need a surplus to compensate for erosion by inflation and to keep up with growing GDP. • Suppose also that expected inflation and growth both are 2% and the real bond yields is 1%. • Compare 0,1 and 2% targeted financial surplus.

  8. 2% surplus 1% surplus Net government assets Share of GDP 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 Buffer stock slowly approaches 50% of GDP if financial surplus is 2%. Half of adjustment in about 25 years. 0.1 0 surplus 0 20 40 60 80 100 Years from now

  9. 2% surplus 1% surplus 0 surplus Taxes with constant surplus 0.50 0.49 0.48 Initial difference in taxes/spendings of 2% erodes over time to 0.5%. 0.47 0.46 0.45 0 20 40 60 80 100 x Years from now

  10. Intergenerational transfers • A 2% surplus leads to asset build-up and thus an expected transfer to future generations. How much? • A simplistic example: • Suppose one generation is 30 years. • Suppose the benefits of tax reduction would go to current old generation, paid by future ones. • Over 30 years 2% surplus leads to a build up of assets  30% of GDP relative to case of zero surplus. • This is about 1% of GDP during this period.

  11. Conclusion • 2% surplus rather than 0 leads to net govt. assets of 50% of GDP. • Awaiting more serious quantitative work, this dos not seem unreasonable from a prudent point of view. • Rational prudence better than over-pessimism (more transparency and accountability) • A little more than half is generated in one generation leading to a fairly small intergenerational transfer. • Have not discussed: • Political failures – is the money going to burn in the pockets of the politicians? • Other reasons for larger intergenerational transfers. • Portfolio choice, risk management, state dependent taxes.

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