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MH-6: Toward Total War- 1863

MH-6: Toward Total War- 1863

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MH-6: Toward Total War- 1863

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  1. MH-6: Toward Total War- 1863

  2. The Civil War (1863) - Toward Total War:Strategic Overview • By 1863: Both sides move toward Total War: • Both field huge Armies of volunteers & conscripts; • Both mobilize their economies & entire populations; • Gradually above $$$ & population seen as legit targets • North: destroys South’s agro, factories, rail, mills; • Anything viewed as potential support for war • NTL – One single Battle cannot end the war • No “Napoleon Austerlitz” is possible • Nothing in Europe approached US Civil War to date • Not even Frederick the Great’s or Napoleon’s Battles

  3. Strategic Overview-2 • 1863: Both sides passed Europe in Total War scale: • Total resources of North vs. Total resources of South • In long runthen – who was most likely to win & why? • Caveat: Total War requires total commitment • For North: political willto stay the course: • Also dependent on perceived progress toward that goal • (It still does!) • At 1863’s start - Rebel victory seemed still possible • South’s battle wins: (Fredericksburg, Holly Springs): • Battle victories encouraged South & depressed North

  4. Strategic Overview-3 • But by July 1863 to end of war- • A turning point finallyemerged • Decisive victories in 1 major battle & 2 key campaigns: • 1. Gettysburg • 2. Vicksburg • 3. Chattanooga • Tactical victories would have major strategic impact • (for now at start of 1863 – still in the future) • NTL both sides sought to win the decisive battle: • Both pursue the elusive dream of Napoleon’s Austerlitz

  5. Battle Map Overview- 1863:

  6. Austerlitz Chimera* • Term’s meaning & historical background: • *Greek mythology (fire breathing lion headed sheep) • Modern term: *unattainable dreamorillusive myth • Napoleon’s tactical battle victory • Battle of Austerlitz-1805 with decisivestrategic result • Tactical victory destroys 3rd Coalition (strategic) • Illusive dream of generals throughout Military History • Factors against decisive Civil War battlefield victory: • Weapons Technology that favored defense • Terrain limiting effective employment of cavalry • Leadership make-up shaped amateur tactics & strategy • Main reason: very rare opportunities & huge size of Armies

  7. Chancellorsville - Phase I • Hooker vs. Lee (& Jackson) • Cmdrs’ Strength & weakness: • Hooker:good organizer & planner- restored Union morale • But also ambitious & overconfident - until chaos of battle… • Lee (& Jackson): no change • Force dispositions (Map): • Hooker:120K • Lee: 60K Force Dispositions

  8. Chancellorsville - Phase I Strategy & Tactics • Hooker’sObjectives & Tactical Concept: • BG Meigadvocates tactical concept: • Conduct bold, rapid turn of Rebel Left Flank: • Tactical aim: crush Lee between 2 halves • Anvil & hammer battle strategy • Hookerembraced Meig’s tactical concept • Believes it has potential strategic impact • Operational & Strategic Objectives: • Destroy Lee’s Army • Force South’s surrender in the East

  9. Chancellorsville - Phase ITactical Battle Plan • Plans & preparation (Battle Map Plan): • Hookertakes ½ of Force & turns Lee’s LF • Sedgwick crosses Rappahannock to fix Lee’s front: • Attack Lee’s center & take Fredericksburg • Hooker then sends Unioncavalry to raid Lee’s LOC to Richmond • (That would turn out to be a big mistake)

  10. Chancellorsville - Phase ITactical Deployment • Hooker’s Deployment: • 1st stage: Sedgwick crosses Rappahannock • Tactical Aim: fix Lee’s attention at Fredericksburg • Rebel scouts report move to Lee • Hooker moves 25 miles NW to Kelley’s Ford • Stuart reports Hooker’s move over Rapidan • Union cavalry conduct lackluster raid-Lee’s LOC • Hookerremains ignorant of Lee’s movements-why? • Calvary off conducting?__________ • Hooker halts advance & forms defensive line in Wilderness

  11. Chancellorsville - Phase IExecution & Tactical Results • Tactical opportunity unfolds: • JEB Stuart reports Union’s RF as: “?__________” • Lee decides to seize opportunity presented • Tactical Results: • Hooker surrenders tactical initiative to Lee • Lee plans with Jackson to exploit it

  12. Chancellorsville - Phase IIStrategy & Tactics • Lee’s Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives: • Tactical: HitHooker’sRF & roll up Union line; • Operational: Destroy Army of the Potomac; • Strategic: Open Washington to potential future attack; • Political: Push Union toward negotiated settlement; • Just the reverse of Hooker’s Objectives

  13. Chancellorsville - Phase IIBattle Execution Plan • Plans & preparation: • Jackson (w/28K) marches across Union front undetected • Lee(w/14K) demonstrates to fix Union center: • Convince Hooker of Lee’s intent: frontal assault • Reinforce Hooker’s desire to surprise Lee • Early (w/10K) to hold heights of Fredericksburg • (Against half of Union’s Army of Potomac)

  14. Chancellorsville - Phase II Battle Execution • Jackson is late but totally surprises Union RF underHoward’scommand • Roll up and through Union RF • Jackson & Lee continue to press Union as darkness falls • Jackson conducts eve Recon & is hit by NC ?_______ fire: • Mistook, along with A.P. Hill, for Union cavalry & is ambushed & wounded seriously • Stuart takes Jackson’s corps- but unclear of Jackson’s plan

  15. Chancellorsville - Phase II Battle Execution-2 • Meanwhile, Sedgwick rolls over Early • Poses serious threat to Lee’s rear • Lee counterattacks & forces Sedgwickto retreat • Hooker remains inert (“2000 yard stare”) • Hooker then goes immediately on defensive: • Surrenders Hazel Grove high ground to Lee’s arty • Commands Chancellorsville & surrounding area • Hooker is wounded (shell shocked) & decides to withdraw • Over strong objections of his corps commanders • Lee intent on Hooker’s destruction • Unable to prevent Hooker’s escape • Demonstrates risks he is willing to take • Frontal assaultsagainst fortified position- Again!

  16. Chancellorsville - Phase IITactical, Operational, & Strategic Results • Lee held Battlefield – (tactical victory), but: • Glory very costly – 13K casualties (20%) • Union casualties: 17K (out of 120K): • Higher casualties less a problem for Union – why? • Attrition rate ?______________________________ • Lee failed to destroy Hooker’s Army • (His Operational Aim) • Strategic situation in Virginia remains unchanged • Austerlitz Chimera remains just that: an illusive dream

  17. Vicksburg Campaign • Background & Overview (Map): • Overland campaign (Nov-Dec 1862) failed • Holly Springs (Van Dorn cut Grant’s LOC) • Several dozen miles of RR LOC torn up by Bedford Forrest • Chickasaw Bluffs (Sherman roughly repulsed) • Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses • Grant:Gritty, determined, good solid leader • Pemberton: mediocre, naïve, & indecisive • Force dispositions: • Union: 44K => 70K (later reinforcements by Hallack) • Confederate: 31K

  18. Vicksburg Campaign II – Strategy & Tactics • Union Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives: • Sever South’s East-West communication; • Open Mississippi to Union control & commerce; • Capture & eliminate Vicksburg command • Plans & preparation: • Various schemes tried & thwarted (Jan-Apr ’63); • Grant later called them: “make-work” efforts #2-5 (Map)*

  19. Vicksburg Campaign II • Grant conducted various failed schemes (Jan-Apr 1863): • 1. Overland campaign • Nov-Dec 1862 • Grant’s LOC cut byVan Dorn at Holly Springs • Sherman repulsed at Chickasaw Bluffs… then Grant tries: • 2. Lake Providence • 3. Canal Bypass • 4. Steele’s Bayou expedition • 5. Yazoo Pass expedition • 6.Grant finally embarks on serious offensive- April-May, 1863

  20. Vicksburg Campaign II- Final Deployment • Operational & tactical Deployment: • As Grantmarches overland on West bank of Mississippi • Porter steams through Vicksburg’s defense on midnight run • Then ferries Grant’s forces across lower part of Mississippito east side of river

  21. Vicksburg- Final Campaign Engagements & Battle Execution • Grant stages out of Bruinsburg 30 April 1863 • Cuts off Port Hudson to south • Grant marches on Jackson(to hit rail & supplies); • Reaches Jackson, MSw/3 corps after 2 small battles: • Attacks Jackson and forces Johnston’s Army North: • Burns Jackson munitions factory, then turns west • Defeats Pemberton units on march to Vicksburg: • Series of engagements prior to reaching outskirts • Champion Hill & Big Black River are the 2 biggest

  22. Vicksburg Campaign II- Siege & Capture • First elements of Grant’s army move into position on 18 May 1863 • 19 May: Conducts initial attacks on Vicksburg defenses • Strongly repulsed twice • Begins siege & waits for Pemberton’s surrender • In the meantime he gathers reinforcements (to 70K) & re-supplies transported by Navy • After 47 Days, Pemberton surrenders on 4 July 1863

  23. Vicksburg Campaign II- results • Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results: • TacticalUnionvictorywith major Strategic impact • Grant captures: 31K troops,172 guns, 60K rifles • South can not afford to replace this operational loss • Strategic impact: • South’s operational loss impacts overall troop levels • Grant reopens Mississippi for Union commerce • Severed Arkansas, Texas, LA from Confederacy

  24. Gettysburg Campaign-prelude • Background & Overview • Eastern Theater situation: • Crisis facing South • Vicksburg stillunder siege • Various strategies considered • Lee persuades all to invade North • Meade vs. Lee: • Both solid professionals • Lee will have serious lapse in judgment during campaign • Force dispositions • Hooker (replaced by Meade): 115K • Lee: 76K • Rebel Deployment: • From Chancellorsville to southern Pennsylvania (Map): • Via west side of Shenandoah • Leeassumed Hookerwould shadow

  25. Gettysburg Campaign-Strategy & Tactics • Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives: • South: force Hooker to follow & relieve pressure on Richmond • Tactical victory in North would: • Threaten key Northern cities • Press North for peace settlement • Gain diplomatic recognition from Britain • North: react to and engage Lee’s forces • Destroy Lee’s army and protect Washington & Baltimore • Plans & preparation: • Originally Lee agreed to Longstreet’s strategy: • Strategic Offensive & Tactical Defense (or so he thought) • Reality of the situation drove the tactics: • Meeting engagement for both sides & unplanned for

  26. Gettysburg Campaign-Invasion of North • By early June Lee deploys north • Sends 3 corps North to PA (Map) • Spreads out over southern PA • Stuart goes off on his own • Surprised by Calvary at Brandy Station • Attempts replay of his famous ride • Lee remains ignorant of Hooker’s close proximity- why? • He asks:“Where is General Stuart? • Lee learns of Hooker’sproximity from Longstreet’s “scout” (spy) Harrison- what does Lee do? • Orders his widely separated Army to concentrate at Gettysburg • Meanwhile Lincoln replaces Hookerwith Meade

  27. Gettysburg-Execution: 1 July 1863 • A “meeting” engagement • Accidental contact soon escalates into major engagement • Union’s BG Buford’s Calvaryholds ground until Reynolds’ 1st Corpsarrives just in time • Enter 2 heavy corps tooverwhelm Union line by late pm 1 July • Union corps forced to retreat through streets of Gettysburg to Cemetery Ridge • Lee makes two fateful decisions: • 1. Fight general engagement & • 2. Fail to insist that LTG Ewell take Cemetery Ridge

  28. Gettysburg-Execution: 2 July 1863 • Day 2: Rebel assault begins at 1630 on Union left • Longstreet’s 1st corps with 2 divisions attack en echelon on Union far left as ordered • Battle is extremely intense to the south at Little Round Top • Col Chamberlain’s 20th Maine barely holds Union’s far left • Then flanks the Rebel RF which culminates in a bayonet charge • On Union right Ewellis: • Ordered to conduct demonstration • Late but almost breaks Union RF • Seized Union arty batteries • Lee convinced victory near & plans to try it again tomorrow

  29. Gettysburg-Execution: 3 July 1863 • Day 3: Lee now determined to prevail at all costs • Plans a repeat of Day 2 (attack both of Meade’s flanks) • But Union arty hit Culp’s Hill first • So Lee decides on a frontal assaulton Meade’s center right (Hancock’s II) • Longstreet is ordered to command the assault of 3 mixed divisions • Pickett’s Charge • Pickett, Pettigrew, & 13K men march almost a mile on line to their objective of a small copse of trees • Union II corps wait there entrenched with rifled muskets & arty cannister • Unmitigated disaster soon follows

  30. Aftermath • Lee reforms his line & waits for Meade to counter-attack • After a day Lee withdraws his forces under cover of heavy rains • His escape made possible in part to Meade’s caution in following at a distance (Calvary) • Unlike the Battle, Lee’s retreat well planned & executed

  31. Gettysburg- Results • Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results: • Major defeat for Lee- who almost lost his entire Army • 20K veteran casualties not replaceable • 15 generals & numerous regimental & field commanders lost • To include: Hood & Barksdale & ALL of Pickett's Brigade Cmdrs • Union tactical victory with great strategic impact • Costly victory (MG Reynolds KIA, Hancock & Sickles WIA) • Strategic: Southejected from North, never to return • Major post-battle questions: • Was major opportunity to destroy Lee’s army missed? • Would Lee’s destruction have ended war?

  32. Chattanooga Campaign-Prelude • Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses: • Bragg: Good tactician but seemly unable to follow through • Also not in full command of subordinates • (Who all like confidence in their Commander) • Rosecrans: cautious & plodding • Tends toward overconfidence when committed • Uneven in temperament in a crisis • Force dispositions: • Bragg : 66K => reinforced: splits into two wings • Rosecrans: 56K

  33. Chattanooga CampaignDeployment Overview

  34. Chattanooga Campaign-Battle of Chickamauga • Rosecrans is convinced Bragg is retreating • Aggressively pursues • Splits forces into columns & deploys over Georgia’s mountainous terrain • Bragg seizes opportunity & attacks 1 Union corps • Feds wage good defense • Rosecrans plugs holes • Then fateful error=>

  35. “Rock of Chickamauga” • Major tactical defeat for Union • Entire right wing of Rosecrans’ line crumbles in disarray • Rosecrans flees the field all the way back to Chattanooga • MG Thomas rallies Left Wing of Union forces and holds on Snodgrass Hill(“Rock of Chickamauga”) • Then makes orderly withdrawal back to Chattanooga lines • Bragg begins siege of Chattanooga • Pinches off Union supply LOC • Rosecran’s army being starved into crisis • But Bragg is roundly criticized for not exploiting his victory • Lincoln turns to Grant-assigned command of all of West • Visits Chattanooga, takes charge, restores “cracker line” • Relieves Rosecrans & replaces with him with Thomas • Reinforces Grant with two corps from Meade • Deploy 1200 miles by rail • Grant organizes forces to break out of Bragg’s siege • Relies on his faithful subordinate Sherman

  36. Chattanooga Campaign-Force Disposition prior to Grant’s Breakout

  37. Battle of Missionary Ridge • Grant’s arrival imbue new spirit in Union forces at Chattanooga • By late Fall ready to attack • 24-25 Nov conduct series of assaults aimed at break out • MG Thomas ordered to attack center & hold at bottom of Missionary Ridge • But his troops still smarting over defeat at Chickamauga

  38. Battle of Missionary Ridge • Thomas’ limited attack turns into full frontal assault at Bragg’s center • Union troops fight their way up ridge • Bragg’s forces flee in disarray

  39. Battle of Missionary Ridge-results • Reason for successful Union attack: • Poor Rebel disposition on ridge • Situated on top of geographic crest vice military crest (?)* • Rebel line of fire blocked (how?) while Union troops used terrain • Rocky terrain and crevices provided ?__________ • Too few Rebels placed at foot of ridge to stop assault • Forced defenders at top to hold fire as friendly troops retreated • Also Bragg failed to pursue Rosecrans after Chickamauga • Mismanaged siege of Chattanooga & allowed Grant to restore situation to Union’s favor • Union tactical victory with strategic impact • Grant secured permanent Union hold on gateway to South • South’s heartland now open to Union attack

  40. Assessment • By 1863 - South’s Battle Losses totaled 66K veterans • South tactical losses translated into key strategic defeat • Losses the South can not replace! • Loss of motivated, combat hardened veterans • Manpower stretched beyond South’s capacity • North: Time was on the Union’s side • Plenty of reserves available - to include willing African Americans • Economic & industrial power finally fully mobilized • Generals get better: Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, Reynolds, Buford • South’s defeat at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, & Chattanooga: • Marked major strategic turning point of the war • Generated crisis of confidence throughout South (historical debate): • Most say eventual defeat as inevitable • Nobody wanted to be the last to die for lost cause • Result: desertions escalated • It would soon get much worse as Grant took overall Command • Sherman’s march of Total War to the Sea

  41. Back-up Slides

  42. Two American Societies at War • Define Total War • Simply stated: everything is considered a target! • North’s Grand Strategy by mid-1863? • South’s war economy targeted • Population demoralization- civilian property hit • Mobilization & variousapproaches to achieving: • Conscription & its mixed success • Political costs high- • South: “Rich man’s war and poor man’s fight” • Results: Draft evasion, riots, unfair burden • Future Lessons Learned (L/L) for WWI

  43. War Economy mobilization • South: less effective: • Highly centralized economic control: • Government runs almost everything (Very inefficient) • Tax revenue only 5% of that required (1/2 of 1% tax) • Barrow & print $$$ => 9000% inflation & high debt • North: more effective: • Decentralized economic control: • Private enterprise runs most everything (some corrupt) • Government manages & encourage BZ’s cooperation; • Tax revenue provides 21% of that required • SECTREAS Chase effective manager of North’s $$; • Lincoln promoted Bz cooperation w/Gov. (or else- rail)

  44. Western Theater • Meanwhile – other operations initially conducted in the West had little significant strategic impact on the war • Grant’sfirst overland campaign to capture Vicksburg had to be abandoned when his LOCs are attacked by Van Dorn at Holly Springs & Bedford Forrest to the NE • Leaving Sherman unsupported & ultimately repulsed at Chickasaw Bluffs • Bragg’s raids into Kentucky & Tennessee end with limited tactical success & little strategic relevance • Culminating in little more than a tactical draw against Rosecransat the Battle ofStones River (Murfreesboro)

  45. Grant’s Overland Campaign to Vicksburg • Long LOC (via rail) vulnerable to cavalry raids • Van Dorn’s attack atHolly Springs • Bedford Forrest to NE • Grantforced to abandon campaign when LOC cut off • Subsists off land => key Lessons Learned (LL) • Shermanleft unsupported at Chickasaw Bluffs: • Soundly repulsed by Vicksburg’s defenders • It’s back to “drawing board”

  46. Battle of Stones River (Murfreesboro) • Execution: 31 Dec 1862 • Bragg anticipates Rosecrans • Attacks Union’s right flank at dawn exploiting tactical surprise • Surprised Union troops on right collapsed into closed “jackknife” like defensive stance • 2 Jan 1863: Bragg then attacks Union left across Stones River • Union holds & its arty decimates Rebel attack • Bragg forced to withdraw 30 miles SE to Tullahoma

  47. Assessment:Stalemate & Contributing Factors • Geography: • Virginia: numerous rivers & creeks (spring rains) • Difficult to maneuver & deploy forces rapidly (time) • Western Theater: greater distances: • Stretch out Lines of Communication & supply; • Overland LOCs (rr) especially vulnerable to attack: • Grant’s Overland Campaign to Vicksburg • Example: Van Dorn at Holly Springs & Bedford Forrest to NE • Different fighting capacities & trade-offs: • North: Mpw, Logistic/supply, $$$ & industrial power • South: Well led & motivated troops, aggressive tactics

  48. Assessment –Toward Total War • Contrasting perspectives: • Federal view: South’s determined resistance surprising • McClellan’s theory: small Southern elite were main culprits • Grant: Surprise assault at Shilohproved otherwise: • Especially after Union victories at Forts Henry & Donelson • Peninsula Campaign convinced the rest of North – long war • Total War now appeared unavoidable • Grand Strategy required major revision for Total War: • Southern society must now be changed by force; • North must overthrow South’s entire way of life; • Total War requires new & harsher tactics: • Seize & destroy property, crops, & all material support; • Destroy industry & towns & RR, & treat civilians as enemy